Thai Guru's Gold und Silber ... (Informationen und Vermutungen)

Den Markt kann keiner genau einschaetzen oder timen da er manipuliert ist wie die anderen.

Heute wurde auch Oil als Waffe benutzt gegen die Goldbugs.

Ja, was ist da los ???? .... und schon verlieren die ersten den Glauben.

Da gehts nach Gefuehl und das muss erstmal gelernt sein wann die Zeit gekommen ist zu rennen, halten oder zu kaufen.

Oben drauf die Paniker, die glauben sie blicken ueberall durch und wissen wo es nun lang geht.

Experten, Analysten, Reporter,CNBC, oben drauf, ..that's it !

Ich bin bestimmt keiner und mache meine eigene Erfahrungen anstatt.....

Was hat das mit schwachen händen zu tun?

Gold ist ein wertloser Plunder den wirklich kein mensch braucht !

und da nun die inflation ihrem ende entgegen geht, hat auch gold keine hausse-berechtigung mehr.

Zitat

Original von Screener
Was hat das mit schwachen händen zu tun?

Gold ist ein wertloser Plunder den wirklich kein mensch braucht !

und da nun die inflation ihrem ende entgegen geht, hat auch gold keine hausse-berechtigung mehr.

Willst du uns Goldbugs etwa beleidigen ?

Falls das Spray nicht helfen sollte....

Uuuh, da gibt es noch was !

Gut da gibt es andere neue Themen ,der thread is .....
An solchen Tagen brauche ich das nicht, ich weiss nicht was ihr darueber denkt ?

""Was willst Du uns sagen ""

RUN RABBIT RUN !!!

Schmeisst Euren Plunder (Gold) hin damit ihr schneller laufen koennt.

........Denn Screener ist jetzt da !

@Edel, vielleicht ist das nun zweimal,ich hoffe das letzte mal:

So einfach in den Raum werfen ?, da fehlt die Begruendung.

Auch Bilder sprechen Baende, oder nicht ?

http://www.321gold.com/editorials/willie/willie102005.html

THE REAL MOTIVE

When the hurricanes hit, it became clear to the world that the United States had no resolve in financial matters. Why should we, when as world currency holders and benefactors, we can print money with abandon and coerce the world to supply the capital necessary to pay our bills? Before the French finance minister, Chairman Greenspan admitted our broken budget process long ago out of control. He was embarrassed to be quoted. My personal take is that Greenspan, soon to exit his post, is eager to lay blame on the US Congress, in order to deflect attention away from his serial bubble engineering modus operandi and track record. He supplied the quote, enjoyed its broadcast, and left it up to the Dept of Treasury to issue lame denials in a scramble

to control damage. He thumbed his noses at Treasury.

The real reason for newfound awareness of price inflationary threats is to provide political cover for a series of continued measured rate hikes by the USFed. The real reason for the sequence of upcoming painful rate hikes is to keep foreigners motivated to support the USTBond sales by the USGovt.

The USFed wants to prevent a run on the USDollar. They also want to prop up the Treasury yield curve, so that the long end can also rise as they push up the short end.

No way. The USFed wants to manage the USDollar, which when the rate hikes stop, is in very big danger of a massive worldwide selloff. No way. The USFed wants to support the yield curve, which already is making lives for bankers very difficult.

We must soon resort to more distortion of the US GDP, which is in all likelihood going to be negative but reported positive. Yes, a recession in real terms will be endorsed as growth.

Ich schalte nun ab, der Tag ist gelaufen.

GNIGHT

An solchen Tagen wie heute koennte ich am besten abfliegen, ausser ghostbusting kann ich eh nichts machen.

Am 7 Dezember steig in eines rein, Goldbugs.

Cambodia and Thailand , soon I come.

Nach dem killing field X(.. ins naechste.

Go- Go, ..so eines waere mir Recht... :))

Das ist nun zu häufig hier,sollten garnicht mehr darauf eingehen.

Nun,bis zum Abflug sieht hier vieles anders aus.
Besser,denk ich mal..... the show is not over !

GNIGHT 2

In Alan Greenspan We Trust

By Martin Wolf

20 Oct 2005 at 10:08 AM EDT

JOHANNESBURG (Business Day) -- Alan Greenspan is the pre-eminent central banker of our era. During his 18 years as chairman of the Federal Reserve, the U.S. has enjoyed low and stable inflation and suffered only two shallow recessions. It has done this despite a stock market crash in 1987, a big downturn in commercial property in the late 1980s, a series of international financial crises in the 1990s, a three-year bear market after 2000, several wars and a terrorist attack on the U.S.

It is little wonder that Greenspan has become an almost legendary figure. Yet how good has his performance been and what lessons does his tenure bequeath?

One reason for questioning the uniqueness of Greenspan’s capacities is that he succeeded a giant. As Greenspan himself said (in a speech delivered on the 25th anniversary of the decision): “The policy change initiated under the leadership of chairman Paul Volcker on that Saturday morning (October 6, 1979) rescued our nation’s economy from a dangerous path of ever-escalating inflation and instability.” Volcker had to crush inflation. Greenspan merely had to keep the show on the road.

Yet another reason for questioning the unique sagacity of the chairman is that low inflation has broken out all over the world. The monetarist counter-revolution, the pain caused by the inflationary excesses of the 1970s, globalisation and the weakening of trade union power have improved the medium-term trade-off between inflation and output, everywhere. So, too, have improved institutions, particularly the widespread move to central bank operational independence and inflation targeting.

By current standards, the Fed is almost antediluvian. Surprisingly for a man once known as a gold bug and disciple of Ayn Rand’s libertarian philosophy, Greenspan has emerged as the policy maker closest in spirit to John Maynard Keynes. This is not because he believes in the naive Keynesian economics of the 1950s and 1960s. But Keynes would not have done so either. What Greenspan shares with the father of macroeconomics is his trust in his own judgment, in discretionary policy making and in the wisdom of managing the long run by treating it as a series of short runs.

What, then, is Greenspan’s approach to monetary policy? First, as he himself put it in his closing remarks at this year’s Jackson Hole symposium, the goal is: “Maximum sustainable economic growth … with price stability pursued as a necessary condition to promote that goal.” The emphasis on maximum growth, combined with Greenspan’s willingness to discover the economy’s speed limit by trial and error, has been a salient (and successful) characteristic of his era.

Second, Greenspan rejects monetary targeting because the relationship between money and spending broke down in the 1980s and early 1990s. As he told the Jackson Hole symposium in 2003: “When significant and shifting uncertainties exist in the macroeconomic environment, (rules) cannot substitute for risk-management paradigms.” Keynes would surely have approved of this pragmatic eclecticism.

Third, Greenspan regards explicit inflation targets as a straitjacket. In 2003, he has noted, the Fed acted to forestall the risk of deflation, albeit small, at the price of increasing the risk of a temporary overshoot in inflation. Thus, “the product of a low probability event and a potentially severe outcome was judged a more serious threat to economic performance than the higher inflation that might ensue in the more probable scenario”.

Yet, fourth, Greenspan has rejected the idea that “risk management” should include trying to prick asset price bubbles. He argues that it is impossible to know whether a bubble is occurring. The right solution, he believes, is a flexible economy and a central bank responsive to falling asset prices. Greenspan believes the U.S. has the former, while he has been hyperactive in response to the latter.

The U.S., one may argue, needs such a policy maker. It is too important for its central bank to target inflation mechanistically or ignore wider consequences of its policies. I have sympathy with this assessment. Yet valid concerns exist. Bank of England governor Mervyn King has one. The U.K.’s framework of monetary policy, with its explicit inflation targets, does the Bank’s work for it, he has argued, by conditioning market expectations. The superiority of explicit targets is shown in the lower volatility in forward interest rates in the U.K. than in the U.S.

A second concern is that the combination of the Fed’s discretion and Greenspan’s domination has made it a one-man band. The transition to a new chairman will create far more uncertainty than is desirable or necessary.

There is a third worry: how can the Fed take a “risk management” approach to central banking while ignoring what has so often proved the biggest risk of all - a massive asset price bubble?

This, then, raises the final concern, namely, that Greenspan’s asymmetrical approach to asset prices - indifference when prices soar and aggressive loosening when they tumble — has encouraged investors to take excessive risks. At the least, critics would continue, a sober central banker should have warned investors of these risks, rather than act as a cheerleader for U.S. productivity.

These concerns are valid. But I personally draw three lessons from the Greenspan era. The first is that it is hard to decide how the most important of all central banks should operate because we do not have a clear enough understanding of the underlying economics, particularly of asset prices.

The second is that giving so much discretion to an institution dominated by one person is risky. Predictability demands clearer objectives. The U.S. should have a central bank with a more modern mandate and a more collegial approach.

The last, however, is that the world has been lucky to have had Greenspan.

Let us hope his successors are equally successful in managing the challenges he has left behind.

sehe gerade, der Screamer wuselt hier immer noch rum -
hat wohl kein Zuhause

GMY

p.s. Wünsche eine Gute Nacht