No Kiev Chicken please James Bond....
..... give me the balls from moscow ballet Klass CCC- 
Die Jungs müssen ja schon ganz gierig nach höheren Zinsen japsen.
Wenn sie jetzt noch Bonds in den Staaten kaufen, werden sie gleich ganz geschlachtet, da hätten sie auch bei den Hühnern bleiben können. 
Vieleicht, man kann nur hoffen, wird wenigstens 1 pro Mille in PM investiert.
Wo sollen sie den sonst bei Stagflation die Knete sicher parken 
GN
Hase
The Debt Bubble - The End Point
by Frank Corbett
January 4, 2007
A lot attention has focused on the housing bubble. Receiving less notice in the mainstream media is the overall credit situation. The debt bubble is much larger than the housing bubble and permeates every sector of the economy. The fallout of the Tech/Media/Telecom bubble of the late 1990’s was for the most part limited to those sectors. When this bubble ends the damage will be far, wide, and deep.
The key question to be addressed here is: When could it end?
First let’s look at the ratio of Total Credit Market Debt to GDP. Intuitively this is not a good picture. There will come a point where cash flows will be strained to service the debt.
[Blockierte Grafik: http://www.financialsense.com/fsu/editorials/2007/images/0104d.28.gif]
Another helpful illustration is to review seasonally adjusted flows of total credit market debt (TCMD) instruments provided by the Federal Reserve. It is essentially the additional debt added each quarter, as opposed to the cumulative total. Flows show the quarterly change and illuminate the rapid growth of credit, especially in recent years. The amount of debt added each quarter has been rising steadily despite an erratic quarter by quarter variation.
[Blockierte Grafik: http://www.financialsense.com/fsu/editorials/2007/images/0104d.29.gif]
Could this data be used to predict a reversal or slowdown? Some sort of quantitative analysis is desirable. The following steps yielded meaningful results.
1. Calculate the moving average of the last four quarters of seasonally adjusted flows to all credit market sectors.
2. Figure the quarterly percentage changes of the moving average from step one.
3. Determine the year over year percentage changes of the quarterly growth derived in step two.
In summary the steps provide a year over year change of the quarterly growth of a four quarter moving average. It is a smoothing technique for volatile quarterly variation.
Using the data provided by the Federal Reserve back to 1981 it is apparent the economy and stock market struggle when the number becomes negative. Serious trouble occurs when the number goes below -10%.
[Blockierte Grafik: http://www.financialsense.com/fsu/editorials/2007/images/0104d.30.gif]
The current level is +8.34%. A decline of 18.34% is required to arrive at -10%. How quickly could the danger zone be reached? Two estimates of time needed to reach -10% are provided in the far right column below.
*
Absolute value of all quarterly changes 9.56% 1.92 Quarters
*
Absolute value of all negative quarters 10.80% 1.70 Quarters
Two quarters is about the shortest time frame until difficulties could ensue. Data is as of September so the end of the first quarter of 2007 is the first potential target date. Based on the time and quarterly change variables, a reasonable estimate is this bubble will end two to four quarters after September, 2006. Look for problems to surface between March and September of next year. The smoothed trend is postured to decline and looks like it may roll over. The second chart pictured above (TCMD Flows) shows a significant decline in flows over the two most recent quarters, from 4 trillion to 3 trillion dollars.
The creation of mortgage debt has slowed appreciably. Undeterred, individuals are still looking for ways to spend by borrowing. Dow Jones reported on November 1 that “89% of Freddie Mac-owned loans that were refinanced resulted in new mortgages with loan amounts that were at least 5% higher than the original loan balances …and is the highest share since the second quarter of 1990.” Revolving credit such as credit cards is expanding. However, corporate debt is the major story of late; it has resurfaced as a powerful force after the 2002 to 2003 debacle.
Financial institutions are aggressively positioned for expansion. Just look in your mailbox. Everybody is pre-approved. Any company qualifies for leveraged bank loans or high yield debt. A department manager at a major financial company submitting a business plan calling for less than 20% growth may as well include a letter of resignation. In a warped expression of Say’s Law, supply of credit creates its own demand. The economy and the consumer may well surprise on the upside for several quarters. In the end though, all bubbles cause their own demise.
Contractions in credit growth have been bad news in the past. The next instance will be more harmful than past episodes given the credit dependent nature of the US economy. Lower interest rates may generate relief for those able to refinance their debt. However, fully levered consumers and businesses will not be in a position to take on additional obligations. Moreover, consumers no longer have a pool of savings to augment income and maintain spending. Fear of job loss could finally motivate people to save, further reducing near term economic growth.
What circumstances might serve as tipping points?
An increase in long term rates would be very harmful. The supply of oxygen to the US economy was restricted in May of 2006 when the ten year US Treasury Bond yield moved over 5%. Raising the price of credit is the most direct means of restricting its growth.
A slowdown in the economy beyond the universally accepted “soft landing” scenario will markedly increase the default rate on loans. If the rate of underperforming loans increases, financial intermediaries will finally demonstrate lending restraint. Sub-prime lending is exhibiting signs of difficulty and two firms recently shut down. (Dissolving the company is the ultimate form of lending restraint.) Corporate borrowers unable to extend their credit lines and experiencing financial stress will lay off employees who will then be unable to meet their payments. Consumer spending, having increased every quarter since 1991, will undergo negative growth. Reduced aggregate demand will further squeeze corporate cash flows and they will cut more expenses, including payroll. The newly unemployed will reinforce the cycle and the problem will multiply to worldwide effect.
The delicate balance of the Yen/Dollar carry trade must be maintained. An enormous shower of liquidity has descended on world financial systems, through borrowing short term in Japan (and Switzerland) and lending long elsewhere. To encourage this arrangement, exchange rates must be relatively stable. When the dollar fell and the yen rose last spring difficulties arose for those hoping to close their Japanese obligation with equal or lower valued yen. The Japanese central bank also drained liquidity from the system and declared an eventual end to ultra-low short rates. Further damage was inflicted on the long end via the decline in bond prices. Over the summer the dollar/yen relation stabilized and Japan’s central bank deferred a rate increase. Almost simultaneously Treasury prices began to rise, restoring profits on the long end of the trade. This scenario needs to be maintained in approximate equilibrium.
The leveraged carry trade is an important driver of our economy as it helps suppress interest rates. Last spring’s partial unwinding was an unpleasant illustration of the potential and eventual impairment. Meanwhile its resumption later in the summer reinvigorated asset prices and risk appetites across the globe. Even if the carry trade is only providing marginal support to bonds, the withdrawal of marginal buyers will cause an adjustment in prices.
Many market observers have been calling for the Federal Reserve to cut short term rates in 2007. Be careful what you wish for. Looser financial conditions may well put downward pressure on the dollar. A decline in the dollar could promote higher long term interest rates and trigger a protracted slump. The Fed may not have the option of substantial easing in the next economic downturn. Some have postulated the Fed may indeed be forced to raise rates. The justification proffered would be inflation; the unspoken reason would be to defend the dollar. It’s possible a Fed Funds move in either direction in excess of 50 bps would be harmful.
Another feasible tipping point is gaining momentum every day. Leveraged buy-outs, mergers, and acquisitions are leading a surge in corporate debt. Reminiscent of the junk bond craze of the 1980’s, highly levered companies have a high degree of financial risk and are extremely exposed should an earnings shortfall occur. This will end badly.
In conclusion a recession or prolonged slowdown is an unavoidable outcome of history’s largest bubble. That it has not been widely noticed makes it all the more dangerous. A credit reduction induced recession is considered at best a very low probability “outlier” by Wall Street. Perhaps that enhances the case presented here. Conventional economists, including those at the Fed, see no problem in unbounded credit and monetary growth. The post 2003 recovery is accepted as solid and sustainable. The fact it is built on debt has conveniently been ignored. Some day it will be viewed differently.
Using the NASDAQ timeline as a basis the major surge began in 1995 and lasted five years. Credit growth went ballistic in 2003 so 2008 would be a comparable end point. From a growth standpoint the NASDAQ had a five-fold gain from near 1000 to 5000. Total Credit Market Debt has about doubled since 2003. A 500% gain from $2.7T projects to $13.5T, a preposterous 170% gain from today’s basis. Looking back to 1997 debt has surged form $1T to an estimated $5T today. The recent pace indicates there is momentum left in the credit creation machine. In a warped expression of Say’s Law, supply of credit creates its own demand. All bubbles in effect cause their own demise. Based on the time and growth variables, a reasonable estimate is this one will end in late 2007 or the first half of 2008.
A more precise quantitative measure is available – contraction of credit. Credit growth can be measured by the year over year growth of the four quarter moving average. (See my previous note and spreadsheet for detail.) The break point is a contraction of 10% or more. Further confirmation will be seen in spreads. The one year Libor over one year T-Bill spread will widen to over 100 bps with perhaps a 50 bps spike in one quarter, indicating mounting stress in the financial system. High yield spreads will shoot upwards as well. The smoothed credit growth rate and Libor spread have in the past issued advanced warning. The stock market will react at about the same time, anticipating problems three to six months down the road.
How could this play out? What is a logical course of events?
Relief will be felt in 2007 at the limited fallout from the Housing slowdown. Goldman Sachs’ economic team has forecast a 1.5% impact to the economy resulting in a GDP growth of 1.5 to 2.0% next year. Consumer spending will slow and inflationary pressures will abate. The desired soft landing will appear to have been achieved -- a slowdown but no recession. The Fed will feel empowered to cut rates. Long term interest rates, already quiescent from a slow economy, will move lower as enormous new carry trades will be placed on Treasuries. Debt creation will surge again. Economic growth will pick up for a time.
It will be the last hurrah, analogous to the NASDAQ of early 2000. All bubbles have a bursting point. At some point some over-leveraged, in over their heads individuals and companies will be unable to meet their debt obligations. Defaults will slowly mount. Financials will finally demonstrate lending restraint. Companies unable to extend their credit lines and now in financial distress will lay off employees who will then be unable to meet their payments. A cowed consumer will retrench. Consumer spending, having increased every quarter since 1991, will experience negative growth. Reduced aggregate demand will squeeze corporate cash flows and they will cut expenditures, including payroll. The newly unemployed will…do the obvious and the problem will multiply to worldwide effect.
In conclusion a deep recession is an unavoidable outcome of history’s largest bubble, the Credit Bubble. That it has not been widely noticed makes it all the more dangerous. Conventional economists, including those at the Fed, see no problem in unbounded credit and monetary growth. The post 2003 recovery is accepted as solid and sustainable. The fact it is built on debt has conveniently been ignored. Some day it will be viewed.
September 15, 2006
The Broker/Dealers (Goldman, Lehman and Bear Stearns) this week reported better-than-expected fiscal third quarter results, an especially inspiriting development considering that they maintained remarkable momentum despite headwinds from the most challenging market environment in many quarters.
For the first nine months or the year, the three Wall Street firms combined for Net Revenues of an incredible $47.8 billion, up 37% from comparable 2005. This provides a valuable reminder that “resiliency” is a defining attribute of contemporary “Wall Street Finance.” As they demonstrated (again) this past quarter, if market dynamics dictate that particular segments of the brokerage/proprietary trading/securities financing/investment banking/derivatives/global finance business face tougher headwinds, it is simply a matter of tacking a bit in another direction. If one sector or region is struggling, just push the others. If one area of the market falls somewhat out of favor, simply fashion and offer buyers (increasingly hedge funds – see “Speculator Watch” above) the type of securities, instruments and/or derivative products with the return, risk and liquidity profile they demand. If clients prefer to leverage U.S. or global securities, fine; need financing to buy companies at home or abroad, no problem; or any complex derivative strategy for any market – now so easily accomplished. And, importantly, championing booms in the relatively better performing areas, sectors and regions works to buttress liquidity for the enjoyment of all (hence, bolstering the lagging – as we witnessed with market pricing this week). It is also worth noting that Goldman, Lehman, and Bear Stearns combined to compensate their employees $23.6 billion during the first three quarters of the year. Have there ever been more powerful direct incentives to sustain a financial boom?
I have argued for too long that mounting U.S. Current Account Deficits are a consequence of the U.S. Financial Sphere creating excessive Credit/”purchasing power” and then directing resultant abundant financial flows to securities and asset markets (with attendant Financial and Economic Spheres maladjustment). These Monetary Processes and resulting Monetary Disorder are only reinforced by the Bernanke Fed’s abhorrence of popping Bubbles.
I hope readers will connect the dots, although we all know that policymakers never ever will. Runaway U.S. Financial Sphere excess and attendant massive U.S. Current Account Deficits are the primary (inflationary) factor spawning this unparalleled Ballooning Pool of Global Speculative Finance.
Dollar “stability” demands ongoing massive central bank dollar purchases – support operations certain to only exacerbate Global Monetary Disorder. In concert, domestic and international Credit system dynamics do today buttress U.S. financial and economic Bubbles – housing slowdown notwithstanding. It’s inevitably a losing proposition.
The market impact of the recent unwind of some commodities and bearish bets is absolutely inconsequential compared to the crisis that will be initiated when Monetary Disorder eventually leads to a scramble (and de-leveraging) out of bursting U.S. and global securities markets Bubbles.
Since the Fed began cutting rates aggressively in early 2001, Total Credit Market Debt has increased $15.8 TN, or 58%, to $42.67 TN (320% of GDP!). The bond market turned giddy this week with the happy notion that Fed policy will soon be poised to once again inflate the market value of the ever-more-massive stockpile of U.S. fixed-income securities, instruments and their derivatives. We’re now witnessing a consequence of the Fed’s flawed “tightening” stance, focusing on economic vulnerability while disregarding precariously loose financial conditions.
To be sure, speculative leveraging these days in the fixed-income markets has an unparalleled capability of creating abundant liquidity for the markets and system generally. And as bond prices inflate in response to heightened speculative leveraging and resulting liquidity creation, those that had been positioned for higher rates (both speculations and hedges) are forced to unwind these trades – in the process creating only more price inflation and liquidity over-abundance. Meanwhile, the yield curve gyrates and causes bloody havoc for myriad curve and rate speculations.
Alas, the specter of unending Credit Bubble excess, unending Current Account Deficits and resulting unending foreign buying of U.S. Treasuries, agencies, ABS, and MBS is providing the impetus for one heck of a liquidity-driven dislocation in bond market pricing.
To begin, it is worth mentioning that in the 21 quarters prior to the second quarter (since the beginning of 1998) total Credit Market Borrowings (Non-financial and Financial) surged 51% - or $10.9 Trillion - to $32.1 Trillion. After an extended period of historic excess, Credit growth has now gone "parabolic." During the second quarter, Total Credit Market Borrowings expanded at an (seasonally-adjusted) annualized rate of $3.35 Trillion (10.4%). This was a pace 27% greater than the previous record posted during 2002's fourth quarter.
Led by record federal and household borrowings, Non-financial debt expanded at a 12% rate, double the first quarter. One has to go all the way back to 1985 to find a year with stronger Non-financial debt expansion. The federal government increased borrowings at a 24.3% annual pace. Total Non-financial Credit increased an unprecedented $631 billion during the quarter to $21.6 Trillion. Since the beginning of 1998, Total Non-financial Credit has jumped $6.40 Trillion, or 42%. Over this same period, GDP increased $2.54 Trillion, or 31%. Thus, over the past 22 quarters, Total Non-financial Credit has increased from 184% of GDP to 200%. Non-financial Credit was about 140% of GDP back in 1980. Since the beginning of 1998, Financial Sector Credit Market Borrowings have surged $5.30 Trillion, or 97%, to $10.76 Trillion. Financial borrowings as a percentage of GDP have jumped from 66% to 100%. Total Credit Market borrowings (Non-financial and Financial) have surged $11.7 Trillion, or 57% over 22 quarters. As a percentage of GDP, Total Credit has increased from 250% of GDP to 300%.
And despite a surge in Household borrowings (expanding 15% annualized to $9.3 Trillion), Household Net Worth jumped $1.7 Trillion during the quarter, or almost 17% annualized, to $41.4 Trillion. There remains little mystery as to why consumer borrowing and spending remains so resilient: Asset Inflation.
And there is simply no way around the very harsh reality that current extraordinary Credit and speculative excesses are setting the stage for financial and economic instability unlike anything experienced in a very long time. Rampant asset inflation and lurching economies are seductively un-enduring inflationary manifestations.
The Debt Bubble - The End Point
http://www.financialsense.com/fsu/editorials/2007/0104d.html
by Frank Corbett
January 4, 2007
A lot attention has focused on the housing bubble. Receiving less notice in the mainstream media is the overall credit situation. The debt bubble is much larger than the housing bubble and permeates every sector of the economy. The fallout of the Tech/Media/Telecom bubble of the late 1990’s was for the most part limited to those sectors. When this bubble ends the damage will be far, wide, and deep.
The key question to be addressed here is: When could it end?
First let’s look at the ratio of Total Credit Market Debt to GDP. Intuitively this is not a good picture. There will come a point where cash flows will be strained to service the debt.
[Blockierte Grafik: http://www.financialsense.com/fsu/editorials/2007/images/0104d.28.gif]
Another helpful illustration is to review seasonally adjusted flows of total credit market debt (TCMD) instruments provided by the Federal Reserve. It is essentially the additional debt added each quarter, as opposed to the cumulative total. Flows show the quarterly change and illuminate the rapid growth of credit, especially in recent years. The amount of debt added each quarter has been rising steadily despite an erratic quarter by quarter variation.
[Blockierte Grafik: http://www.financialsense.com/fsu/editorials/2007/images/0104d.29.gif]
Could this data be used to predict a reversal or slowdown? Some sort of quantitative analysis is desirable. The following steps yielded meaningful results.
1. Calculate the moving average of the last four quarters of seasonally adjusted flows to all credit market sectors.
2. Figure the quarterly percentage changes of the moving average from step one.
3. Determine the year over year percentage changes of the quarterly growth derived in step two.
In summary the steps provide a year over year change of the quarterly growth of a four quarter moving average. It is a smoothing technique for volatile quarterly variation.
Using the data provided by the Federal Reserve back to 1981 it is apparent the economy and stock market struggle when the number becomes negative. Serious trouble occurs when the number goes below -10%.
[Blockierte Grafik: http://www.financialsense.com/fsu/editorials/2007/images/0104d.30.gif]
The current level is +8.34%. A decline of 18.34% is required to arrive at -10%. How quickly could the danger zone be reached? Two estimates of time needed to reach -10% are provided in the far right column below.
*
Absolute value of all quarterly changes 9.56% 1.92 Quarters
*
Absolute value of all negative quarters 10.80% 1.70 Quarters
Two quarters is about the shortest time frame until difficulties could ensue. Data is as of September so the end of the first quarter of 2007 is the first potential target date. Based on the time and quarterly change variables, a reasonable estimate is this bubble will end two to four quarters after September, 2006. Look for problems to surface between March and September of next year. The smoothed trend is postured to decline and looks like it may roll over. The second chart pictured above (TCMD Flows) shows a significant decline in flows over the two most recent quarters, from 4 trillion to 3 trillion dollars.
The creation of mortgage debt has slowed appreciably. Undeterred, individuals are still looking for ways to spend by borrowing. Dow Jones reported on November 1 that “89% of Freddie Mac-owned loans that were refinanced resulted in new mortgages with loan amounts that were at least 5% higher than the original loan balances …and is the highest share since the second quarter of 1990.” Revolving credit such as credit cards is expanding. However, corporate debt is the major story of late; it has resurfaced as a powerful force after the 2002 to 2003 debacle.
Financial institutions are aggressively positioned for expansion. Just look in your mailbox. Everybody is pre-approved. Any company qualifies for leveraged bank loans or high yield debt. A department manager at a major financial company submitting a business plan calling for less than 20% growth may as well include a letter of resignation. In a warped expression of Say’s Law, supply of credit creates its own demand. The economy and the consumer may well surprise on the upside for several quarters. In the end though, all bubbles cause their own demise.
Contractions in credit growth have been bad news in the past. The next instance will be more harmful than past episodes given the credit dependent nature of the US economy. Lower interest rates may generate relief for those able to refinance their debt. However, fully levered consumers and businesses will not be in a position to take on additional obligations. Moreover, consumers no longer have a pool of savings to augment income and maintain spending. Fear of job loss could finally motivate people to save, further reducing near term economic growth.
What circumstances might serve as tipping points?
An increase in long term rates would be very harmful. The supply of oxygen to the US economy was restricted in May of 2006 when the ten year US Treasury Bond yield moved over 5%. Raising the price of credit is the most direct means of restricting its growth.
A slowdown in the economy beyond the universally accepted “soft landing” scenario will markedly increase the default rate on loans. If the rate of underperforming loans increases, financial intermediaries will finally demonstrate lending restraint. Sub-prime lending is exhibiting signs of difficulty and two firms recently shut down. (Dissolving the company is the ultimate form of lending restraint.) Corporate borrowers unable to extend their credit lines and experiencing financial stress will lay off employees who will then be unable to meet their payments. Consumer spending, having increased every quarter since 1991, will undergo negative growth. Reduced aggregate demand will further squeeze corporate cash flows and they will cut more expenses, including payroll. The newly unemployed will reinforce the cycle and the problem will multiply to worldwide effect.
The delicate balance of the Yen/Dollar carry trade must be maintained. An enormous shower of liquidity has descended on world financial systems, through borrowing short term in Japan (and Switzerland) and lending long elsewhere. To encourage this arrangement, exchange rates must be relatively stable. When the dollar fell and the yen rose last spring difficulties arose for those hoping to close their Japanese obligation with equal or lower valued yen. The Japanese central bank also drained liquidity from the system and declared an eventual end to ultra-low short rates. Further damage was inflicted on the long end via the decline in bond prices. Over the summer the dollar/yen relation stabilized and Japan’s central bank deferred a rate increase. Almost simultaneously Treasury prices began to rise, restoring profits on the long end of the trade. This scenario needs to be maintained in approximate equilibrium.
The leveraged carry trade is an important driver of our economy as it helps suppress interest rates. Last spring’s partial unwinding was an unpleasant illustration of the potential and eventual impairment. Meanwhile its resumption later in the summer reinvigorated asset prices and risk appetites across the globe. Even if the carry trade is only providing marginal support to bonds, the withdrawal of marginal buyers will cause an adjustment in prices.
Many market observers have been calling for the Federal Reserve to cut short term rates in 2007. Be careful what you wish for. Looser financial conditions may well put downward pressure on the dollar. A decline in the dollar could promote higher long term interest rates and trigger a protracted slump. The Fed may not have the option of substantial easing in the next economic downturn. Some have postulated the Fed may indeed be forced to raise rates. The justification proffered would be inflation; the unspoken reason would be to defend the dollar. It’s possible a Fed Funds move in either direction in excess of 50 bps would be harmful.
Another feasible tipping point is gaining momentum every day. Leveraged buy-outs, mergers, and acquisitions are leading a surge in corporate debt. Reminiscent of the junk bond craze of the 1980’s, highly levered companies have a high degree of financial risk and are extremely exposed should an earnings shortfall occur. This will end badly.
In conclusion a recession or prolonged slowdown is an unavoidable outcome of history’s largest bubble. That it has not been widely noticed makes it all the more dangerous. A credit reduction induced recession is considered at best a very low probability “outlier” by Wall Street. Perhaps that enhances the case presented here. Conventional economists, including those at the Fed, see no problem in unbounded credit and monetary growth. The post 2003 recovery is accepted as solid and sustainable. The fact it is built on debt has conveniently been ignored. Some day it will be viewed differently.
Using the NASDAQ timeline as a basis the major surge began in 1995 and lasted five years. Credit growth went ballistic in 2003 so 2008 would be a comparable end point. From a growth standpoint the NASDAQ had a five-fold gain from near 1000 to 5000. Total Credit Market Debt has about doubled since 2003. A 500% gain from $2.7T projects to $13.5T, a preposterous 170% gain from today’s basis. Looking back to 1997 debt has surged form $1T to an estimated $5T today. The recent pace indicates there is momentum left in the credit creation machine. In a warped expression of Say’s Law, supply of credit creates its own demand. All bubbles in effect cause their own demise. Based on the time and growth variables, a reasonable estimate is this one will end in late 2007 or the first half of 2008.
A more precise quantitative measure is available – contraction of credit. Credit growth can be measured by the year over year growth of the four quarter moving average. (See my previous note and spreadsheet for detail.) The break point is a contraction of 10% or more. Further confirmation will be seen in spreads. The one year Libor over one year T-Bill spread will widen to over 100 bps with perhaps a 50 bps spike in one quarter, indicating mounting stress in the financial system. High yield spreads will shoot upwards as well. The smoothed credit growth rate and Libor spread have in the past issued advanced warning. The stock market will react at about the same time, anticipating problems three to six months down the road.
How could this play out? What is a logical course of events?
Relief will be felt in 2007 at the limited fallout from the Housing slowdown. Goldman Sachs’ economic team has forecast a 1.5% impact to the economy resulting in a GDP growth of 1.5 to 2.0% next year. Consumer spending will slow and inflationary pressures will abate. The desired soft landing will appear to have been achieved -- a slowdown but no recession. The Fed will feel empowered to cut rates. Long term interest rates, already quiescent from a slow economy, will move lower as enormous new carry trades will be placed on Treasuries. Debt creation will surge again. Economic growth will pick up for a time.
It will be the last hurrah, analogous to the NASDAQ of early 2000. All bubbles have a bursting point. At some point some over-leveraged, in over their heads individuals and companies will be unable to meet their debt obligations. Defaults will slowly mount. Financials will finally demonstrate lending restraint. Companies unable to extend their credit lines and now in financial distress will lay off employees who will then be unable to meet their payments. A cowed consumer will retrench. Consumer spending, having increased every quarter since 1991, will experience negative growth. Reduced aggregate demand will squeeze corporate cash flows and they will cut expenditures, including payroll. The newly unemployed will…do the obvious and the problem will multiply to worldwide effect.
In conclusion a deep recession is an unavoidable outcome of history’s largest bubble, the Credit Bubble. That it has not been widely noticed makes it all the more dangerous. Conventional economists, including those at the Fed, see no problem in unbounded credit and monetary growth. The post 2003 recovery is accepted as solid and sustainable. The fact it is built on debt has conveniently been ignored. Some day it will be viewed.
September 15, 2006
The Broker/Dealers (Goldman, Lehman and Bear Stearns) this week reported better-than-expected fiscal third quarter results, an especially inspiriting development considering that they maintained remarkable momentum despite headwinds from the most challenging market environment in many quarters.
For the first nine months or the year, the three Wall Street firms combined for Net Revenues of an incredible $47.8 billion, up 37% from comparable 2005. This provides a valuable reminder that “resiliency” is a defining attribute of contemporary “Wall Street Finance.” As they demonstrated (again) this past quarter, if market dynamics dictate that particular segments of the brokerage/proprietary trading/securities financing/investment banking/derivatives/global finance business face tougher headwinds, it is simply a matter of tacking a bit in another direction. If one sector or region is struggling, just push the others. If one area of the market falls somewhat out of favor, simply fashion and offer buyers (increasingly hedge funds – see “Speculator Watch” above) the type of securities, instruments and/or derivative products with the return, risk and liquidity profile they demand. If clients prefer to leverage U.S. or global securities, fine; need financing to buy companies at home or abroad, no problem; or any complex derivative strategy for any market – now so easily accomplished. And, importantly, championing booms in the relatively better performing areas, sectors and regions works to buttress liquidity for the enjoyment of all (hence, bolstering the lagging – as we witnessed with market pricing this week). It is also worth noting that Goldman, Lehman, and Bear Stearns combined to compensate their employees $23.6 billion during the first three quarters of the year. Have there ever been more powerful direct incentives to sustain a financial boom?
I have argued for too long that mounting U.S. Current Account Deficits are a consequence of the U.S. Financial Sphere creating excessive Credit/”purchasing power” and then directing resultant abundant financial flows to securities and asset markets (with attendant Financial and Economic Spheres maladjustment). These Monetary Processes and resulting Monetary Disorder are only reinforced by the Bernanke Fed’s abhorrence of popping Bubbles.
I hope readers will connect the dots, although we all know that policymakers never ever will. Runaway U.S. Financial Sphere excess and attendant massive U.S. Current Account Deficits are the primary (inflationary) factor spawning this unparalleled Ballooning Pool of Global Speculative Finance.
Dollar “stability” demands ongoing massive central bank dollar purchases – support operations certain to only exacerbate Global Monetary Disorder. In concert, domestic and international Credit system dynamics do today buttress U.S. financial and economic Bubbles – housing slowdown notwithstanding. It’s inevitably a losing proposition.
The market impact of the recent unwind of some commodities and bearish bets is absolutely inconsequential compared to the crisis that will be initiated when Monetary Disorder eventually leads to a scramble (and de-leveraging) out of bursting U.S. and global securities markets Bubbles.
Since the Fed began cutting rates aggressively in early 2001, Total Credit Market Debt has increased $15.8 TN, or 58%, to $42.67 TN (320% of GDP!). The bond market turned giddy this week with the happy notion that Fed policy will soon be poised to once again inflate the market value of the ever-more-massive stockpile of U.S. fixed-income securities, instruments and their derivatives. We’re now witnessing a consequence of the Fed’s flawed “tightening” stance, focusing on economic vulnerability while disregarding precariously loose financial conditions.
To be sure, speculative leveraging these days in the fixed-income markets has an unparalleled capability of creating abundant liquidity for the markets and system generally. And as bond prices inflate in response to heightened speculative leveraging and resulting liquidity creation, those that had been positioned for higher rates (both speculations and hedges) are forced to unwind these trades – in the process creating only more price inflation and liquidity over-abundance. Meanwhile, the yield curve gyrates and causes bloody havoc for myriad curve and rate speculations.
Alas, the specter of unending Credit Bubble excess, unending Current Account Deficits and resulting unending foreign buying of U.S. Treasuries, agencies, ABS, and MBS is providing the impetus for one heck of a liquidity-driven dislocation in bond market pricing.
To begin, it is worth mentioning that in the 21 quarters prior to the second quarter (since the beginning of 1998) total Credit Market Borrowings (Non-financial and Financial) surged 51% - or $10.9 Trillion - to $32.1 Trillion. After an extended period of historic excess, Credit growth has now gone "parabolic." During the second quarter, Total Credit Market Borrowings expanded at an (seasonally-adjusted) annualized rate of $3.35 Trillion (10.4%). This was a pace 27% greater than the previous record posted during 2002's fourth quarter.
Led by record federal and household borrowings, Non-financial debt expanded at a 12% rate, double the first quarter. One has to go all the way back to 1985 to find a year with stronger Non-financial debt expansion. The federal government increased borrowings at a 24.3% annual pace. Total Non-financial Credit increased an unprecedented $631 billion during the quarter to $21.6 Trillion. Since the beginning of 1998, Total Non-financial Credit has jumped $6.40 Trillion, or 42%. Over this same period, GDP increased $2.54 Trillion, or 31%. Thus, over the past 22 quarters, Total Non-financial Credit has increased from 184% of GDP to 200%. Non-financial Credit was about 140% of GDP back in 1980. Since the beginning of 1998, Financial Sector Credit Market Borrowings have surged $5.30 Trillion, or 97%, to $10.76 Trillion. Financial borrowings as a percentage of GDP have jumped from 66% to 100%. Total Credit Market borrowings (Non-financial and Financial) have surged $11.7 Trillion, or 57% over 22 quarters. As a percentage of GDP, Total Credit has increased from 250% of GDP to 300%.
And despite a surge in Household borrowings (expanding 15% annualized to $9.3 Trillion), Household Net Worth jumped $1.7 Trillion during the quarter, or almost 17% annualized, to $41.4 Trillion. There remains little mystery as to why consumer borrowing and spending remains so resilient: Asset Inflation.
And there is simply no way around the very harsh reality that current extraordinary Credit and speculative excesses are setting the stage for financial and economic instability unlike anything experienced in a very long time. Rampant asset inflation and lurching economies are seductively un-enduring inflationary manifestations.
Hi Baron,
kannst das bitte mal so in 2-3 Sätzen wiedergeben.hab nen Mega Kater! 
Gruss Atze
Look at this:
A 500% gain from $2.7T projects to $13.5T, a preposterous 170% gain from today’s basis. Looking back to 1997 debt has surged form $1T to an estimated $5T today. The recent pace indicates there is momentum left in the credit creation machine. In a warped expression of Say’s Law, supply of credit creates its own demand. All bubbles in effect cause their own demise. Based on the time and growth variables, a reasonable estimate is this one will end in late 2007 or the first half of 2008.
Nach Angaben des Autors Ende 2007 bis Anfang 2008.
Er nimmt dazu die NASDAQ-Bubble als Masstab.
Wir werden sehen. Dazu ist auch noch festzuhalten, dass die Yield-Carry-Trades bereits im Mai 2006 fast geplatzt wären.
Wenn ein grosser "Unfall" passiert, kann es jederzeit geschehen.
Die US-Wirtschaft erholt sich rüstungsbedingt ein wenig und deshalb wird auch die Debt Bubble auf absehbare Zeit so weitergehen.
Was vielleicht noch nicht in aller Tragweite bei den Leuten angekommen ist, obwohl es ja vorhersehbar war und alles andere als ein Geheimnis ist: die US-Rüstungsindustrie brummt wie verrückt, und ein Gutteil der neugeschaffenen Jobs stammt aus genau diesem Sektor - ganz ähnlich wie schon zu Zeiten des Vietnamkriegs.
Und wie damals "schaffen" es die dafür Verantwortlichen, nicht allein für die eigene Armee zu produzieren und Steuergelder in den Rüstungssektor zu leiten, sondern die Kunden aus aller Welt stehen Schlange und reißen ihnen die Waffen förmlich aus der Hand.
Für die politisch-ökonomischen Eliten läuft bis heute alles nach Plan, das muß man in aller Deutlichkeit feststellen, auch wenn der Irakkrieg scheinbar ein "Desaster", ein "Irrtum", eine "Fehlentscheidung " oder eine "Katastrophe" etc. sein soll.
Sie schaffen ein katastrophales politisches Szenario und bringen damit den einzigen Industriesektor nach vorne, auf dem sie mehr als nur mithalten können.
Ganz perfide auch manche amerikanischen Finanzseiten im Internet - noch bis vor Weihnachten wird für Gold getrommelt und nun darf es auch einmal ein Investment in der Rüstungsindustrie sein. Warum sollen denn immer nur die big boys alles abstauben?
Dieses Land ist geistig völlig verkorkst, die Leute würden ihre eigene Großmutter verkaufen, Hauptsache es bringt Profit.
mfG
Goldcore
Also wenn ich richtig gerechnet habe sind es nur 33 Mrd. USD p.a.
Sind das nicht winzige Mengen ?
Die haben doch 70 Mrd. USD HB Defizit pro Monat.
Oder sind es 33.000 Mrd. USD
So viel kann aber nicht sein, daß würde ja bis in eine andere Galaxie reichen.
Gruß Hase
Eher 2.!
Kracht die "Housing Bubble"? 
Der Mainstream wird langsam aktiv!
http://boerse.ard.de/content.j…ldung&key=dokument_205316
Pessimisten warnen, dass das Platzen der Finanzmarktblase vor fünf Jahren eine Rezession bewirkt habe. Deren Wert habe rund sieben Billionen Dollar betragen. Demgegenüber schätzen Experten den wertmäßigen Umfang der Blase auf der Spitze des Immobilienbooms zwar nur auf rund fünf Billionen Dollar. Ein Einbruch könnte trotzdem drastischer ausfallen, da die meisten US-Bürger den Großteil ihres Privatvermögens in Form von Hausbesitz halten, heißt es.
WOLFOWITZ' WELTBANK
Sie vergibt jährlich bis zu 25 Milliarden Dollar an Krediten, oft verzichtet sie auf Zinsen und Gewinne - die Weltbank ist einer der größten Geldgeber der Dritten Welt. Gleichzeitig will sie ihre Kunden erziehen zu Selbstverantwortung und globalem Denken. Aber wie wirksam ist sie?
[Blockierte Grafik: http://www.spiegel.de/img/0,1020,700606,00.jpg]
Kritisiert wird die Weltbank seit ihrer Gründung, weil viele Projekte scheitern. Seit sie vom Bush-Gefährten Paul Wolfowitz geleitet wird, ist aus Kritik Hass geworden. Dabei hat die Bank ihre Strategie längst geändert - ist sie nun auch effektiver?
mehr...
[URL=http://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/0,1518,459779,00.html]Spiegel Online[/URL]
Experten warnen vor dem großen Crash
Von Arvid Kaiser
Nach vier Wachstumsjahren erwartet die Finanzmärkte nun das fünfte - so lautet die gängige Prognose. Extrem unwahrscheinlich, halten Skeptiker dagegen. Vielmehr stünden die Börsen unmittelbar vor einer neuen Baisse. Die Unruhe wächst.
Hamburg - Die Zwerge haben zu tief und zu gierig geschürft. So lautet in J.R.R. Tolkiens Fantasy-Epos "Herr der Ringe" die düstere Erklärung, warum das einstmals goldene Minenreich Moria von Tod und Verderben überzogen wurde und nun schreckliche Fabelwesen, die Balrogs, beherbergt. Ähnlich mystisch und abwegig mögen Beobachtern der Börsenhausse im Januar 2007 moderne Kassandrarufe erscheinen, die Party sei bald vorbei. Doch diese Rufe werden lauter - und die Begründungen werden besser.
Vier Jahre in Folge sind die Aktienmärkte inzwischen gewachsen, allein der Dax Chart zeigen legte im vergangenen Jahr um 22 Prozent zu. Die meisten Analysten sagen für 2007 ein weiteres Plus voraus - auch wenn es wahrscheinlich nicht so deutlich ausfällt wie im Vorjahr. Aber 7000 Punkte, ein neues rundes Ziel, sollten drin sein. Der Aufschwung der deutschen Wirtschaft beginnt gerade erst - und da soll es schon wieder vorbei sein?
Die Antwort lautet ja, wenn man Hans Albrecht glaubt. Der Gründer des Private-Equity-Hauses Nordwind Capital schenkte seinen Geschäftsfreunden zu Weihnachten "The Great Crash: 1929" von John Kenneth Galbraith. Das Buch des unorthodoxen Ökonomen über die Ursachen der Weltwirtschaftskrise sei eine gute Vorbereitung auf das neue Jahr, fand Albrecht. "Wie 1999, bin ich überzeugt, dass sich die Finanzmärkte derzeit in einem Zustand großer irrationaler Übertreibung befinden - um es milde auszudrücken."
Selbst den Vergleich mit 1929 hält Albrecht für passend. "Die bemerkenswerteste Parallele ist die Liquiditätsblase", sagt der ehemalige Hedgefondsmanager. Das Finanzvermögen in den G8-Ländern wachse um ein Vielfaches schneller als die Produktivität, davon lasse sich nur ein Bruchteil mit der Inflation erklären. "Also ist es eine Blase", folgert Albrecht. Seine Hauptsorge sei, dass ein Ansturm auf Hedgefonds zu einer großen Krise der internationalen Finanzmärkte führt.
Selbst Optimisten beginnen zu zweifeln
Bisher seien schon mehr als 1,3 Billionen Dollar in Hedgefonds investiert, die wiederum stark fremdfinanziert seien - überschüssiges Kapital werde auf Wetten gesetzt, die nicht eingelöst werden könnten. Immer mehr Anleger sähen bei anderen, dass diese ihre Einlagen in wenigen Jahren verdoppeln und wollten ebensolche Renditen erzielen. Das erinnere an die Geschichte vom König, der auf jedes Feld eines Schachbretts die doppelte Zahl Reiskörner legen wollte. "Das Verdoppeln hat ein Ende", sagt Albrecht.
Manche der Mahner und Warner haben ihr feines Gespür für künftige Entwicklungen schon mehrfach unter Beweis gestellt. sind schon lange im Geschäft. Der Vermögensverwalter und ehemalige Direktor der Banque Bruxelles Lambert (heute ING) Roland Leuschel etwa sah die Börsencrashs von 1987 und 2000 rechtzeitig voraus, gefährdete seinen Ruf später aber mit konstanten Warnungen vor neuen Krisen, die nicht eintrafen. Nach eigenen Angaben hat Leuschel Mitte 2006 alle Aktien verkauft - zu früh, weil er damit die Jahresendrally verpasste.
Dass der Schweizer Marc Faber von Hongkong aus in seinem "Gloom, Boom & Doom Report" verbreitet, große Schwellenländerbörsen wie die in China, Russland oder Indien würden bald zusammenbrechen, ist ebenfalls keine Überraschung. Der leicht exzentrische Investmentguru sonnt sich seit Jahren in seinem Image als "Dr. Doom", der gegen den Trend wettet und immer dann gewinnt, wenn der Herdentrieb die Lemminge über die Klippe springen lässt.
Doch nun beginnt auf der anderen Seite die große Mehrheit der notorischen Optimisten zu zweifeln. "Inzwischen ist die Volatilität einzelner Aktien schon wieder sehr hoch, und eine Korrektur nach den jüngsten Kursanstiegen ist eigentlich absehbar", sagte Peter Oppenheimer, Europa-Stratege der Investmentbank Goldman Sachs, jüngst auf einer Strategiekonferenz der Bank. Korrektur wohlgemerkt, von einem Crash mochte Oppenheimer nicht sprechen. Langfristig gehe das Börsenwachstum weiter, versprach der Investmentbanker.
Dennoch sei das Vertrauen der Anleger in die gute Konjunktur zuletzt zu groß gewesen. Noch im ersten Quartal werde es einen deutlichen Dämpfer geben. So sichern sich die Auguren allmählich für den Fall ab, dass das historisch ungewöhnliche, aber gewünschte fünfte gute Börsenjahr in Folge doch nicht kommt. Die ermutigende Tendenz soll aber bleiben.
"Die Hoffnung auf eine sanfte Landung hatten wir in jeder Rezession", meint dazu Claus Vogt, Leiter Research und Vermögensverwaltung der Berliner Effektenbank und Co-Autor eines Buchs mit Leuschel. Dass es 2007, von den USA ausgehend, zu einer neuen Wirtschaftskrise kommt, hält Vogt für beinahe ausgemacht: "Die Wahrscheinlichkeit beziffere ich auf 80 bis 90 Prozent." Sogar den Zeitpunkt kann Vogt eingrenzen, nämlich auf das zweite oder dritte Quartal. Im ersten Quartal spiele das ungewöhnlich milde Wetter noch mit.
US-Immobilienmarkt liefert Grund zur Skepsis
Vogt begründet seine Prognose mit der Zinsstruktur in den USA. Langfristige Anleihen bieten eine niedrigere Rendite als kurzfristige. Das bedeutet, dass die Akteure das kurzfristige Risiko als hoch einschätzen. Laut einer Studie der US-Zentralbank Federal Reserve ist eine inverse Zinsstruktur in der Vergangenheit der sicherste Indikator für eine bevorstehende Rezession gewesen - mit einem Vorlauf von rund einem Jahr. Just Ende 2005 trat das seltene Phänomen erstmals seit 2000 wieder auf.
Ein weiterer Grund sei, dass die "Exzesse" im US-Immobilienmarkt sich allmählich auflösten. Und wenn die Realwirtschaft einbreche, so Vogt, kämen auch die Börsen nicht an einer "ordentlichen Baisse" vorbei. Im historischen Durchschnitt habe jede Rezession den Dow Jones Chart zeigen um 36 Prozent gedrückt. Seinen Kunden empfehle er, jetzt defensiver vorzugehen, mit Stop-Loss-Orders zu verhindern, dass sie die Abwärtsbewegung voll mitgehen.
Für Vorsicht spreche auch die Aktienbewertung selbst. Im Gegensatz zu den meisten anderen Analysten hält Vogt die derzeitigen Bewertungen für hoch. Wenn man das Kurs-Gewinn-Verhältnis auf Grundlage der tatsächlichen Gewinne der vergangenen zwölf Monate anstelle zukünftig erwarteter Gewinne berechne, liege es für den Standard & Poor 500 Chart zeigen derzeit bei 18 - der Vergleichswert vor der Weltwirtschaftskrise 1929 sei 19 gewesen. Nur im Vergleich zu den extremen Ausreißern 1999/2000 erscheine die jetzige Bewertung gering.
Außerdem seien die Gewinnmargen derzeit auf einem Rekordniveau, was für die Zukunft sinkende Gewinne erwarten lasse. Andere klassische Indikatoren wie Kurs-Umsatz-Verhältnis oder Umsatzrendite zeigten eine Überbewertung von 50 Prozent an. Dass nach wie vor nur eine Minderheit von Kursverlusten ausgeht setzt, ficht Vogt nicht an. "Nach vier Jahren Bullenmarkt neigen die Leute dazu, bullish zu sein", ist seine Erklärung.
[URL=http://www.spiegel.de/wirtschaft/0,1518,460937,00.html]http://www.spiegel.de/wirtschaft/0,1518,460937,00.html[/URL]
Lasse die letzten Warner noch verstummen und bekehrt durch immer weiter steigende Kurse ihre eigenen Prognosen über Bord werfen.
Dann kanns anfangen, so richtig zu rumpeln.
Irgendwie - so sehe ich das - fehlt momentan noch der Funke, der alles hochgehen lässt.
Soll dem Pfund der Boden entzogen werden?
Ein Insider der Londoner City warnte am 5. Januar in einem Gespräch mit EIR vor der unmittelbaren Gefahr eines Einbruchs des britischen Pfundes. Lyndon LaRouche merkte dazu an: Man müsse einkalkulieren, daß die Briten versuchen, das Potential des mehrheitlich demokratischen neuen US-Kongresses zu unterminieren, indem sie das Pfund Sterling absichtlich einbrechen lassen, um einen Zusammenbruch des Dollars auszulösen. Der Bericht aus London sei im Zusammenhang damit zu sehen, daß mit dem dramatischen Umbruch der Kongreßwahl vom 7. November der Weg zu einer vernünftigen Politik der USA in der Tradition von Franklin Roosevelt offenstehe.
Unter diesen Umständen sei zu erwarten, daß die Finanzoligarchie, deren Zentrum London ist, versuchen werde, dies zu verhindern, indem sie sozusagen einen "Kurzschluß" auslösen. Das sei der Hintergrund des Vorstoßes für einen bewußt herbeigeführten Absturz des Pfundes, so LaRouche. Ein Absturz des Pfund Sterling werde auf den Finanzmärkten eine Kettenreaktion auslösen, die zu einem noch tieferen Sturz des Dollar führt.
So sei es schon 1967-68 gewesen, als die britische Labour-Regierung Harold Wilson dem Pfund gezielt den Boden entzog: Dies habe dann zur Zerstörung des gesamten Bretton-Woods-Systems der festen Wechselkurse am 15. August 1971 geführt. Heute sei der Dollar sehr anfällig, weil die „Globalisierung" das ganze Weltfinanzsystem ruiniert habe. Der Dollar könne schnell auf 80% des jetzigen Wertes und dann noch tiefer stürzen, sagte LaRouche. Dann geriete das ganze Weltwährungssystem in eine Zusammenbruchskrise.
sas
HAUSHALTSKRISE
Libyen feuert 400.000 Staatsangestellte
Die Regierung Libyens greift durch, um ihre Finanznot in den Griff zu bekommen: 400.000 Menschen sollen entlassen werden - ein Drittel aller staatliche Beschäftigten.
Tripolis - Ministerpräsident Al-Baghdadi Ali Al-Mahmudi sagte, mit der Maßnahme solle der Druck auf den Staatshaushalt gemindert werden. Zugleich werde diese Weise der private Sektor "neue Wachstumsimpulse erhalten", behauptete er.
In den vergangenen Jahren war die Belegschaft des libyschen Staates auf mehr als eine Million Menschen angewachsen. Für ihre Gehälter müssten bis zu vier Milliarden Dinar (rund 2,4 Milliarden Euro) aufgebracht werden, sagte der Regierungschef bei der Vorlage des neuen Staatshaushaltes.
Al-Mahmudi betonte, die Betroffenen würden weiter staatliche Unterstützung erhalten. Die Gehälter würden für drei Jahre weitergezahlt. Alternativ werde der Staat 50.000 Dinar Kredit an jeden Ex-Beschäftigten geben, der seine eigene Firma gründen wolle. So sollten "produktive Tätigkeiten" gefördert werden.
Der libysche Staatschef Muammar Gaddafi hat wiederholt kritisiert, sein Land sei wirtschaftlich zu stark vom Ölgeschäft abhängig. Fast alle Deviseneinnahmen des Landes stammen aus dem Ölexport. Der Ölpreis an den Weltmärkten ist in den vergangenen Wochen auf hohem Niveau deutlich gefallen.
Die libysche Wirtschaft leidet seit Jahren unter Sanktionen der internationalen Gemeinschaft, Korruption, Bürokratie und der Unterentwicklung des Bankensystems. Die Arbeitslosenquote beträgt je nach Berechnungsweise mindestens 13 Prozent.
itz/Reuters
Guatemala: Bankenkrise verschärft sich weiter
[Blockierte Grafik: http://media.de.indymedia.org/images/2007/01/166539.jpg]
Seit nunmehr vier Wochen üben sich die Guatemalteken als Überlebenskünstler. Es gibt weiterhin nicht ausreichend Geldscheine, alle Geldautomaten des Landes sind leer und das Innenministerium wittert ganz offiziell in ganzseitigen Zeitungsanzeigen eine Verschwörung der organisierten Kriminalität, um das Land ins Chaos zu stürzen. Derweil wurde nun das zweite Geldinstitut, die „Banco de Comercio“ geschlossen. Es ergingen insgesamt 22 Haftbefehle gegen hochrangige Banker des Landes.
Auf den ersten Blick wirkt Lobo, ein ehemaliger Angstellter bei Daimler Chrysler in Deutschland gefasst. „Mein ganzes Geld ist weg“, sagt er. 600.000 Quetzal, umgerechnet 60.000 Euro hat er bei der „Banco der Comercio“ in Guatemala angelegt. Nahezu seine ganze Abfindung, als er nach über einem Jahrzehnt Daimler den Job hinschmiss und sich vor einigen Monaten ans Auswandern nach Guatemala aufmachte. Auch Ulises geht es nicht besser. Der ehamlige Journalist des „Schwarzwaelder Boten“ in Oberndorf hat rund 50.000 Euro beim jüngsten Bankencrash in Guatemala verloren. Seine private Rente liess er sich erst kürzlich als Einmalzahlung nach Mittelamerika ueberweisen. Das war ein Fehler.
Zu unerwarteter, landesweiter „Berühmtheit“ gelang indes der 59jaehrige Flugkapitän Roberto Lemus Alvarado. Er hatte all seine Ersparnisse, umgerechnet 130.000 Euro, bei der „Banco de Comercio“ angelegt und durfte auf Einladung eines Abgeordneten im Parlament bei einer aktuellen Anhörung höchstpersönlich den Zentralbankchef fragen, ob er denn sein Geld wiedersehen werde. Nachdem dieser verneinte, beging der Pilot kurzerhand Suizid und gab damit der Bankenkrise in Guatemala eine ganz persönliche, sehr tragische Note (siehe Foto).
Wie es nun wirklich weiter geht, weiss niemand. Das Innernministerium liess in ganzseitigen Zeitungsanzeigen erklären, dass man die organisierte Kriminalität hinter der Geldkrise vermute. Man habe eine Spezialeinheit gegründnet, überwache nun den Telefon und e-mail-Verkehr, um die mögliche Verschwörung aufzudecken.
Den meisten Kontoninhabern geht es derweil nur um eines: Ihre Schäfchen möglichst noch ins Trockene zu holen und das Ersparte unter das Kopfkissen zu legen. Was nicht unbedingt einfach ist. Die staatliche CHN-Bank hat weiterhin den Höchstauszahlungsbetrag auf 50 Euro reduziert, bei der halbstaatlichen Banrural bekommt man maximal 200 Euro.
Kommende Woche soll sich nach Regierungsangaben die Bargeldsituation verbessern, wenn neu Scheine im Nennwert von 1,8 Milliarden Quetzal aus der Druckerei in Deutschland geliefert werden. Doch dies reicht wohl maximal einige Tage, um die angestauten Geldbedürfnisse zu befriedigen.
Wahrscheinlicher ist, dass neben der „Bancafé“ und der „Banco de Comercio“ auch noch weitere Banken in den nächsten Tagen Bankrott anmelden werden.
[Blockierte Grafik: http://media.de.indymedia.org/images/2007/01/166540.jpg]
Polizei druchsucht Bankerwohnungen in Guatemala-Stadt
http://de.indymedia.org/2007/01/166538.shtml
Kommentar GOLD_Baron: Genau so könnte es beim gloabeln Crash aussehen: Man gibt der Kriminalität oder dem "internationalen Terrorismus" die Schuld & hat eine konkrete global umspannende Rechtfertigung für totale Überwachung.
OPEC Dumps Treasuries at Fastest Pace Since 2003 on Oil Slide
By Bo Nielsen and Daniel Kruger
Jan. 22 (Bloomberg) -- OPEC nations are unloading Treasuries at the fastest pace in more than three years as crude oil prices tumble, sending bond yields higher.
Exporters including Indonesia, Saudi Arabia and Venezuela, sold 9.4 percent, or $10.1 billion, of their U.S. government debt securities in the three months ended in November, according to Treasury Department data. Members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries last sold Treasuries for three straight months in June 2003.
Oil producers have surpassed Asian central banks as the largest pool of global savings, accumulating an estimated $500 billion in 2006 alone, according to research by Pacific Investment Management Co. The sales during those three months mark a reversal because OPEC countries have boosted their holdings of U.S. government bonds by 70 percent to $97 billion in the past 17 months, Treasury data show.
``There will be a significant sell-off,'' Joseph Stiglitz, a Nobel laureate and economics professor at Columbia University in New York, said in an interview. ``Medium-term and long-term yields will go up.''
Oil producers, including non-OPEC countries, have disclosed almost $200 billion of U.S. government, corporate and agency bonds, said Ramin Toloui, who helps manage about $641 billion for Newport Beach, California-based Pimco, a unit of Munich- based Allianz SE. The holdings are split about evenly between securities due in less than a year and those with longer maturities.
Higher Yields
Treasury 10-year note yields were unchanged at 4.78 percent last week, with the price of the 4 5/8 notes due in November 2016 finishing Jan. 19 at 98 26/32. Yields on two-year notes rose 4 basis points to 4.92 percent. A basis point is 0.01 percentage point.
OPEC members are selling Treasuries because crude prices have declined 34 percent from a record high of $78.40 a barrel in July. They are reducing demand for U.S. government bonds at the same time as central banks from China to Romania say they want to reduce holdings of dollar-denominated assets.
For every $10 drop in the price of a barrel of oil, OPEC members adjust Treasury holdings by about $34 billion, according to estimates by Michael Pond, an interest-rate strategist in New York at Barclays Capital Inc. Selling that amount would raise yields by 0.05 percentage point, he said.
Yields on the benchmark 10-year note have climbed 35 basis points from a 10-month low in December as economic data on housing and employment suggested the Federal Reserve would not cut its target rate for overnight loans between banks from 5.25 percent before June.
Investing `Petrodollars'
Short-term yields have remained above those on longer-term securities since mid-August. That situation, known as an inverted yield curve, has occurred only 11 percent of the time in the past two decades, according to Bloomberg data. Traders watch that difference because four of the past five recessions have been preceded by inverted yield curves.
``The pickup in oil revenues and the recycling of the petrodollars'' was one reason for 10-year yields falling as low as 4.33 percent last year, said George Goncalves, a fixed-income strategist in New York at Bank of America Corp.
`Money to Invest'
OPEC export revenue will decline by about $42 billion by the second quarter, from a peak of $126 billion in the third quarter of 2006 as oil prices tumble, according to estimates from commodity analysts at Charlotte, North Carolina-based Bank of America. Crude for February delivery fell $1 last week to $51.99 a barrel on the New York Mercantile Exchange.
``Lower oil prices mean less inflation pressure, but that doesn't seem to be going on,'' said Stiglitz of Columbia. ``The dollar has been subjected to a great amount of exchange-rate volatility, and it's not a good store of value anymore.''
OPEC countries increased holdings of U.S. government bonds by 115 percent from 2002 to 2006 when the price per barrel rose almost tripled, according to Treasury data.
They still hold more Treasuries than in 2005, when oil prices jumped 41 percent.
``Oil prices are still high compared to the long-run average, and that leaves the oil-producing countries with money to invest in U.S. Treasuries,'' said Torsten Slok, an economist at Deutsche Bank AG in New York.
Deutsche Bank estimates Middle East countries will stop investing in U.S. securities should oil decline to $30 a barrel. Oil averaged $33.28 a barrel for the 10 years ended in 2006.
Foreign Reserves
The oil exporters in the Middle East, Asia, Africa and South America bought an average of $2.5 billion of U.S. fixed- income securities in the 12 months ended in May 2005, when crude oil averaged about $42 a barrel, Goncalves said. Purchases jumped to $7.3 billion a month from June 2005 through August 2006, when oil averaged about $60 a barrel, he said.
``When you bring the oil price down, that's going to take a lot of excess money off the table,'' said Andrew Brenner, head of global fixed income for New York-based Hapoalim Securities USA, which has $70 billion under management.
Only Japan, China and the U.K. own more Treasuries than the 12-OPEC nations, according to Treasury data released last week. The OPEC data doesn't include securities owned by Russia and Norway, which account for 40 percent of oil producer reserves, according to Toloui at Pimco.
Central bankers in oil producers Venezuela, Indonesia and the United Arab Emirates have said they will invest less of their reserves in dollar assets.
China, the second-largest holder of U.S. debt, also is cutting back holdings. The central bank, which owned $346.5 billion of Treasuries as of November, trimmed purchases by 1.7 percent in the first 10 months of 2006, Treasury figures show.
``The Chinese are slowing down their buying, so that leaves a big hole after the oil money,'' said Brenner at Hapoalim Securities.
Storm Watch Update
FORECAST 2007
Disinflation then Reinflation Part 1
by Jim Puplava
http://www.financialsense.com
January 19, 2007
ZitatKommentar GOLD_Baron: Genau so könnte es beim gloabeln Crash aussehen: Man gibt der Kriminalität oder dem "internationalen Terrorismus" die Schuld & hat eine konkrete global umspannende Rechtfertigung für totale Überwachung.
Die Systeme sind wohl offen für Cyberattacken aus afghanischen Hölen 
Aber wo Du RECHT hast, hast DU Recht, ich sehe das genauso und führe folgende Prinzipien an:
Lewinistisches Prinzip: Auftauen --> Verändern --> Stabilisieren (Eine neue Ordnung aus dem Chaos schaffen)
These: Finanzcrash ---> Antithese: Cyberattacke von Terroristen ---> Synthese: Überwachungsstaat (Bevölkerung sensibilisiert für mehr Überwachung, da im Chaos die Veränderungsresistenz leichter überwunden werden kann)
Summers, Trichet Warn Davos Party-Goers They Underestimate Risk
By John Fraher
Jan. 22 (Bloomberg) -- Lawrence Summers has a message for investors heading to the Swiss mountain resort of Davos this week to toast a year of booming returns and record bonuses.
``It's worth remembering that markets were very upbeat in the early summer of 1914,'' the former U.S. Treasury secretary observes.
While Summers isn't predicting the onset of another world war, he and European Central Bank President Jean-Claude Trichet are among those who are warning the more than 2,200 movers and shakers at the 37th annual meeting of the World Economic Forum that they've become too complacent about risks ranging from trade imbalances to terrorism.
A glut of cheap money and the strongest global economic growth in three decades have encouraged banks, private-equity firms and hedge funds to bet that the good times will keep rolling.
``It's too good to be true,'' says Vittorio Corbo, head of Chile's central bank, who will speak at a seminar in Davos about the dangers of derivatives. ``Tomorrow the mood could change. We have to be prepared.''
Davos attendees -- who are likely to include U.K. Prime Minister Tony Blair, U.S. Senator and possible 2008 presidential candidate John McCain, Citigroup Inc. Chief Executive Officer Charles Prince and Carlyle Group Inc. co-founder David Rubinstein -- have heard the warnings about complacency before.
Last Year's Warnings
In fact, they heard them last year at Davos, when Summers, the former president of Harvard University, billionaire George Soros and Bundesbank President Axel Weber cited the potential consequences of trade imbalances, budget deficits and the then- surging price of oil.
Since then, the rewards have just gotten better for investors. Prices of London's most expensive homes surged 29 percent last year, bonuses at the five largest U.S. investment firms rose 30 percent to $36 billion and the Dow Jones Industrial Average climbed to a record.
``We shouldn't pour cold water on everything,'' Deutsche Bank AG Chief Executive Officer Josef Ackermann, 58, said in a Jan. 16 interview. ``We, the eight or nine players in global investment banking, have a very good future.''
Profits are soaring, the value of takeovers last year rose to a record $3.6 trillion and the Morgan Stanley Capital International World Index of global stocks climbed to a record on Jan. 3. Goldman Sachs Group Inc. Chief Executive Lloyd Blankfein, another Davos attendee, last year earned a bonus of $53.4 million.
An Appetite for Risk
With banks tapping what Trichet calls an ``ample'' pool of liquidity, investor appetite for risk has never been greater.
Several measures show perception of risk is near historic lows. The gap between the yield demanded by investors to hold emerging-market and U.S. government bonds narrowed to a record on Jan. 17, according to JPMorgan Chase & Co., while the amount of debt used to finance European buyouts rose to 8.7 times earnings in the third quarter, the most ever.
Hedge funds in the U.S. are the most leveraged since 1998, the year that Long-Term Capital Management collapsed, according to Bridgewater Associates Inc., a Westport, Connecticut-based fund manager. Regulators from the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York and the U.K.'s Financial Services Authority, concerned that credit standards for hedge funds are too lax, are jointly probing whether lenders set strict enough limits on loans.
Little Concern
Meanwhile, one gauge of stock-market volatility -- the Chicago Board Options Exchange's VIX index -- shows that concern about a slump in equity prices is at a 13-year low.
Trichet, 64, who's scheduled to speak at a Davos seminar on the topic along with Israel central-bank chief Stanley Fischer, People's Bank of China Deputy Governor Wu Xiaoling and Harvard economist Kenneth Rogoff, said at a Jan. 11 news conference that ``we continue to see, overall, a low level of risk appreciation, and a disorderly unwinding of this situation would be a risk that we have to be fully conscious of.''
Willem Buiter, professor of European political economy at the London School of Economics, is considerably more blunt.
``Current risks are ludicrously underpriced,'' says Buiter, a former member of the Bank of England's Monetary Policy Committee. ``At some point, someone is going to get an extremely nasty surprise.''
Among things that might go wrong: a renewed surge in oil prices. Jim Rogers, chairman of New York-based Beeland Interests Inc. and co-founder with Soros of the Quantum hedge fund, says crude is likely to exceed $100 a barrel, almost double its current level.
$100 Oil
``Within the context of the bull market, oil will go over $100,'' Rogers, who predicted the start of the commodities rally in 1999, said in a Jan. 18 interview in Tokyo. ``It will go over $150. Whether that is in 2009 or 2013, I don't have a clue, but I know it's going to happen.''
Higher interest rates might also topple exuberant markets. The Bank of England surprised investors this month with a quarter point increase in its benchmark rate. Trichet's ECB is raising borrowing costs to try to rein in soaring asset prices and credit growth.
The ECB, unlike other major central banks, explicitly uses money supply to gauge inflation. Growth of M3, the broadest measure of money supply and the bank's preferred measure, unexpectedly accelerated to the fastest pace in more than 16 years in November, climbing 9.3 percent.
Already Stung
Some investors have already been stung. Venezuela's Caracas Stock Exchange Index has lost more than a quarter of its value in the past three weeks after President Hugo Chavez pledged to nationalize industries. The prices of copper and other commodities have plunged partly on concern a slowing U.S. economy will cool demand.
``We've seen a taste of what's to come in the last few days,'' says Nouriel Roubini, a professor of economics at New York University who will attend the forum's opening seminar on the state of the global economy with Summers. ``You'll see declines in equity prices, further falls in commodity prices.''
Summers, 52, in an e-mail drawing his World War I parallel and expanding on a column he wrote in the Financial Times, says that ``financial history demonstrates that the biggest liquidity problems always follow the moments of greatest confidence.'' The six months after the Sarajevo assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand, heir to the Austro-Hungarian throne, saw the Dow Jones Industrial Average lose a third of its value -- an object lesson in the perils of failing to adequately price risk.
``Complacency can be a self-denying prophecy,'' Summers says.
