Beiträge von GOLD_Baron

  • Gold und Silber... Informationen und Vermutungen I

    Goldpreis profitiert von Inflationssorgen


    Gold stieg heute im Zuge von neuen Inflationssorgen im Markt. Die Daten zu den amerikanischen Konsumentenpreisen fielen höher aus als erwartet. Einige Marktteilnehmer bauten daraufhin Positionen in Gold auf, um sich vor möglichen Risken durch die Inflation zu schützen. „Es gibt immer noch unterschwellige Inflationserwartungen da draußen“, meinte Daniel Vaught, Rohstoffanalyst von AG Edward. Die Gold Futures mit Fälligkeit im April stiegen um 1,1% auf 668,40 Dollar je Unze.


    http://www.stock-world.de/news…ert-von-Inflationssorgen-

  • Apple

    Zitat

    Deine Analyse zu Apple ist nicht sehr tiefgründig...


    Ich finde es immer schwer, jemand nicht in seinen Versuchen und Absichten zu stark zu verletzen.


    Aber adrian, was soll das? Du wirst sicher viele Kritik, sowohl positiv als auch negativ bekommen. Die negativen schmerzen meistens...aber sowas überall (wallstreet-online, hier) zu posten finde ich nicht korrekt.


    Qualität setzt sich durch...wenn du nicht besser wirst, hast du Dir jetzt schon eine Schlinge um Deinen Hals ("dein Ziel") gelegt.

  • Global Economic Collapse

    Ford, in `Meltdown,' May Seek Wage Cut, Analyst Says (Update3)


    [Blockierte Grafik: http://www.orbitcast.com/archives/ford-logo.jpg]


    By John Lippert and Jeff Green


    Feb. 20 (Bloomberg) -- Ford Motor Co. is in a ``meltdown'' and may ask the United Auto Workers union to accept reduced pay and benefits during this year's contract talks, a labor economist said.


    Ford may seek union backing for a plan to cut wages and benefits by 20 percent, said Sean McAlinden, an analyst at the Center for Automotive Research in Ann Arbor, Michigan. That could lower costs by $1.4 billion annually for four years, McAlinden estimated.


    Ford Chief Executive Officer Alan Mulally on Jan. 3 said he would ask the union's help in strengthening the company. Ford, the world's third-largest automaker, lost a record $12.7 billion last year on plunging sales of pickups and sport-utility vehicles. The company's UAW contract expires Sept. 14.


    ``If Ford's market share falls to 10 or 12 percent by this summer, and if they start to burn cash at twice the rate they've planned, something will have to be done,'' McAlinden said at a labor-relations seminar in Ypsilanti, Michigan. ``We're really, really worried about Ford.''


    Ford captured 15.2 percent of U.S. sales in January, about 10 points below its annual level a decade ago. Ford spokeswoman Marcey Evans declined to comment on the company's goals for the contract talks. UAW spokesman Roger Kerson declined to comment.


    Shares of Ford rose 12 cents to $8.65 at 4:20 p.m. in New York Stock Exchange composite trading. GM shares fell 39 cents to $35.95, and DaimlerChrysler's U.S. shares dropped 44 cents to $72.89.


    Ford's Labor Bill


    During 2006, Dearborn, Michigan-based Ford spent $3,227 per North American-built vehicle on labor, a 15.1 percent increase in two years, McAlinden said. The 2006 figure includes $2,592 per vehicle for wages and health care for active workers, and $635 for retiree health care.


    GM last year spent $3,289 per North American-built vehicle on labor, for a 14.7 percent increase over the two-year span, McAlinden said. The GM figure includes $2,339 per vehicle for wages and health care for active workers, and $950 for retiree health care.


    Detroit-based GM, the world's largest automaker, reported net losses of $3.03 billion through three quarters of last year, and has delayed its fourth-quarter earnings release.


    When Ford's current UAW contract expires in September, its number of active UAW employees will have declined by 41 percent in four years to 55,000, McAlinden said. GM's UAW headcount will have declined by 39 percent to 76,000, and Chrysler will have dropped by 30 percent, to 46,000, he said.


    The three companies combined hope to cut another 20,000 UAW jobs by 2011, McAlinden said.


    `Baby Boomers' Retire


    By that time, about 90 percent of GM's current workers --the so-called ``Baby Boom'' generation hired during the 1960s and 1970s, will have retired. The company's willingness to replace them depends on whether the UAW accepts wages and benefits for newly hired workers that match those at Japanese-owned assembly plants in the U.S., McAlinden said. The replacement rate will also depend on the union's flexibility in factory work rules that affect productivity.


    Toyota Motor Corp. now pays its U.S. assemblers $26 an hour, compared with $28 an hour at Detroit-based companies, he said. Toyota enjoys an even bigger overall cost advantage because, among other things, it doesn't offer a UAW-style early retirement option after 30 years of service.


    ``If these rates aren't matched by the UAW, the Detroit 3 will replace very few workers,'' McAlinden said. ``They will move (manufacturing) capacity to Mexico or off-shore.''


    Health-Care Talks


    One of the UAW's goals during the talks, McAlinden said, will be to replenish a Voluntary Employee's Beneficiary Association fund, or VEBA, set up at GM and Ford to minimize out- of-pocket health costs for retirees. If the current funds in the VEBAs are used up, these out-of-pocket costs could double to $1,500 per family, he said.


    With the average age of GM's existing workforce at 49 years, and with the company carrying 400,000 retirees and surviving spouses, McAlinden said the UAW may not allow its VEBA to be expanded to include GM's entire retiree health care liability.


    GM Chief Financial Officer Fritz Henderson said in January that he may be interested in mimicking a similar plan adopted by Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. last year.


    The UAW is also negotiating with Cerberus Capital Management LP about future wages and benefits at the bankrupt auto-parts supplier Delphi Corp., which GM spun off in 1999. Cerberus is the lead negotiator for a group of investors that have offered $3.4 billion for most of Delphi's assets.


    That offer expires on Feb. 28. McAlinden said the talks may continue for another month as Cerberus is pressuring the union to trim wages for skilled-trades workers such as pipefitters and electricians.


    Skilled-trades workers at Delphi now earn $31.75 an hour, or twice as much as non-skilled assemblers, McAlinden said.


    http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/…A2mFsorNI&refer=worldwide

  • Global Economic Collapse

    American mortgages


    Bleak houses


    Feb 15th 2007 | NEW YORK
    From The Economist print edition


    [Blockierte Grafik: http://www.economist.com/images/20070217/D0707FN1.jpg]


    America's riskiest mortgages are set to pop. Where will the shrapnel land?


    LAST March, ResMAE, a mortgage lender catering to risky borrowers, cut the ribbon on its new headquarters in Brea, California. The sprawling, 135,000-square-foot building dwarfed the company's 458 local employees. But it fitted the firm's outsized ambitions. Less than a year later the company, rather than its ribbon, was facing the chop. This week it said it had filed for bankruptcy and was selling its assets for a diminutive $19m.


    ResMAE is one of over 20 casualties among America's “subprime” mortgage lenders, which serve borrowers with spotty credit histories at higher interest rates. This end of the market took on $605 billion of new mortgages last year, more than a fifth of the total. But as interest rates have climbed, these loans have soured and the shares of bigger subprime lenders, such as Countrywide Financial and IndyMac, have sagged.


    Does the rot run deeper? That fear ran down a few spines on February 7th, when HSBC, Europe's biggest bank, revealed that bad loans at its American subprime mortgage division were 20% higher than expected. The same week New Century, the second-biggest such lender in America, projected a big drop in loans this year because of poor market conditions.


    They are not the only ones exposed to America's home-loan blues. Citigroup peddles mortgages to risky borrowers through CitiFinancial, its consumer-finance arm. Subprime lenders have also been scooped up by investment banks, including Morgan Stanley, Merrill Lynch and Deutsche Bank, in recent months. Notably absent are Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, America's government-sponsored mortgage giants. Both were set up for people who dreamt of homeownership, but could not afford it. They also have the best data on borrowers, including those rejected for loans in the past. Perhaps they knew something others did not.


    Indeed, the woes of the subprime lender are mostly self-inflicted. After interest rates turned up in 2004, mortgage-makers could no longer count on custom from homeowners looking to switch to new mortgages at cheaper rates. Saddled with expensive lending platforms, mortgage-writers were desperate for a new source of revenues. They found two: riskier borrowers and riskier products.


    They loosened their lending standards as the demand for loans started to drop in 2004. They also resorted to “alternative” products with enticing terms and off-putting names, such as “negative-amortisation” loans (which set repayments so low that the debt gets bigger) or “hybrid” adjustable-rate mortgages (with low teaser rates that jump after a few years). About 27% of all mortgages made in 2006 were of such non-traditional kinds, according to Inside Mortgage Finance, a newsletter.


    Not content with these two moneypots, the more eager lenders began to combine them to make a third. They offered risky products to insecure borrowers. According to the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), hybrid mortgages made up three-quarters of all new subprime loans in 2004 and 2005. The FDIC reckons many firms underwrote hybrid loans assuming that borrowers would refinance them quickly, before the low introductory rates jumped. But this was a reckless assumption when interest rates were rising and house prices softening.


    An over-reliance on unseasoned risk models is also partly to blame for bad underwriting. Subprime and alternative mortgages belong to “uncharted territory”, says Sheila Bair, head of the FDIC, making “modelling credit performance exceptionally difficult”. The chief executive of HSBC, Michael Geoghegan, admitted as much in a conference call last week: “You've got to have history for analytics...the fact of the matter is there [isn't history] for the adjustable-mortgage rate business when you've had 17 jumps in US interest rates.”


    The pressure to lend did not only come from within. Even as mortgage-writers lured borrowers with soft terms, they were themselves tempted by the strong appetite of investors for riskier assets. Wall Street banks did a roaring trade packaging bunches of subprime loans into mortgage-backed securities, and selling them on to investors, greedy for yields (see chart).


    [Blockierte Grafik: http://www.economist.com/images/20070217/CFN996.gif]


    The art of securitisation, as it is called, adds liquidity to the market and allows risks to be parcelled out to those most eager to bear them. Over the past few years, it has also freed up cash for more lending and earned banks pots of money. But it may have made a wobbly subprime market even wobblier. Banks are traditionally supposed to know a bit about the borrowers on their books. But in many cases, their loans did not stay on their books long enough for them to care. Mortgages were written for a fee, sold to investment banks for a fee, then packaged and floated for another fee. At each link in the chain, the fees mattered more than the quality of the loans, which could always be passed on. “This was classic market failure,” says Anthony Sanders, a mortgage expert at Ohio State University's Fisher College of Business. “The private sector wanted fees and got them, and they did not much care what happened afterwards.”


    Some banks do get caught holding the live grenade. FDIC reckons that depository institutions hold $3 trillion of mortgages. Much of this is higher-quality stuff, but not all. And even banks eager to securitise their loans sometimes retain the “residual”—the most risky slice where losses hit first. CreditSights, a research firm, notes that Bear Stearns holds about $6.8 billion in residuals, although only a fraction is below investment grade. Banks that write mortgages are also contractually obliged to buy back securitised loans if their underwriting is shown to be shoddy or if the loans sour too quickly. That is what felled ResMAE and is hurting Accredited Home Lenders Holding, a San Diego lender.


    Burnt palms


    Diversified banks will not meet the same fate. Many big ones, notes Howard Mason of Sanford Bernstein, a research outfit, were careful not to mix risky products with risky borrowers. Wells Fargo, for instance, sells most of its alternative mortgages to “prime” customers. Citigroup sells to subprime borrowers but does not offer alternative mortgages. However, the unregulated non-bank mortgage lenders, like New Century, could suffer.


    Should loan losses climb, investors in mortgage-backed securities will also get burnt, especially those holding the riskier, higher-yielding bonds. Financial engineers worked their mysterious magic with these securities, turning the junkiest mortgages into high-grade, sometimes AAA-rated, securities. They could do this only with the blessing of credit-ratings agencies, which made a profitable business out of rating these securities. But critics say the agencies got complacent, and doubt the pooled loans were sufficiently diverse, or sliced up with sufficient art truly to have dispersed risk. One possible blind spot is that the dodgiest mortgages all behave similarly in times of stress. Another is that it is hard to avoid heavy exposure to mortgages from California, the biggest market in America, where alternative products were popular.


    No one quite knows in whose hands these little bombs will ultimately explode. The hope is that the risks are widely and thinly spread. The fear is that they all sit in the lap of a few big hedge funds. But the real casualties may be homeowners, who often took out risky loans they could barely afford or did not understand. The FDIC has already tightened rules on underwriting negative-amortisation loans, and the Senate has begun to hold hearings on predatory mortgage lending. With Democrats now in charge of Congress, there is a fair chance the politicians will act. The Eliot Spitzer of the housing downturn may be about to start his charge.

  • Global Economic Collapse

    KKR, Blackstone Push for Record Low LBO Loan Rates (Update1)


    By Harris Rubinroit


    Feb. 21 (Bloomberg) -- Henry Kravis and Stephen Schwarzman never had an easier time getting the lowest interest rates on loans from their bankers.


    Just three months after borrowing $12.8 billion to pay for hospital operator HCA Inc. in November, Kohlberg Kravis Roberts & Co. and its partners negotiated a new loan with lower rates. Schwarzman, chief executive officer of Blackstone Group LP, is doing the same for a $3.5 billion loan that financed the takeover of Freescale Semiconductor Inc., the mobile-phone-chip maker.


    Leveraged buyout firms are leading borrowers refinancing $64 billion of loans so far this year, more than in all of 2006, according to ratings company Standard & Poor's. Banks are giving in and reducing rates because corporate defaults are near all- time lows.


    ``This is the best loan market for borrowers I have ever seen,'' said Kenneth Moore, a managing director at First Reserve Corp., a private equity firm in Greenwich, Connecticut, that manages more than $12.5 billion and specializes in buying energy companies.


    Loans for companies rated four or five levels below investment grade yielded an average 2.26 percentage points more than the three-month London interbank offered rate in the week ending Feb. 15, S&P says. That gap over Libor, a lending benchmark, was the smallest ever and compared with more than 4 percentage points in 2003. The difference saves $17.4 million a year for every $1 billion a company borrows.


    HCA Refinances


    Nashville, Tennessee-based HCA this month refinanced $12.8 billion of term loans arranged when a group including New York- based KKR, led by the 63-year-old Kravis, agreed to buy the company for $33 billion.


    The new loans pay interest at 2.25 percentage points over Libor, compared with the original agreement of 2.50 percentage points and 2.75 percentage points. For KKR and its partners, the annual savings amount to $54 million. The three-month Libor is 5.36 percent.


    Loans helped fuel a record $1.55 trillion in mergers and acquisitions in the U.S. last year, New York-based S&P said. So- called leveraged loans financed 57 percent of those transactions, the highest in seven years, it said. Leveraged loans are considered below investment grade and are rated below BBB- at S&P and Baa3 by Moody's Investors Service.


    ``There is clearly room to exceed the biggest loan deal ever done,'' Moore said. HCA's financing was the largest sold to investors.


    Charlotte, North Carolina-based Bank of America Corp., along with JPMorgan Chase & Co. and Citigroup Inc., both based in New York, led banks in arranging $480 billion of leveraged loans last year, up 62 percent from 2005, according to S&P. Parts of the loans are sold to investors, two-thirds of which aren't banks, up from 25 percent in 2001, according to S&P.


    Investor `Influx'


    More than 250 institutions purchased high-yield loans last year, compared with fewer than 100 in 2002, S&P says. Many of the investors are new to the market, including Boston-based State Street Global Advisors, which said in November it would start buying loans.


    ``The influx of additional market participants has diminished the ability for investors to organize and oppose a re- pricing,'' said Frederick Haddad, a partner at New York-based GoldenTree Asset Management LP, which oversees about $7.9 billion. ``The re-pricings are a function of too much liquidity. Private equity firms looking to get better terms and one-up each other have become epidemic in the loan market.''


    Private equity firms announced more than $400 billion of acquisitions in the U.S. last year, including nine of the 10 biggest LBOs, according to data compiled by Bloomberg. Private equity firms typically finance about two-thirds of the purchase price with debt, resulting in below-investment grade credit ratings for the target company.


    Little Risk


    Schwarzman, 60, surpassed the record this month when New York-based Blackstone paid $39 billion for real estate investment trust Equity Office Properties Trust of Chicago.


    Lenders see little risk in giving borrowers what they want. An expanding economy is making it easier than ever for companies to meet their debt payments. The default rate on leveraged loans was 0.45 percent in January, the lowest ever, according to S&P. That compares with an average of 3.05 percent over the past 10 years, according to data compiled by Credit Suisse Group.


    The U.S. economy will expand 2.7 percent this year, according to a survey of 69 analysts by Bloomberg News from Feb. 1 to Feb. 8. The anticipated rate of growth is 0.2 percentage point faster than a survey the previous month.


    Lenders are recouping most of their money even after defaults. Recovery rates for bank debt averaged an all-time high of 93 percent last year, an S&P study found.


    Loan investors in New York-based Refco Inc., the futures trader that in October 2005 filed for bankruptcy, recovered all their principal last year, according to S&P. Bondholders received about 83 cents on the dollar.


    Disappearing Gap


    Money is pouring into loans from investors looking to profit after the gap between interest on loans and yields on speculative-grade bonds, which offer fewer protections, disappeared following the Federal Reserve's 17 rate increases between June 2004 and June 2006.


    Borrowers with non-investment-grade ratings pay interest of 7.58 percent on average for loans, compared with about 7.59 percent for high-yield bonds, according to New York-based Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. Over the past 10 years, loan rates have averaged 2.30 percentage points less than yields on junk bonds, which have fewer protections.


    ``High-yield bond investors are moving into the loan market as the spreads between high-yield bonds and leverage loans have narrowed,'' said Seth Katzenstein, a New York-based managing director at GSC Group, which manages more than $18 billion.


    Market Lull


    Lenders will be able to reject demands for lower rates in coming months because more companies will require credit, said Howard Tiffen, who oversees $7 billion of bank debt at Morgan Stanley Investment Management in Oakbrook Terrace, Illinois. Borrowers have profited from a lull in new deals, he said.


    That will change in coming weeks because New Orleans-based Freeport-McMoRan Copper & Gold Inc. will need $11.5 billion of loans for its $26 billion acquisition of Phelps Dodge Corp., the world's third-largest copper producer and based in Phoenix, Arizona.


    A group led by Kinder Morgan Inc. Chairman Richard Kinder said in August that it would take the Houston-based company private for about $22 billion, using $8.6 billion of loans for the purchase, according to filings with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission.


    ``The big deals coming will bring the market back into equilibrium,'' said Tiffen, who has run the Van Kampen loan funds since 1999. ``The market is not well-balanced. But, this is not particularly unusual. Most years we see periods where demand gets ahead of supply and vice versa.''


    Too Complacent


    Banks may be too complacent, according to CreditSights Inc., a New York-based debt research firm.


    ``The worst of loans are written in the best of times and that could well apply to the current lending boom,'' said Louise Purtle, an analyst at CreditSights. ``Loan sizes are increasing, borrowers are becoming more levered, and the number and stringency of covenants is being reduced.''


    Borrowers in the U.S. this year have received or are seeking $16.3 billion of loans without so-called maintenance covenants, or restrictions such as quarterly limits on the amount of debt a borrower can have relative to earnings before items such as depreciation, interest and taxes. The amount compares with the record $24 billion for all of 2006, according to S&P.


    `All About Control'


    ``Covenants are all about control,'' said GSC's Katzenstein. ``With covenants, you can get concessions from the borrower such as an increased interest rate or fees'' if they violate the terms of their loans, he said.


    Austin, Texas-based Freescale is asking lenders to lower the rate on a $3.5 billion loan used to help fund its $17.6 billion LBO by a Blackstone-led group in December. The company in November agreed to pay lenders 2 percentage points above Libor. It wants to cut the margin to 1.75 percentage points, saving about $8.75 million in annual interest.


    Nielsen Co., the owner of the ratings service and Adweek magazine, last month persuaded lenders to cut the margins on $5.2 billion of loans taken out in August that funded its $11.7 billion buyout. The group includes KKR, Blackstone and Carlyle Group of Washington.


    Haarlem, Netherlands-based Nielsen is paying interest at Libor plus 2.25 percentage points, down from 2.50 percentage points to 2.75 percentage points on separate loans, slashing its annual costs by about $23.5 million.


    To contact the reporter on this story: Harris Rubinroit in New York at hrubinroit@bloomberg.net .
    Last Updated: February 21, 2007 10:30 EST


    http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/…sid=a0J7Vy9q0ESw&refer=us

  • Global Economic Collapse

    DAX 2000 UND 2007


    Zwei Mal 7000 Punkte - zwei Welten


    Von Matthias Streitz


    Nach sechs Jahren hat es der Dax am Morgen kurz über 7000 Punkte geschafft, dann bröselten die Kurse. Ein verblüffender Unterschied zur aufgeheizten Stimmung des 3. Januar 2000, als der Index die Marke zum ersten Mal übersprang. Ein Vergleich zweier Börsentage.


    Hamburg - Es war ein Trip wie auf Koks: Als der Dax Chart zeigen im Millenniumsfieber des Januars 2000 zum ersten Mal in seiner Geschichte über die Marke von 7000 Punkten stieg, da lagen Euphorie und Kollaps eng beieinander.


    Schon das Wort "stieg" ist eine Untertreibung: Der Dax stieg nicht in jenen frühen Handelsminuten des Börsentages 3. Januar 2000. Er eilte, er schnellte, er schoss.


    Nach einem Raketenstart in den ersten Handelsminuten rauschte der Index bis auf 7159,33 Punkte hoch. Rasant auch der Absturz gleich danach: Ab dem Nachmittag fiel und fiel und fiel der Dax, bis herunter auf 6750,76 Zähler. 410 Punkte Verlust in nur wenigen Stunden - eine sensationell breite Spanne. Fast noch erstaunlicher war, dass der Börsenmakler Thomas Mühlbauer hinterher in einem Interview sagte: "Das war ein ganz normaler Tag."


    Im Rückblick ist klar: Die Kursachterbahn des 3. Januar 2000 war Vorbote des Zusammenbruchs, einer historischen Kurskorrektur, die den Dax nach seinem Allzeithoch von 8064,97 Punkten immer weiter in die Tiefe trieb. Erst im März 2003 war der Wendepunkt erreicht, bei nur noch 2202,96 Punkten.


    "Im Jahr 2000 sind die Dinge ins Kraut geschossen", sagt Trudbert Merkel, der Manager des DekaFonds, im Rückblick. Vor allem den Kleinaktionären ist die Verlustfurcht seitdem zum Instinkt geworden - obwohl und eben weil die Kurse inzwischen seit fast vier Jahren wieder steigen.


    Andere Risikokultur


    So sah das Drehbuch für den Börsentag 21. Februar 2007 ganz anders aus: Der Dax hüpfte zwar gleich in den ersten Handelsminuten über 7000 Punkte - doch er kam nur bis zu 7005,34 Zählern. Am Nachmittag fiel der Index sogar bis auf 6922 Punkte zurück. "Da fehlt noch der letzte Kick, um die 7000 Punkte so richtig zu nehmen", fand der Postbank-Aktienstratege Heinz-Gerd Sonnenschein.


    Nicht nur die Zahlen des 3. Januar 2000 und des 21. Februar 2007 unterscheiden sich - auch die Anleger- und Risikokultur hat sich gewandelt. Wie anders die Stimmung vor sieben Jahren war, aufgeheizt nach den Tech-Börsengängen der späten Neunziger - das zeigt ein Blick in die Presse von damals:


    "Für Einsteiger ist es nicht zu spät", urteilte "Capital" Anfang Januar 2000 - die Überschrift lautete "Warten auf das Feuerwerk".


    Der Dax könne bis 2010 auf 15.000 Punkte steigen, prognostizierte der New Yorker Fondsmanager Heiko Thieme in der "Welt am Sonntag".


    "Steuern runter, Kurse rauf - 7000 Dax-Punkte sind erst der Anfang", war am 3. Januar 2000 dem "Focus" zu entnehmen.


    SPIEGEL ONLINE schloss Anfang 2000 eine Börsenkolumne mit dem Satz: "Wenn die Analysten Recht behalten, dann hält der Kurs nach oben auch im neuen Börsenjahr weiter an."


    Auch in diesen Tagen wagen sich manche Boom-Prognostiker weit vor. "Der Dax klettert noch viel weiter", weissagt etwa die "Frankfurter Allgemeine Sonntagszeitung". Doch die Inbrunst und der Neue-Ära-Eifer des Jahres 2000 sind weg. Getrud Traud, Chefvolkswirtin der Helaba, meint deshalb: "Heute ist die Entwicklung an der Börse viel gesünder."


    Was also soll der Kleininvestor tun? Er sollte sich vor halbinformierten Propheten hüten. Und er könnte darauf achten, wie Insider handeln. In den vergangenen zwei Monaten haben Top-Manager von 32 der 110 größten börsennotierten Konzerne in Deutschland Aktien ihres eigenen Unternehmens abgestoßen. Nur bei acht Unternehmen kauften die Insider ihre eigenen Aktien.


    Das ist ein Indiz, dass es mit den Kursen eher abwärts als aufwärts gehen könnte. Aber eben nur ein Indiz.


    mit dpa/Reuters


    [URL=http://www.spiegel.de/wirtschaft/0,1518,467853,00.html]http://www.spiegel.de/wirtschaft/0,1518,467853,00.html[/URL]


    Wo liegt die Intention vom Spiegel? ?(

  • Gold und Silber... Informationen und Vermutungen I

    Kurz und knapp:


    Steigt der Goldpreis über 670 bzw. 700 könnte eine massive Euphorie einsetzen, die ihn bis 800 bzw. 900 treibt. Das würde nicht nur Hedge-Fonds, sondern auch sämtliche Banken, etc. in die Predulie bringen und den Untergang des heutigen Finanzsystems bedeuten.


    (oh, ich klinge ja fast wie Walter K.) :D

  • Global Economic Collapse

    Default would send shockwaves round world 13/02/2007


    If Ecuador fails to pay interest on its debt this week the move could resonate far beyond its borders.


    Investment bankers, hedge funds and other investors around the world are watching developments closely - for the potential impact on the broader emerging markets and on a new, but fast-growing, sector of the financial world known as credit derivatives.


    There have been very few defaults by sovereign borrowers in recent years, following history's biggest - on about $100bn (€77bn, £51bn) of debt - by Argentina in 2001. Moreover, few governments have defaulted on debt when their ability to pay has not been in much doubt...


    Read
    Financial Times