Gold und Silber... Informationen und Vermutungen I

Rhetoric and Reality:

The View from Iran

By George Friedman

The Iraq war has turned into a duel between the United States and Iran. For the United States, the goal has been the creation of a generally pro-American coalition government in Baghdad -- representing Iraq's three major ethnic communities. For Iran, the goal has been the creation of either a pro-Iranian government in Baghdad or, alternatively, the division of Iraq into three regions, with Iran dominating the Shiite south.

The United States has encountered serious problems in creating the coalition government. The Iranians have been primarily responsible for that. With the death of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi in June, when it appeared that the Sunnis would enter the political process fully, the Iranians used their influence with various Iraqi Shiite factions to disrupt that process by launching attacks on Sunnis and generally destabilizing the situation. Certainly, Sunnis contributed to this, but for much of the past year, it has been the Shia, supported by Iran, that have been the primary destabilizing force.

So long as the Iranians continue to follow this policy, the U.S. strategy cannot succeed. The difficulty of the American plan is that it requires the political participation of three main ethnic groups that are themselves politically fragmented. Virtually any substantial group can block the success of the strategy by undermining the political process. The Iranians, however, appear to be in a more powerful position than the Americans. So long as they continue to support Shiite groups within Iraq, they will be able to block the U.S. plan. Over time, the theory goes, the Americans will recognize the hopelessness of the undertaking and withdraw, leaving Iran to pick up the pieces. In the meantime, the Iranians will increasingly be able to dominate the Shiite community and consolidate their hold over southern Iraq. The game appears to go to Iran.

Americans are extremely sensitive to the difficulties the United States faces in Iraq. Every nation-state has a defining characteristic, and that of the United States is manic-depression, cycling between insanely optimistic plans and total despair. This national characteristic tends to blind Americans to the situation on the other side of the hill. Certainly, the Bush administration vastly underestimated the difficulties of occupying Iraq -- that was the manic phase. But at this point, it could be argued that the administration again is not looking over the other side of the hill at the difficulties the Iranians might be having. And it is useful to consider the world from the Iranian point of view.

The Foundation of Foreign Policy

It is important to distinguish between the rhetoric and the reality of Iranian foreign policy. As a general principle, this should be done with all countries. As in business, rhetoric is used to shape perceptions and attempt to control the behavior of others. It does not necessarily reveal one's true intentions or, more important, one's capabilities. In the classic case of U.S. foreign policy, Franklin Roosevelt publicly insisted that the United States did not intend to get into World War II while U.S. and British officials were planning to do just that. On the other side of the equation, the United States, during the 1950s, kept asserting that its goal was to liberate Eastern Europe from the Soviet Union, when in fact it had no plans, capabilities or expectations of doing so. This does not mean the claims were made frivolously -- both Roosevelt and John Foster Dulles had good reasons for posturing as they did -- but it does mean that rhetoric is not a reliable indicator of actions. Thus, the purple prose of the Iranian leadership cannot be taken at face value.

To get past the rhetoric, let's begin by considering Iran's objective geopolitical position.

Historically, Iran has faced three enemies. Its oldest enemy was to the west: the Arab/Sunni threat, against which it has struggled for millennia. Russia, to the north, emerged as a threat in the late 19th century, occupying northern Iran during and after World War II. The third enemy has worn different faces but has been a recurring threat since the time of Alexander the Great: a distant power that has intruded into Persian affairs. This distant foreign power -- which has at times been embodied by both the British and the Americans -- has posed the greatest threat to Iran. And when the element of a distant power is combined with one of the other two traditional enemies, the result is a great global or regional power whose orbit or influence Iran cannot escape. To put that into real terms, Iran can manage, for example, the chaos called Afghanistan, but it cannot manage a global power that is active in Iraq and Afghanistan simultaneously.

For the moment, Russia is contained. There is a buffer zone of states between Iran and Russia that, at present, prevents Russian probes. But what Iran fears is a united Iraq under the influence or control of a global power like the United States. In 1980, the long western border of Iran was attacked by Iraq, with only marginal support from other states, and the effect on Iran was devastating. Iran harbors a rational fear of attack from that direction, which -- if coupled with American power -- could threaten Iranian survival.

Therefore, Iran sees the American plan to create a pro-U.S. government in Baghdad as a direct threat to its national interests. Now, the Iranians supported the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003; they wanted to see their archenemy, former President Saddam Hussein, deposed. But they did not want to see him replaced by a pro-American regime. Rather, the Iranians wanted one of two outcomes: the creation of a pro-Iranian government dominated by Iraqi Shia (under Iran's control), or the fragmentation of Iraq. A fragmented Iraq would have two virtues. It would prove no danger to Iran, and Iran likely would control or heavily influence southern Iraq, thus projecting its power from there throughout the Persian Gulf.

Viewed this way, Iran's behavior in Iraq is understandable. A stable Iraq under U.S. influence represents a direct threat to Iran, while a fragmented or pro-Iranian Iraq does not. Therefore, the Iranians will do whatever they can to undermine U.S. attempts to create a government in Baghdad. Tehran can use its influence to block a government, but it cannot -- on its own -- create a pro-Iranian one. Therefore, Iran's strategy is to play spoiler and wait for the United States to tire of the unending conflict. Once the Americans leave, the Iranians can pick up the chips on the table. Whether it takes 10 years or 30, the Iranians assume that, in the end, they will win. None of the Arab countries in the region has the power to withstand Iran, and the Turks are unlikely to get into the game.

The Unknown Variables

Logic would seem to favor the Iranians. But in the past, the Iranians have tried to be clever with great powers and, rather than trapping them, have wound up being trapped themselves. Sometimes they have simply missed other dimensions of the situation. For example, when the revolutionaries overthrew the Shah and created the Islamic Republic, the Iranians focused on the threat from the Americans, and another threat from the Soviets and their covert allies in Iran. But they took their eyes off Iraq -- and that miscalculation not only cost them huge casualties and a decade of economic decay, but broke the self-confidence of the Iranian regime.

The Iranians also have miscalculated on the United States. When the Islamic Revolution occurred, the governing assumption -- not only in Iran but also in many parts of the world, including the United States -- was that the United States was a declining power. It had, after all, been defeated in Vietnam and was experiencing declining U.S. military power and severe economic problems. But the Iranians massively miscalculated with regard to the U.S. position: In the end, the United States surged and it was the Soviets who collapsed.

The Iranians do not have a sterling record in managing great powers, and especially in predicting the behavior of the United States. In large and small ways, they have miscalculated on what the United States would do and how it would do it. Therefore, like the Americans, the Iranians are deeply divided. There are those who regard the United States as a bumbling fool, all set to fail in Iraq. There are others who remember equally confident forecasts about other American disasters, and who see the United States as ruthless, cunning and utterly dangerous.

These sentiments, then, divide into two policy factions. On the one side, there are those who see Bush's surge strategy as an empty bluff. They point out that there is no surge, only a gradual buildup of troops, and that the number of troops being added is insignificant. They point to political divisions in Washington and argue that the time is ripe for Iran to go for it all. They want to force a civil war in Iraq, to at least dominate the southern region and take advantage of American weakness to project power in the Persian Gulf.

The other side wonders whether the Americans are as weak as they appear, and also argues that exploiting a success in Iraq would be more dangerous and difficult than it appears. The United States has substantial forces in Iraq, and the response to Shiite uprisings along the western shore of the Persian Gulf would be difficult to predict. The response to any probe into Saudi Arabia certainly would be violent.

We are not referring here to ideological factions, nor to radicals and moderates. Rather, these are two competing visions of the United States. One side wants to exploit American weakness; the other side argues that experience shows that American weakness can reverse itself unexpectedly and trap Iran in a difficult and painful position. It is not a debate about ends or internal dissatisfaction with the regime. Rather, it is a contest between audacity and caution.

The Historical View

Over time -- and this is not apparent from Iranian rhetoric -- caution has tended to prevail. Except during the 1980s, when they supported an aggressive Hezbollah, the Iranians have been quite measured in their international actions. Following the war with Iraq, they avoided overt moves -- and they even were circumspect after the fall of the Soviet Union, when opportunities presented themselves to Iran's north. After 9/11, the Iranians were careful not to provoke the United States: They offered landing rights for damaged U.S. aircraft and helped recruit Shiite tribes for the American effort against the Taliban. The rhetoric alternated between intense and vitriolic; the actions were more cautious. Even with the Iranian nuclear project, the rhetoric has been far more intense than the level of development seems to warrant.

Rhetoric influences perceptions, and perceptions can drive responses. Therefore, the rhetoric should not be discounted as a driving factor in the geopolitical system. But the real debate in Iran is over what to do about Iraq. No one in Iran wants a pro-U.S. government in Baghdad, and blocking the emergence of such a government has a general consensus. But how far to go in trying to divide Iraq, creating a pro-Iranian government in Baghdad and projecting power in the region is a matter of intense debate. In fact, cautious behavior combined with extreme rhetoric still appears to be the default position in Tehran, with more adventurous arguments struggling to gain acceptance.

The United States, for its part, is divided between the desire to try one more turn at the table to win it all and the fear that it is becoming hopelessly trapped. Iran is divided between a belief that the time to strike is now and a fear that counting the United States out is always premature. This is an engine that can, in due course, drive negotiations. Iran might be "evil" and the United States might be "Satan," but at the end of the day, international affairs involving major powers are governed not by rhetoric but by national interest. The common ground between the United States and Iran is that neither is certain it can achieve its real strategic interests. The Americans doubt they can create a pro-U.S. government in Baghdad, and Iran is not certain the United States is as weak as it appears to be.

Fear and uncertainty are the foundations of international agreement, while hope and confidence fuel war. In the end, a fractured Iraq -- an entity incapable of harming Iran, but still providing an effective buffer between Iran and the Arabian Peninsula -- is emerging as the most viable available option.

mvd

Old picture.....Former New York Stock Exchange Chairman Richard A. Grasso, left, is photographed by CNBC photographer Andy Tenke as he leaves New York state Supreme Court's Appellate Division.

140 millionen USD forderte er fuer seine Abfindung, er wusste schon warum.

Hier noch was anderes in der Richtung Drogenhaendler/NYSE diese Saubande laesst sich noch ablichten mit denen und ladet sie ein :

AL GORE AND HILLARY CLINTON POSE WITH DRUG TRAFFICKER JORGE CABRERA

These photos are symbolic of an elite that has nothing but contempt for the American people, whose arrogance knows no bounds, and that has every intention of abusing their hapless victims to the maximum degree possible.

But chinks have begun to emerge in the armor. And those chinks are Grand Canyon-size wide. When Richard Grasso, head of the New York Stock Exchange, in an act of arrogance that rivals Gore and Hillary posing with Cabrera, dares to travel to Columbia and offer the good auspices of his office and the Big Board to the narco-terrorists FARC, then you can be sure that the end is near for the present world financial system. Grasso never would have made that trip save that part of the elite now feels it's useless to even pretend that we have an industrial, or post-industrial, economy. We have become the new Dope Inc., and Grasso's trip put an official stamp on it.

These photos should be a sobering warning to those who think the drug epidemic would end if only we could get rid of Clinton and Bush.

It won't ! The corruption is endemic to the system, and only by getting rid of the present system can their be any hope for a positive future. And this may come sooner than later. With NYSE chief Grasso trooping dutifully through the jungles of Columbia, it is tacit acknowledgment by the elite that the whole ball of wax is about to crash - and soon. Of course, they have every intention of heading for the hills with their ill-gotten gains when that dark day comes, and leaving their hapless victims (the American people) holding the bag as the system crashes all around them.

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Moechte nicht wissen was die alle so wegschnupfen im Monat.

Hier die Bilder von dem Saupack: VIVA AMERICA !

http://www.wethepeople.la/drugs2.htm

Attacking Iran: What’s Really In It For Bush?

Paul Craig Roberts | January 17, 2007

......A former member of the National Security Council gave me a possible answer.

Bush can bury his defeat in Iraq with a "victory" in Iran.

Here is the victory scenario: Bush and Cheney will claim that their air attack on Iran succeeded in destroying Iran’s (non-existent) nuclear weapons program. The victory claimed by the Bush Regime and the propagandistic US media will "make America safe from nuclear attack." This will restore Bush’s popularity and move the US back to a 50-50 political split in time for Karl Rove to steal the 2008 election with the fraudulent electronic voting machines built and programmed by Republican operatives.

The former national security official believes that Bush will be able to claim victory over Iran, because Iran will avoid responding militarily. Iran will not use its Russian missiles to sink our aircraft carriers, to shut down oil facilities throughout the Middle East, or to destroy US headquarters in the "green zone" in Baghdad. Instead, Iran will adopt the posture of another Muslim victim of US/ Israeli aggression and let the anger seep throughout the Muslim world until no pro-US government is safe in the Middle East.

Bush needs a short-run victory, and Iran will let him have it—in order to gain the long-run victory.

The consequences for the US, Israel, and the US puppet regimes in the Middle East will be catastrophic, but they will not occur in the short-run.

This explanation solves the dilemma of why Bush would get deeper into the quagmire for the sake of the Israel Lobby. A US attack on Iran allows Bush both to satisfy the powerful Israel Lobby and to claim to have destroyed Iran’s (non-existent) weapons of mass destruction.

http://infowars.com/articles/w…hat_is_in_it_for_bush.htm

"The consequences for the US, Israel, and the US puppet regimes in the Middle East will be catastrophic, but they will not occur in the short-run"".

Man kann das nun glauben oder nicht, die Zukunft wird es zeigen, zumindest nehme ich davon Kentniss dann bin ich nicht ueberrascht.

Die Spannung im nahen Osten eskaliert nun bis Ende des Jahres.

Nach astrologischen Berechnungen kann man im Januar/Februar 2008 erahnen wohin alles laeuft.

Die kriegerischen Handlungen haben ihren Hoehepunkt ab 2. Haelfte 2009 bis 2011.

Nach dem Maya Kalender beginnt eine neue Episode der Menschheit in 2012. .... (ich denke mir das selbe, die Welt sieht dann anders aus)

Eine kritsche Zeit fuer 2007 ist ab 28. Februar 2007, 25.Juni 2007, mitte Dezember 2007.

Fuer 2008 der 26. Januar, 14.Juni, 4.November und der 27.November.

Dozens die in massive US storm

2007-01-17

A massive winter storm has covered swaths of the United States in a mantle of snow, sleet and ice, killing at least 42 people, threatening millions of dollars in citrus crops and leaving hundreds of thousands without electricity, officials said on Tuesday.

In Nord Europa ist auch ein Chaos, dort starben 27 Menschen.

Ten deaths were reported in the United Kingdom while seven people died in Germany, four in the Netherlands; three in the Czech Republic, one in France and two in Belgium.

Ich kriege hier nichts mit, ist es wirklich so schlimm bei Euch ?

Gruss

Eldo

Zum Thema Iran und Gold:

http://news.goldseek.com/GoldLetter/1169136180.php

For months, rumors of war between the United States and Iran have been building. Many fear that President Bush is spoiling for a fight, and they've begun to interpret various developments in the region as the run-up to an attack on Tehran. A report in the British press about a possible Israeli raid on Iran's nuclear facilities quickly became linked with predictions about coordinated action with the United States. Observers on all sides, left, right and other, convinced themselves that the appointment of Adm. William Fallon to oversee military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan meant there would soon be Tomahawk missiles, if not U.S. soldiers, crossing the border into Iran.

http://www.salon.com/opinion/f…/01/12/iran/index_np.html

Der Analyst Jack Chan sagt er haelt sich momentan aus den EM Aktien raus und sitzt auf Cash in einen anderern Aritikel.

The US Dollar is hated by nearly everyone, even its own government apparently (out of control wildcat spending) and of course the voracious American consumer who just can't wait to get his hands on ever more credits to feed his consumption habits and push the nation's current account further and further out of balance. The Fed does not hate the dollar however. The dollar is the Fed's note, its product, its means of creating limitless fiat fun - and debt. The gold bugs of course know that this entire mess is one huge Ponzi scheme, which is why they expect a dollar collapse imminently and have been since Nixon closed the gold window for good.

So we are going on 4 decades of "imminently".

Talk about frustration :(.....more

http://www.gold-eagle.com/editorials_05/tanashian011707.html

Mond hin, Mond her.... kurz gesagt:

'Scope for gold to hit $850

'2007-1-19 15:14

London - Gold will struggle to break out of its current trading range in the short term and may slip towards $600.
But price charts signal a big rally later this year.

Chart analysts, who predict future price moves by tracing past market performance, said gold might move closer to its record high of $850 an ounce, last seen more than a quarter of a century ago, in the second half of 2007.

"The market is going sideways and is in a long-term uptrend. Ultimately, there should be quite bullish price action later this year," said Phil Roberts, analyst at Barclays Capital.

"You need to take out the $650-$675 area to really get things going again and trigger a move to probably $800 and higher," he added.

Darauf muss man warten koennen, Oil wacht langsam auf, Gold & Silber spaeter.
Durch staendiges hinschauen gehts auch nicht rauf, oder ?

Timing ist so eine Sache, Vorhersagungen ebenfalls.

Lassen wir uns ueberraschen wuerde ich sagen,.. lets have a good weekend.

Gruss

Adam Hamilton plottet irgendeine Chart die das OB/V beim HUI anzeigt und nimmt diese ebenso in Betracht.
Momentan sieht es so aus das vor kurzen ein Oversold Signal da war und nun Interesse aufkommen sollte. Der 68 ma von den Aden sisters ist auch interessant.

Sinclair meint naechste Woche wird interessant, mal schaun.

Zum Glueck kommt der USD/IDX nicht ueber die 85.
Chartist sagen wenn es drei mal auf den selben Wert nach oben schlaegt aber nicht durchbricht hat sich ein Bereich gebildet wo es eine Zeitlang nun bleibt. Sieht so aus das ab 85 die Leute dem USD Wunder keinen glauben schenken.

Adam rechnet das selber aus mit dem Durchnittspreis der HUI Aktien und Tagesvolumen.

Interessant wie klein der Markt beim HUI ist, Microsoft z.B. hat das dreifache Volumen und Value als der HUI. Letzten Mai bei dem ATH war das max. HUI Volumen nur 99 millionen Aktien mit Wert von 2,155 millionen USD das ist gar nichts im Vergleich zu MSF.

""The total market capitalizations of all the HUI stocks, as of the end of 2006, were only running at $91,794m. This compares to $304,840m or so for Microsoft alone""

Er redet das wir in Phase 2 des Bullenmarkt sind und Tage kommen werden wo weit mehr Aktien gehandelt werden als im sonnigen Mai 2006.

In dem Markt ist das meiste Geld noch lange nicht drin so klein ist der.....noch !

Wenn sie eines Tages eine Stunde von Gold/Silber und deren Aktien auf CNBC berichten dann wird es noch interessanter.
Rick Santelli auf dem Gold Pit anstatt beim T-Bond Pit, das waere der Hammer.

Bis dort hin ist es noch weit weg, vielleicht auch der Punkt einen Teil zu vekaufen denn die letzten beissen die Hunde..

http://www.321gold.com/editori…ilton/hamilton012007.html

Gruss

Eldo

germoney

Grandich sagt, falls Oil auf 45 USD faellt dann kauft er blind ein.
Die 65 USD kommen dieses Jahr bestimmt wieder, wer weiss was mit Iran passiert.
Billiges Oil und Kupfer ist gut fuer die Minen, bitte nicht vergessen.
.
Er sagt auch, wenn Gold nicht auf 720 USD dieses Jahr steigt dann kommt er nie mehr wieder ins Studio oder zu einem Interview. Wer Grandich kennt , der kennt seine soweit korrekten Vorhersagen. Dollar nagative ist er natuerlich auch, es ist nur mehr eine Frage wann er unter 80 abschmiert.
Bei dem Punkt ist POG locker bei 1000USD. Der Bullenmarkt bei Oil ist charttechnisch vorbei, fuer mich wird er genauso manipuliert damit der Dollar gut dasteht und man Zinsenkungen erlauben kann. Das mit der Goldilocks Landing wird nichts sagt er, das ist eine Illusion vom Markt.
Amerika geht bald 6-9 Jahre den Bach runter, erwaehnte er auch.

AMUSING PREDICTIONS

by Justice Litle

After holding in the $60s for many months, crude has dropped precipitously in the past few weeks, and is now in the vicinity of $50 a barrel. A number of reasons have been given for the sharp fall in price, all of them more or less linked.

To begin with, warm winter weather has resulted in lower seasonal energy use than anticipated. (Global heating oil demand, for example, is estimated to be off by 20-30%.) At the same time, OPEC’s production cuts are seen as ineffectual in the face of cheating, and Russia has been hesitant to slash its record output.

On top of this, commodity speculators have become bearish and institutional investors are getting cold feet. When spot crude fetches a higher price than the further-out futures contracts - a situation known as "backwardation" - it becomes profitable to buy the back months and wait for prices to rise as the spot draws closer. The persistence of backwardation in 2006 led institutional investors and commodity index trackers to load up on long-dated crude oil contracts; now that the market is no longer in backwardation, those same players find themselves losing money.

As icing on the cake, the crude oil market is suffering from intrigue fatigue. Like a jaded child desensitized to violence on television, the market has grown bored with overly familiar catastrophe scenarios. (Yet if anything, the geopolitical situation is more precarious today than a year ago: Israel leaking plans for a tactical strike on Iran; Saudi Arabia threatening to aid Iraq’s Sunnis if the Shia majority pushes too far; U.S. military morale at low ebb; escalating tensions between Russia and Europe; nationalization on the rise; Iran accelerating its nuclear program; and so on.)

In light of all the recent bearishness, it is worthwhile to ponder the Energy Information Administration’s recently released "Annual Energy Outlook 2007 (Early Release version)." Here are the two most interesting sentences out of the whole thing (in your humble editor’s opinion):

"Oil, coal and natural gas... are projected to provide roughly the same 86% share of the total U.S. primary energy supply in 2030 that they did in 2005 (assuming no changes in existing laws and regulations...

"In 2030, the average real price of crude oil is projected to be above $59 per barrel in 2005 dollars, or about $95 per barrel in nominal dollars."

Trying to predict anything 23 years out is a foolhardy exercise... but the EIA projections are nonetheless instructive.

For one thing, the projections show just how small the alternative energy base still is in comparison with fossil fuels. It is not that the EIA expects zero growth in alternative energy’s slice of the pie over the next few decades; rather, the EIA expects total energy demand to overwhelm all else, with fossil fuels filling the breach. (For this same reason, the EIA expects nuclear power’s share of the pie to actually fall in percentage terms, even as more nuclear power plants go online.)

The EIA’s second prediction is chuckle inducing. For crude to be just above $59 in 2030 - not far from where it is now - means little will have changed on the whole. And how helpful of the EIA to let us know that $59 in 2005 will translate to $95 in 2030. That’s a wonderfully benign inflation rate... just over 2% per annum between here and there.

As you might have guessed, the point here is not to put faith in government agency predictions. Instead, it’s to get some perspective on where we stand for the long term.

As a government agency and an offspring of the Department of Energy, the EIA is congenitally optimistic in its conclusions -- much as the Bureau of Labor Statistics is congenitally blind to inflation. And with all the data at hand, the EIA’s projected long-term price band of $50-60 crude (more or less) is truly the optimistic case.

Such a prediction almost completely writes off the ramifications of Peak Oil, and relies on heavily aggressive assumptions in regard to deep-water drilling and Canada’s oil sands. Such a prediction also requires an almost touching naivete in terms of U.S. monetary policy; can we really expect inflation to run just 2.1% per year for the next 23 years? (What happens when the dollar goes down in flames?)

There are far too many variables to make an informed guess at crude oil’s 2030 price. But we do have enough information to note that, given the piles of data presently available, the optimistic number crunchers at the EIA see crude trading solidly for the duration. In fact, their $50-60 price range represents the shiny happy scenario, leaving out the ugly but all-too-real possibilities looming before us.

The other thing we can gather from the EIA prediction is this: Nobody knows nothin’. Meaning, all the data points in the world can’t predict the distant future. To grasp how ludicrous these types of specific predictions are, just observe the fate of those who make them. In the real world, the best you can do is marshal the facts to get a sense of what’s possible and what isn’t... what makes sense and what doesn’t. In this sense, broad observations regarding the possible course of future events should be rooted in the laws of physics. What goes up must come down... that which cannot persist must eventually cease... and so on.

In the short run, a market can do most anything - especially one dominated by speculators with a quarterly, or even monthly, time horizon. But in the long run, as Jesse Livermore noted, the best and truest allies will always be underlying conditions. You’ll see all kinds of numbers fly around in the coming weeks and months, feet stampeding this way and that... but through it all, the long-term energy picture won’t shift much.

We’re dealing with sweeping sea change here, not ephemeral seasonal stuff.

That’s why I’m not inclined to worry too much about this recent crude oil slide.
There’s never any money in running around like a chicken with your head cut off. Traders rely on speed and reflex, investors on patience and fortitude; to the best of my knowledge, nervous panic is no help to either discipline. If anything, the short-term roller coaster gives an edge to those with a taste for the long-term view.

Regards,

Justice Litle