Beiträge von Ulfur

    Gestern hat Quadra bei Inca den Stecker rausgezogen, durch Rücktritt vom Magistralprojekt. . Begründung, Magistral passe nicht zu den Investitionskriterien von Quadra. Allerdings hat man das ja vor 9 Monaten noch anders gesehen.


    Warnzeichen konnte die unterbliebene Bekanntmachung der Scoping Studie sein, die auch nicht überarbeitet veröffentlicht wurde.


    Quadra hat neben den Akquisitionskosten von grob 2,75 Mio USD noch fast 4 Mio USD in die Exploration gesteckt, das ernsthafte Interesse von Quadra war also vorhanden. Kürzlich hat Quadra in den USA noch eine weitere Kupfergrube mit sehr geringen Graden (ich glaube gar nur 0,39% Ku ) gekauft, Quadra´s Minen/Projekte haben alle recht hohe Cash Cost. Es muß somit arge Bedenken gegeben haben.


    Inca will nun einen neuen Partner suchen, das dürfte aber sehr schwer werden. Immerhin ist die finanzielle Situation wegen der Akquisitionseinnahmen recht gesund, rd. 1,7 Mio CAD Cash und Wertpapiere.


    Kurs brach gestern bis zu 46% ein und schloß dann 26% niedriger. Marktkapitalisierung nur noch 5,05 Mio CAD, von denen immerhin ca. 1,6 Mio durch Cash/Wertpapiere ( abzüglich Schulden ) gedeckt sind. Die restlichen 3,45 Mio CAD sind durch 570.000 t Kupfer und 40.000t Molybdän gedeckt, die allerdings womöglich nicht ökonomisch abbaubar sind. Frage, wie Quadra seine 1 Mio Incaaktien abstößt.


    [Blockierte Grafik: http://www.mainzelahr.de/smile/krank/kruecken.gif]


    Ich hoffe, Aladin hat mit Candente mehr Glück.

    [Blockierte Grafik: http://www.5web.be/afbeeldingen/pechvogel2.jpg]


    Leider ist Droopy nicht in der gleichen Situation wie etwa Gold Fields oder Anglo. Wenn die Kosten schneller steigen als die Erlöse ist das insbesondere bei unserem Marginal Miner fatal.


    Es gibt jede Menge Goldminen, bei denen die Cash Cost unter 420$/oz liegen. Die können sich ein vorübergehenden überproportionalen Kostenanstieg leisten.


    Aus dem Artikel sehen wir, daß die nächste Kostensteigerungsrunde schon avisiert ist.


    Nach den Restrukturierungsmaßnahmen im letzten Jahr sollte Blyvoor wieder profitabel sein. Nun sieht man, davon kann keine Rede sein. Wann beginnt die nächste Review und Retrenchment bei Blyvoor? Wann wird Droopy auch Blyvoor abstoßen müssen?


    Es mag sein, daß dies alles in der Bewertung ist. Dann ist diese Bewertung vermutlich auch korrekt. Was es bräuchte, wären bessere Aussichten für DRD. Allerdings scheinen die ständigen neuen negativen Meldungen es eher nahezulegen, daß Droopy im Pech kleben bleibt.
    [Blockierte Grafik: http://www.tabaluga.com/dvg/charaktere/images/pechvogel.gif]
    Ob Droopy jemals etwas für unsere Rente tut?



    Was der Yahoo-User beanstandet, ist auch mir aufgefallen, der Gegensatz von Droopy Schlagzeilen-Meldungen und den tatsächlichen Gegebenheiten. Es ist einfach verlogen, sich mit 5%igen Wachstum in SA zu brüsten, aber das insgesamt negative Wachstum zu unterschlagen. Die Quartalsmeldungen sollen sachlich informieren und keine reinen Promotionäußerungen sein.


    Läßt es den Bewerber besser aussehen, wenn er sich mit einer guten Note im Fach Religion großtut, aber zu verheimlichen sucht, daß er trotzdem leider, leider im Abitur durchgefallen ist? Vermutlich wird er nicht nur als Versager angesehen, sondern auch noch als Aufschneider und Lügner.

    Desert Sun, keeping the Brazilian gold flag flying
    Rhona O'Connell
    '27-OCT-05 15:54'


    LONDON (Mineweb.com) -- At a luncheon seminar in London last week by LM Associates, one of the presenting companies was Desert Sun Mining, which describes itself as "a different kind of emerging gold producer”.


    Desert Sun, which is listed on Toronto, AMEX and in Frankfurt, is capitalised at US$165 million and started its first mine on the Bahia Gold Belt, which extends for 155 km in eastern Brazil. This belt has proven mineralisation along its length, testament to which is provided by the activity of garimpeiros – local individual miners who pan for gold on surface and who have been procuring gold in Brazil for a lot longer than most of the commercial companies, of which much used to be smuggled out of the country through Uruguay. The Belt has attractive geology, comprising large quartz pebble conglomerates and has excellent exploration potential.


    The Jacobina mine had a production history prior to its acquisition by Desert Sun in 2002. Anglo American developed the property while William Resources operated it during the 1980s and 1990s, during which time it produced 700,000 ounces of gold prior to the suspension of operations in 1999 due to low gold prices.


    Desert Sun has implemented an aggressive growth plan and after modernising the operations, brought the mine back on stream within one year, bringing in large-scale mining equipment and is operating with 400 personnel (which compares favourably with the 1,500 that ere employed there previously). The mine is located in an area with good infrastructure, on a power grid. The company’s managing director (Bruce Humphrey) noted that the governor of the Bahia State is a geologist, which makes the state particularly mining-friendly.


    Mineral Resources (excluding the results of the 2005 programme, which will be released at the end of the year) amount to 22.2 million tonnes of indicated resource at 2.49g/t, and 2.62 million tonnes grading 2.83 g/t, giving gold content of 1.81 million ounces and 240,000 ounces respectively. There is an inferred resource of 22.2 million tonnes at 2.61 g/t, giving contained gold of 1.9 million ounces. Proven and probable reserves stood at 1.2 million ounces in August 2005.


    The mine was brought on stream on schedule and on budget; the first gold pour was in March this year and commercial production started in July. The company is on target to achieve the initial output rate of 100,000 ounces per annum, and should raise this to 130,000 ounces in 2006, while targeted exploration is increasing reserves and resources.
    The low ore grade is compensated for by the fact that the mine is shallow allowing for ramp mining with no shafts or hosting and that the rock is competent, requiring little support and no backfill. The operation is on a reasonably large- scale, crushing 4,200 tonnes of ore daily and the liberation process is simple, via crushing, grinding, leaching (carbon-in-pulp) and electrowinning.


    The company’s business model is geared towards expanding production, leveraging infrastructure and reducing costs, combined with exploration over the 15 km length of the belt with a view to growing revenues and cash flow. The areas under exploration at present are Canavieiras, three km to the north of the processing plant, the Morro do Vento extension area immediately to the north of the processing plant and also Pindobacu-Fuma, “the northern area” 50km north of Jacobina.


    Recent drill results have thrown up, inter alia, a 2.6 metre section at Canavieiras grading 21.62g/t, within a 9.9 metre section grading 7.04g/t, along with a four metre section at 15.28g/t within a 17.8 metre section grading 4.67g/t. These and other results are extensions of reefs previously mined, while reefs below the old workings (past production was 458,000 tonnes of ore at 8.65g/t) are showing grades of up to 4.26g/t and some 8-gramme intersections have been identified.. Higher-grade mineralisation now extends 400 metres along strike and at least 200 metres across strike with the zones open to the east and the south.


    At Morro do Vento, 7,985 metres have been drilled, largely on the southern extension of the Basal and Main reefs, and are showing grades of up to 5.94g/t and an underground programme has commenced. Production is scheduled for 50,000 ounces per annum, starting in 2007and a pre-feasibility study is planned for 2006.


    In the northern area, 5,991 metres have been drilled to date and are showing similar grades and the company believes that the most prospective area extends for 700 metres along strike.


    Desert Sun is on track to produce 250,000 ounces per annum in 2009 from Jacobina, Morro do Vento and Canavieiras, with significant upside potential from the northern belt and the company expects to maintain production at or above this level for many years. Initial costs of production are estimated at $250/ounce all-in, but a portion of revenues have been hedged at three reals to the dollar; the current rate is 2.23 and this will ensure that overall costs come down in dollar terms. Metal output is not hedged, and Desert Sun is debt-free. Peru may have taken over as the largest gold producer in Latin America, but Desert Sun is one company that will keep Brazil’s output rate competitive.
    http://www.mineweb.net/sections/gold_silver/510232.htm

    Kosten würgen Droopy


    <Kosten in allen Minen außer einer gestiegen, was bedeutet, daß die Firma nichts von einem Goldpreis hat, der auf 17Jahreshoch schwebt.
    Blyvoor +8%. Im ersten Halbjahr konnte Management Kosten bei den angestrebten 81.000Rd/kg halten, aber nun galoppieren sie bei lähmenden 87806.
    Ölpreis und Regen [Blockierte Grafik: http://www.cosgan.de/images/smilie/konfus/g070.gif] sowie Energieunterbrechungen haben die Kosten für die Australasiatischen Minen steigen lassen. >


    Jedes Quartal 1000 Gründe, warum´s wieder nicht so lief.


    Costs strangle DRDGold
    By: Gareth Tredway
    Posted: '27-OCT-05 15:47' GMT © Mineweb 1997-2004


    JOHANNESBURG (Mineweb.com) -- Costs were up at all but one of DRDGold’s mine, in South Africa and Australasia, for the September quarter, which meant the company was unable to capitalise on a gold price that is hovering around 17-year highs.


    Costs at Blyvoor, now the company’s largest South African mine since the liquidation of DRDGold’s North West operations early this year, jumped 8% quarter on quarter. Management was able to maintain costs at the mine near the targeted R81,000/kg for the first half of the year, but by the September quarter they were galloping along at a crippling R87,806/kg.


    CE Mark Wellesley-Wood blames the higher costs were because of a couple of ‘once-off issues’ and believes that costs will come down in the current quarter. But he qualified this forecast by adding that a 6% wage increase negotiated during the September quarter, will probably raise the targeted figure to about R82,000/kg.


    At the Crown Mines and East Rand Proprietary Mines (ERPM) operations, where DRDGold holds a 40% interest, results were mixed. At Crown higher grades helped lower costs during the quarter to R78,248/kg from R81,879/kg previously. But at ERPM, lower grades pushed costs up by 13% to R86,319/kg, from R76,395 in the June quarter.


    Overall the South Africa operations produced 2,106kg (67,710oz) of gold, against 2,014kg (64,752oz) in the June quarter.


    According to one of the slides in Wednesday’s presentation, the higher costs knocked about 16.8% off South African cash operating profit when compared to the June quarter. But there was still a cash operating profit of about R23.55 million for the quarter.


    According to an empowerment deal first announced last quarter, Crown, ERPM and Blyvoor are to be placed in a separate vehicle called DRDGold SA. Khumo Bathong, the 60% holder of Crown, will then take a 15% stake in the combined grouping and DRDGold the other 85%.


    Paseka Ncholo, non-executive chairman of DRDGold and head of Khumo Bathong, will then become executive chairman of DRDGold SA. Part of the reason for Ncholo’s appointment as chairman of the South African operations, management says, is so that Wellesley-Wood can focus on the cost issues at the company’s Australasian operations where rocketing costs need to be attended to.


    At June’s interim results announcement, the Australasian operations were already showing signs of under-performance, with Porgera and Tolukuma still profitable, but down 23% and 24% half year on half year.


    Costs at the Australasian operations were up again at $308/oz compared to $282/oz previously. Soaring oil prices are seen as the main driver behind the higher costs, but other operational snags, including more rain than usual at Tolukuma and power disruptions at Porgera, both in Papa New Guinea, also affected costs. In other words, costs were boosted by factors beyond management’s control. Presumably reductions will come about because of management’s intervention.


    The board of Emperor Gold, a Fijian gold miner in which DRDGold has a 45.33% stake, is considering an offer by DRDGold management to absorb DRDGold’s Australasian assets. The result would be the formation of a large group with a single management that can address all the operational and cost issues at the Australasian operations.
    http://www.mineweb.net/sections/whats_new/510231.htm

    Zitat

    Jetzt saftige Gewinne...


    [Blockierte Grafik: http://www.cosgan.de/images/smilie/konfus/k020.gif]




    Droopy vermeldet in den Schlagzeilen, daß SA-Produktion um 5% gestiegen ist. Was es nicht in den Schlagzeilen meldet, ist, daß die Gesamtproduktion gefallen ist.


    Dazu ein User aus dem Yahoo-Board:


    drooy always misleading


    Every-every-every damned time.. Total group production goes down again, but no, they make the titel of the Article: "SA production up 5%". I mean, that's like the only positive statement in the article. They could as well make the title: "Group cash operating costs up 9%". The thing is, I don't (always) blame 'em for this, they can't help it that price of oil goes up while 1/3 of mining costs is fuel. But it once again proves that MWW does nothing but misleading the investors.

    Schon lange keine Postings mehr von der allseits beliebten Silly Sally


    Martin Siegel:
    Die australische Sally Malay veröffentlicht ihren Jahresbericht für das Geschäftsjahr 2004/05 und gibt den operativen Gewinn mit 15,8 Mio A$ an, was einem aktuellen KGV von 6,9 entspricht. Sally Malay bleibt auf dem aktuellen Kursniveau von unter 0,70 A$ eine Kaufempfehlung.




    Minews Story
    Date: October 25, 2005

    Australian Investors May be Missing the Trick With Sally Malay Which Is Making Great Progress At Both Mines

    By Our Man In Oz.


    The markets have been unkind to Sally Malay over the past few weeks, which is ironic because the company itself has never looked in better shape. :)) Problems earlier in the year with the ore-grinding mill at the company’s namesake nickel mine in the far north of Western Australia have been resolved and production is rising there, and at its 75 per cent owned Lanfranchi mine near Australia’s nickel capital, Kambalda. If all goes to plan the company, which is named after a 19th century Afghan camel driver who worked across the north of Australia, will produce a record 11,250 tonnes of nickel in the current financial year, and lift its profit from last year’s maiden A$12.2 million to an even more respectable A$30 million.


    “It really is going better than expected,” Sally Malay chief executive, Peter Harold, told Minesite from his Perth office. “We’re on track to switch from open pit to underground ore at the Sally Malay mine, and progress at Lanfranchi has been excellent. Cash costs are falling at both mines and we’re pursuing our goal of being a three-mine business, generating more than A$100 million a year in earnings before interest, tax and depreciation.”


    The annoying thing for Harold is that while most events in the field are going well the nickel price itself has been heading south, taking with it Sally Malay’s share price which has eased from A80 cents at the end of September to around A68 cents today. On the London Metal Exchange, nickel has slipped from US$7.50 a pound a few months ago, to around US$5.50/lb. The fall in the metal price (and the share price) is not welcome by any producer, but the nickel price is still well above its long-term average and a country mile above Sally Malay’s estimated cash cost of US$3/lb at its namesake mine, and well above the US$3.50/lb estimate for Lanfranchi, which is 25 per cent owned by the unlisted Australian company, Donegal Mining.


    Investors, by watching the LME too closely and directly applying an easier nickel price to the Sally Malay situation, might be missing the point about a business which is doing everything asked of it in production terms and continuing to deliver excellent exploration results. On October 14, for example, Sally Malay slipped another A1 cent on the ASX while announcing fabulous ore-grade intersections from drilling at the Helmut South orebody at Lanfranchi. Best assays were 17.44 metres at 5.44 % nickel, and 35.2metres at 4.09 % nickel. Both are at the upper end of anything previously reported from the orebody which was first worked by WMC Resources.


    As well as looking at the potential of an expanded Lanfranchi operation there is little doubt that the underground phase of the Sally Malay mine will have a much longer life than the four years envisaged in the original design. A fresh drilling program is confidently expected to expand the “deeps” aspect of the orebody which extends beyond the current mine plan. The Perth-based stockbroking firm of Hartleys likes the Sally Malay story and is tipping the stock as a buy at a price below A80 cents. Hartleys said in report dated October 18 that Sally Malay’s total nickel production this financial year would be around 11,150 tonnes, rising next year to 13,700 tonnes – a level which should see the company rank as Australia’s fourth or fifth biggest nickel miner.


    “The Sally Malay mine has been a surprise in terms of reconciling nickel in the ground with what we projected,” said Harold. “The first mining stope we’ve delineated underground has an extra 700 tonnes of contained nickel, so from all accounts our reserve estimates are pretty conservative.” Harold told Minesite that the transition from openpit to underground should be a seamless operation. “We’re developing the underground stopes now. The openpit comes to an end in the middle of the first quarter next year, and underground is ramped up, with no difference in metallurgy.”


    The question of mine life at Sally Malay is one which has had some investors thinking, but Harold is confident that he will deliver an upside surprise. “At this stage the underground phase lasts four years, but there is a non-JORC resource of another 1.5 million tonnes further down in what we call the Sally Malay Deeps, which we plan to drill in the second half of next year. So the plan is to prove up at least another two to three years, taking us out beyond 2012.”


    Another issue which has raised some concern with investors is a breakdown in the relationship between Sally Malay and Thundelarra on the nearby Copernicus nickel deposit. Established as a joint venture, there is a dispute between the parties about expenditure levels and development plans. “The dispute is unfortunate,” Harold said. “We’re hopeful of a court hearing in December which should resolve the matter. There are two possible outcomes. The first is that we’ve spent the money and earned our 60 per cent interest in the deposit. The second is that the court finds against us. We’ll just have to wait and see.”


    “We’ve been very much focused on getting the mine up and running,” he said. “And you’d have to say that the results have been pretty positive. The plant is working well now and we’re hopeful of being able to get 900,000 tonnes a year through it, compared with the nominal capacity of 750,000 tonnes. Now that we’re operating smoothly we can step up our regional exploration work.”


    Harold said work at Lanfranchi had been slowed by labour and equipment shortages. “We were a little ambitious in terms of our timing,” he said. “The market got extremely tight which is why we dropped the contract mining option and decided to slow up, owner mine it, and just go for the high-grade core at Helmut South, which was definitely the prudent approach. If we hadn’t done that we would have ended up with a lot of people, and gear, spending a lot of money, and I’m not sure we would have made a lot.”


    In its review of the Sally Malay, Hartleys said that catalysts for a higher share price include delivering better than expected production, further exploration success at Sally Malay Deeps, or at the Lanfranchi project, increases to reserves, especially at Sally Malay Deeps, and further growth through acquisition or merger.
    http://www.minesite.com/storyFull5.php?storySeq=3070


    Beim Streit zwischen Thundelarra und Sally sollte noch eine dritte Möglichkeit, ein Vergleich, denkbar sein.

    Ob das das Problem wirklich löst, ist fraglich.


    Der betreffende User vergibt gerne Extrembewertungen, entweder "1" oder "10" und dies gleich doppelt, da er anscheinend mit einem weiteren Nick operiert. Im Forum treibt er sein Unwesen schon lange, so daß obige Maßnahmen bei ihm womöglich nicht weiterhelfen.

    Die neuen Explorationsgebiete in der Katangaprovinz des Kongo sind nun bekanntgegeben worden, allerdings ohne viel Einzelheiten


    ADDITIONAL ORE RESERVES - RUASHI MINING sprl


    Johannesburg. Tuesday, 25 October 2005. Metorex is pleased to announce that the Board of Directors of Gecamines has approved the allocation of four additional copper and cobalt exploration areas to Ruashi Mining sprl.


    These four target areas are envisaged to contain both copper and cobalt typical in the Copper Belt region of the Katanga Province of the DRC and are identified as:


    1. Musonoi East (in the Kolwezi Area) - part of PE 525

    2. Sokoroshe I - PE 523

    3. Sokoroshe II - PE 538

    4. Kileba


    Musonoi East has been partially drilled by Gecamines and has evidenced high grades of copper and cobalt. Further drilling and exploration work will be required.


    Sokoroshe I and II and Kileba are considered exciting copper/cobalt exploration targets as indicated by previous trenching and pitting exploration work that has been done in the area. These target areas which are in close proximity to the Ruashi Mine will require comprehensive drilling and exploration programmes and could result in a cluster mining development and increased scale of operations at Ruashi. Musonoi East is situated in the Kolwezi area, which would provide Ruashi Mining with a foothold and mining activity in that region.
    ...
    http://www.metorexgroup.com/pr/press_add_ore_res.html

    Viel Freude kommt aber nicht auf. Während der erhaltene Goldpreis nur um 3% stieg, waren die Cash Cost um 7% (SA-Operationen) bzw 9% (sonstige) höher.


    Die Cash Kosten bei Blyvoor stiegen von 393 auf 419$/oz, bei einem erzielten Goldpreis von 436$/oz. Blyvoor dürfte insgesamt weiter Verluste produzieren. :(

    Celtic von russischer Wirrnis nicht gelähmt


    Celtic Far From Hamstrung by Russian Imbroglio


    By Stephen Clayson
    26 Oct 2005 at 01:55 PM EDT


    LONDON (ResourceInvestor.com) -- Celtic Resources [AIM:CER] has had a torrid time of things of late, and serves as an example of the pitfalls that can await Western miners trying to make their way in Russia. Nevertheless, the company is confident of the outlook for its producing assets in Kazakhstan, and hopes that in time its Russian travails will be surmounted.


    Russia


    Legal wrangling regarding the ownership of Nezhdaninskoye, often described as potentially one of the world’s largest gold mines and of which Celtic owns 50%, has been ongoing in one form or another for some years now, and still shows little sign of coming to a satisfactory end. Two issues bedevil the asset. The first is the recent sale by Russia’s Alrosa of the other 50% of the project not owned by Celtic to Polyus, the gold mining arm of Russian behemoth Norilsk Nickel. The second is the rather irregular claim by parties still essentially unknown to 30% of Nezhdaninskoye. This is contested by Celtic, but remains unquashed in any decisive fashion.


    What marks out the first issue as troublesome is the way in which an ostensibly superior offer for Nezhdaninskoye from Celtic and its strategic partner Barrick Gold [NYSE:ABX; TSX:ABX] was turned down in favour of the proposition from Polyus. This was accompanied by a precipitous collapse in Celtic’s share price, rumoured to be orchestrated by parties with an interest in the success of Polyus’ offer for Nezhdaninskoye, as Celtic’s bid was comprised in significant part of its own shares and was therefore made much less attractive by such a depreciation.


    Despite all this, Celtic’s Managing Director Kevin Foo says that he is not unhappy with the change of ownership from Alrosa to Polyus [Blockierte Grafik: http://www.smiliemania.de/smilie132/00000285.gif] , hoping that perhaps in time this will be propitious for the serious development of Nezhdaninskoye, which has been stalled for quite a while now. Several options exist for the way in which this might proceed. Celtic’s preferred route according to Foo would be for the company and Polyus to try and develop Nezhdaninskoye to production on an equal footing, with Celtic probably assisted by Barrick in order to help satisfy the sizable funding demands that this would entail.


    However, it remains uncertain which course may be taken. Polyus may attempt to buy Celtic out of Nezhdaninskoye, or even reverse into Celtic as a whole, which would allow the Russian company to gain control of Nezhdaninskoye as well as to secure a UK listing. Foo imparts that Polyus is still undertaking due diligence on Nezhdaninskoye in order to ascertain exactly what it has acquired, and that progress on the asset’s development is more likely once this has been completed and the Russian firm has a clearer idea of the direction in which it wants to move.


    Unfortunately for Celtic, the market is probably awaiting a resolution, or at least more clarity on both issues concerning Nezhdaninskoye before taking account of the asset within Celtic’s overall valuation, which is currently based largely the company’s two producing mines in Kazakhstan.


    Kazakhstan


    Kazakhstan is arguably the bright spot for Celtic at the moment. The company has two producing mines in the country, Suzdal and Zherek, and has plans to eventually increase the output of both. In addition, Foo reports that Celtic is considering the acquisition of further assets in the country, which in many ways offers a superior operating environment for Western companies than that to be found in its erstwhile suzerain to the north. Celtic is also interested in making acquisitions in Kyrgyzstan, a country with some notable gold mining potential, though without all the relative amenities of its larger neighbour Kazakhstan.


    Celtic is targeting gold production of 80,000oz/yr from Suzdal, its primary asset in Kazakhstan, by the end of next year, with 100,000oz/yr the company’s goal from the year after that. This would be a significant increase from the mine’s current annual production of around 40,000oz, and is intended to be achieved by tapping refractory underground sulphide ores following the exhaustion of overhead, open pit accessible oxides. These sulphide resources are relatively high grade at around 12g/t, but their composition necessitates bio-recovery, a $45 million plant for which has now been constructed and paid for. Foo expects operating costs for the sulphide operation at Suzdal to come in at less than $200/oz; fairly competitive on a global scale.


    Celtic’s second asset in Kazakhstan, Zherek, currently produces around 20,000oz/yr gold through open pit oxide mining, in return for operating costs in the region of $220/oz. However, the company expects these resources to be exhausted by 2007, following which underlying sulphides may be transported to the bio-recovery plant at Suzdal to further extend the life of both assets.


    In all, Celtic’s activities in Kazakhstan have been crucial in allowing the company to weather the storm stirred up by the inauspicious events that have overtaken Nezhdaninskoye. Partly as a consequence, Celtic is currently on a sound financial bedrock, with cash balances of around $15 million, $10 million of which is from a recent placing, and of course fairly healthy future cash flow to be expected from the Suzdal and Zherek mines.


    Investment Outlook


    It is hoped by Foo that progress of some sorts regarding the situation of Nezhdaninskoye may become apparent by the end of the year. If so, this could precipitate a recovery in Celtic’s share price, which has more than halved to just over 200 pence since the beginning of the year.


    In the meantime though, improvements to Celtic’s assets in Kazakhstan or a prudent expansion of the company’s portfolio there may offer upside to shareholders. But what would ideally accompany this would be a resolution one way or another of the Nezhdaninskoye embroilment. If this were to be the case, Celtic might be set for a new beginning.
    http://www.resourceinvestor.com/pebble.asp?relid=14045

    Nochmal auf deutsch:


    Business Wire
    Die Apollo Gold Corporation unterbricht die Förderung in den Montana Tunnels
    Mittwoch 26. Oktober 2005, 09:38 Uhr


    DENVER- 25. Oktober 2005 Die Apollo Gold Corporation ("Apollo" oder das "Unternehmen") (TSX:APG) (AMEX:AGT) gab heute bekannt, dass die Förderung in ihrer Mine der Montana Tunnels aufgrund der aktuellen Probleme mit den Wänden des östlichen Schachtes ausgesetzt wird. Obgleich der Zugang zum Schacht weiterhin möglich ist, sind die aufgetretenen Probleme nicht mit den gültigen Sicherheitsstandards des Unternehmens vereinbar, so dass die Apollo Gold Corporation sich dazu entschlossen hat, eine technische Überprüfung der Möglichkeiten des Schachtzugangs und sicherheitsrelevanter Fragestellungen
    in Bezug auf die Mine einzuleiten. Das Unternehmen plant, über einen Zeitraum von etwa 14 Tagen mit reduzierter Belegschaft Haldenmaterial niedriger Qualität abzutragen und u. a. Blei- und Zinkkonzentrat herzustellen.


    Der Präsident und CEO von Apollo, David Russell, erklärte: "Unser Unternehmen hat mit externen Beratern die technische Überprüfung eingeleitet. Diese wird zwei bis vier Wochen dauern. In dem Bericht sollen schwerpunktmäßig die Optionen für den Schachtzugang analysiert und entwickelt werden, damit dort weiterhin sicher gearbeitet werden kann. Wie auch bisher, haben sichere Arbeitsbedingungen für unsere Beschäftigten oberste Priorität. Gleichzeitig geht es darum, kosteneffiziente Lösungen zu finden. Viele der in den Montana Tunnels Beschäftigten sind bis zur Fertigstellung des Berichts vorübergehend freigestellt worden. Apollo bedauert die Folgen für die Belegschaft. Zu diesem Zeitpunkt sind wir noch nicht in der Lage, den wirtschaftlichen Gesamtschaden dieser Vorkommnisse für Apollo abzuschätzen".


    Über die Apollo Gold Corporation


    Bei der Apollo Gold Corporation handelt es sich um ein im Goldbergbau tätiges Unternehmen, das eine Mine in Montana betreibt, in Ontario (Kanada) das Entwicklungsprojekt Black Fox weit vorangebracht hat und das Huizopa-Projekt leitet, ein Explorationsprojekt im Frühstadium im Sierra Madre-Goldgürtel (Chihuahua/Mexiko).


    Das Black Fox-Projekt ist entlang des Verwerfungssystems Destor-Porcupine angesiedelt, innerhalb des Abitibi Greenstone-Gürtels, der zu den weltweit besten Schürfgebieten zählt. Hier wurden insgesamt mehr als 75 Millionen Unzen Gold in so bekannten Minen wie Dome, Hoyle Pond, Hollinger, Holt McDermott und Harker Holloway geschürft. Apollo erwarb Black Fox Ende 2002, als die Preise für Edelmetalle im Keller waren. Der Kauf erfolgte im Rahmen des strategischen Plans des Unternehmens, hochwertige Schürfgebiete für Gold zu explorieren und zu entwickeln, um seine älteren und weniger ergiebigen Minen zu ersetzen. Die derzeitigen Explorationspläne umfassen des Weiteren kontinuierliche Oberflächen- und Untergrundbohrungen in den zentralen mineralisierten Zonen und den Zonen für unedle Metalle von Black Fox, wo hochwertige Silber-, Blei- und Zinkmineralisierung zusammen mit hochwertigem Gold vorkommt.
    http://de.biz.yahoo.com/051026/240/4qmb1.html