ZitatGOLD_Baron : Einige drehen langsam durch. Ich hoffe es kommt nochmal ein massiver Absturz, damit es diese Ungläubigen aus dem Bullenmarkt wedelt.
[Blockierte Grafik: http://www.kitconet.com/charts/metals/gold/t24_au_en_usoz_2.gif]
Danke PPT!
[Blockierte Grafik: http://img.godmode-trader.de/charts/28/2006/coruscant625.GIF]
[Blockierte Grafik: http://www.kitconet.com/charts/metals/gold/t24_au_en_usoz_2.gif][Blockierte Grafik: http://www.weblinks247.com/exrate/exr24_eu_en_2.gif]
Da könnt Ihr Euch Eure charttechnischen (Sinnlos-)Unterstützungen sonstwohin stecken.
Dem Fahrstuhl wurden heute die Trageseile durchgeschnitten. 
0,77 USD für nen Euro? Sind denn jetzt alle wahnsinnig geworden?
THE EMPIRE STROKES BACK
Rebound möglich?
Fonds Magazin 12/06, Kommentar von Dr. Ulrich Kater, Chefvolkswirt der DekaBank
" ...Die Währungen beruhen einzig auf "Papier", also auf dem Vertrauen in die Notenbanken. Ein solches Vertrauen ist gegenwärtig berechtigt. Die Geldwertstabilität ist heute fast so hoch wie zu Zeiten des Goldstandards, weil die Notenbanken ihre Aufgabe verantwortungsvoll erfüllen. Nicht nur die Zinsen, sondern auch die Inflation ist (fast) so niedrig wie zu Bismarcks Zeiten (...)
...Wie rüstet man sich nun als Anleger für eine solche Welt niedriger Inflationsraten? Alle typischen Kriseninvestments, wie etwa Gold, sind vor diesem Hintergrund nicht notwendig. Gold reagiert auf viele Einflüsse: Die Nachfrage aus Konsum und Handel ist genauso wichtig wie die Anlegerentscheidungen oder die Strategien der Zentralbanken. Daher schwankt der Goldpreis stark und ist schwierig vorauszusehen. (...)"
"...auf die Zentralbanken kommt die schwierige Aufgabe zu, die erreichte Stabilität zu verteidigen. Die expansive Geldpolitik der vergangenen Jahre muß nun wieder eingefangen werden. Und dabei müssen die Notenbanken wachsam sein, daß sich nicht von neuem Inflationserwartungen aufbauen. Als Mahnung sollten sie sich dabei vor Augen halten, daß in Papierwährungssystemen die Inflation niemals tot ist; gegenwärtig ist sie allerdings eingesperrt und gut bewacht"
Der Rohstoff Gold verliert an Glanz
05.01.2007
Verluste. Im Dezember ging der Goldpreis nach unten.
[Blockierte Grafik: http://www.diepresse.com/upload/20070104/Rfn_AP.jpg]
Schönes Anlage-Objekt. Im vorigen Jahr stieg der Goldpreis
um über 20 Prozent. | (c) APA
Wien (Bloomberg/sr). So schnell kann es gehen. Noch vor einem Monat waren sich alle Experten einig. 2007 wurde als "Jahr des Goldes" gehuldigt, Preisanstiege von bis zu 20 Prozent erwartet. Nun sieht es anders aus. Nachdem der Goldpreis in der ersten Dezemberhälfte um fünf Prozent einsackte, beginnen die Analysten, ihre Meinung zu überdenken - obwohl sich der Preis mittlerweile wieder erholt hat. Mit 643 Dollar je Feinunze steht der Rohstoff wieder dort, wo er Anfang Dezember stand.
"Es hat den Anschein als würde der Gold-Rallye die Puste ausgehen", sagt Ralph Preston, Rohstoff-Analyst beim Broker Heritage West Financial. Noch am 4. Dezember hatte er sich optimistisch gezeigt, jetzt überwiegt die Skepsis: "Derzeit gibt es keinen Grund für einen weiteren Anstieg." Solange der Preis nicht die Marke von 665 Dollar durchbreche, sehe er kein Kaufsignal.
Im vergangenen Jahr war Gold sehr gefragt. Es galt als Alternative zu Öl und anderen Rohstoffen in politisch unsicheren Zeiten in Iran und Nordkorea. Der Preis für das Edelmetall kletterte von Januar bis Dezember um mehr als 20 Prozent nach oben. Mitte Mai stand der Kurs bei 730,40 Dollar - ein 26-Jahres-Hoch.
"Alle Argumente haben für einen noch höheren Ölpreis gesprochen, aber dann ist es nicht passiert", sagt Christoph Eibl, Vermögensverwalter bei Tiberius Asset Management in der Schweiz. Nun wären viele Anleger enttäuscht. Deshalb könnte es mit dem Goldpreis weiter nach unten gehen.
Das sehen nicht alle so. Hannes Loacker, Rohstoff-Experte bei der RZB, bleibt dem vor einem Monat geäußertem Zielpreis von "zumindest 650 Dollar" bis Jahresmitte treu. Als Hauptgrund nennt er den schwachen Dollar. "Da Gold ausschließlich in Dollar gehandelt wird und der Rohstoff nicht automatisch mit einem fallenden Dollarkurs an Wert verliert, passt sich sein Preis an", sagt Loacker. Dieses Phänomen habe sich in der zweiten Jahreshälfte des Vorjahres gezeigt. Und man werde es auch heuer beobachten können. Derzeit kostet ein Euro 1,32 Dollar. Zur Jahresmitte sieht Loacker einen Euro-Dollar-Kurs von 1,35. Weshalb ihn auch ein Goldpreis von 670 Dollar je Feinunze keineswegs überraschen würde.
http://www.diepresse.com/Artik…el=e&ressort=fn&id=609306
Der Thread bezieht sich allgemein auf die "Bloßstellung" und das "Schlechtmachen" von Gold in der Presse.
Look at this:
A 500% gain from $2.7T projects to $13.5T, a preposterous 170% gain from today’s basis. Looking back to 1997 debt has surged form $1T to an estimated $5T today. The recent pace indicates there is momentum left in the credit creation machine. In a warped expression of Say’s Law, supply of credit creates its own demand. All bubbles in effect cause their own demise. Based on the time and growth variables, a reasonable estimate is this one will end in late 2007 or the first half of 2008.
Nach Angaben des Autors Ende 2007 bis Anfang 2008.
Er nimmt dazu die NASDAQ-Bubble als Masstab.
Wir werden sehen. Dazu ist auch noch festzuhalten, dass die Yield-Carry-Trades bereits im Mai 2006 fast geplatzt wären.
Wenn ein grosser "Unfall" passiert, kann es jederzeit geschehen.
[Blockierte Grafik: http://www.spiegel.de/img/0,1020,770541,00.jpg]
Washington - Besonders liebe Gäste, so ist es Tradition im Weißen Haus, werden gleich auf der gegenüberliegenden Straßenseite untergebracht. Wer im Blair-Haus unterkommt, der offiziellen Herberge für die Besucher des Präsidenten, gilt etwas in Washington.
Haben die beiden sich dort ein Zimmer zusammengenommen?
The Debt Bubble - The End Point
http://www.financialsense.com/fsu/editorials/2007/0104d.html
by Frank Corbett
January 4, 2007
A lot attention has focused on the housing bubble. Receiving less notice in the mainstream media is the overall credit situation. The debt bubble is much larger than the housing bubble and permeates every sector of the economy. The fallout of the Tech/Media/Telecom bubble of the late 1990’s was for the most part limited to those sectors. When this bubble ends the damage will be far, wide, and deep.
The key question to be addressed here is: When could it end?
First let’s look at the ratio of Total Credit Market Debt to GDP. Intuitively this is not a good picture. There will come a point where cash flows will be strained to service the debt.
[Blockierte Grafik: http://www.financialsense.com/fsu/editorials/2007/images/0104d.28.gif]
Another helpful illustration is to review seasonally adjusted flows of total credit market debt (TCMD) instruments provided by the Federal Reserve. It is essentially the additional debt added each quarter, as opposed to the cumulative total. Flows show the quarterly change and illuminate the rapid growth of credit, especially in recent years. The amount of debt added each quarter has been rising steadily despite an erratic quarter by quarter variation.
[Blockierte Grafik: http://www.financialsense.com/fsu/editorials/2007/images/0104d.29.gif]
Could this data be used to predict a reversal or slowdown? Some sort of quantitative analysis is desirable. The following steps yielded meaningful results.
1. Calculate the moving average of the last four quarters of seasonally adjusted flows to all credit market sectors.
2. Figure the quarterly percentage changes of the moving average from step one.
3. Determine the year over year percentage changes of the quarterly growth derived in step two.
In summary the steps provide a year over year change of the quarterly growth of a four quarter moving average. It is a smoothing technique for volatile quarterly variation.
Using the data provided by the Federal Reserve back to 1981 it is apparent the economy and stock market struggle when the number becomes negative. Serious trouble occurs when the number goes below -10%.
[Blockierte Grafik: http://www.financialsense.com/fsu/editorials/2007/images/0104d.30.gif]
The current level is +8.34%. A decline of 18.34% is required to arrive at -10%. How quickly could the danger zone be reached? Two estimates of time needed to reach -10% are provided in the far right column below.
*
Absolute value of all quarterly changes 9.56% 1.92 Quarters
*
Absolute value of all negative quarters 10.80% 1.70 Quarters
Two quarters is about the shortest time frame until difficulties could ensue. Data is as of September so the end of the first quarter of 2007 is the first potential target date. Based on the time and quarterly change variables, a reasonable estimate is this bubble will end two to four quarters after September, 2006. Look for problems to surface between March and September of next year. The smoothed trend is postured to decline and looks like it may roll over. The second chart pictured above (TCMD Flows) shows a significant decline in flows over the two most recent quarters, from 4 trillion to 3 trillion dollars.
The creation of mortgage debt has slowed appreciably. Undeterred, individuals are still looking for ways to spend by borrowing. Dow Jones reported on November 1 that “89% of Freddie Mac-owned loans that were refinanced resulted in new mortgages with loan amounts that were at least 5% higher than the original loan balances …and is the highest share since the second quarter of 1990.” Revolving credit such as credit cards is expanding. However, corporate debt is the major story of late; it has resurfaced as a powerful force after the 2002 to 2003 debacle.
Financial institutions are aggressively positioned for expansion. Just look in your mailbox. Everybody is pre-approved. Any company qualifies for leveraged bank loans or high yield debt. A department manager at a major financial company submitting a business plan calling for less than 20% growth may as well include a letter of resignation. In a warped expression of Say’s Law, supply of credit creates its own demand. The economy and the consumer may well surprise on the upside for several quarters. In the end though, all bubbles cause their own demise.
Contractions in credit growth have been bad news in the past. The next instance will be more harmful than past episodes given the credit dependent nature of the US economy. Lower interest rates may generate relief for those able to refinance their debt. However, fully levered consumers and businesses will not be in a position to take on additional obligations. Moreover, consumers no longer have a pool of savings to augment income and maintain spending. Fear of job loss could finally motivate people to save, further reducing near term economic growth.
What circumstances might serve as tipping points?
An increase in long term rates would be very harmful. The supply of oxygen to the US economy was restricted in May of 2006 when the ten year US Treasury Bond yield moved over 5%. Raising the price of credit is the most direct means of restricting its growth.
A slowdown in the economy beyond the universally accepted “soft landing” scenario will markedly increase the default rate on loans. If the rate of underperforming loans increases, financial intermediaries will finally demonstrate lending restraint. Sub-prime lending is exhibiting signs of difficulty and two firms recently shut down. (Dissolving the company is the ultimate form of lending restraint.) Corporate borrowers unable to extend their credit lines and experiencing financial stress will lay off employees who will then be unable to meet their payments. Consumer spending, having increased every quarter since 1991, will undergo negative growth. Reduced aggregate demand will further squeeze corporate cash flows and they will cut more expenses, including payroll. The newly unemployed will reinforce the cycle and the problem will multiply to worldwide effect.
The delicate balance of the Yen/Dollar carry trade must be maintained. An enormous shower of liquidity has descended on world financial systems, through borrowing short term in Japan (and Switzerland) and lending long elsewhere. To encourage this arrangement, exchange rates must be relatively stable. When the dollar fell and the yen rose last spring difficulties arose for those hoping to close their Japanese obligation with equal or lower valued yen. The Japanese central bank also drained liquidity from the system and declared an eventual end to ultra-low short rates. Further damage was inflicted on the long end via the decline in bond prices. Over the summer the dollar/yen relation stabilized and Japan’s central bank deferred a rate increase. Almost simultaneously Treasury prices began to rise, restoring profits on the long end of the trade. This scenario needs to be maintained in approximate equilibrium.
The leveraged carry trade is an important driver of our economy as it helps suppress interest rates. Last spring’s partial unwinding was an unpleasant illustration of the potential and eventual impairment. Meanwhile its resumption later in the summer reinvigorated asset prices and risk appetites across the globe. Even if the carry trade is only providing marginal support to bonds, the withdrawal of marginal buyers will cause an adjustment in prices.
Many market observers have been calling for the Federal Reserve to cut short term rates in 2007. Be careful what you wish for. Looser financial conditions may well put downward pressure on the dollar. A decline in the dollar could promote higher long term interest rates and trigger a protracted slump. The Fed may not have the option of substantial easing in the next economic downturn. Some have postulated the Fed may indeed be forced to raise rates. The justification proffered would be inflation; the unspoken reason would be to defend the dollar. It’s possible a Fed Funds move in either direction in excess of 50 bps would be harmful.
Another feasible tipping point is gaining momentum every day. Leveraged buy-outs, mergers, and acquisitions are leading a surge in corporate debt. Reminiscent of the junk bond craze of the 1980’s, highly levered companies have a high degree of financial risk and are extremely exposed should an earnings shortfall occur. This will end badly.
In conclusion a recession or prolonged slowdown is an unavoidable outcome of history’s largest bubble. That it has not been widely noticed makes it all the more dangerous. A credit reduction induced recession is considered at best a very low probability “outlier” by Wall Street. Perhaps that enhances the case presented here. Conventional economists, including those at the Fed, see no problem in unbounded credit and monetary growth. The post 2003 recovery is accepted as solid and sustainable. The fact it is built on debt has conveniently been ignored. Some day it will be viewed differently.
Using the NASDAQ timeline as a basis the major surge began in 1995 and lasted five years. Credit growth went ballistic in 2003 so 2008 would be a comparable end point. From a growth standpoint the NASDAQ had a five-fold gain from near 1000 to 5000. Total Credit Market Debt has about doubled since 2003. A 500% gain from $2.7T projects to $13.5T, a preposterous 170% gain from today’s basis. Looking back to 1997 debt has surged form $1T to an estimated $5T today. The recent pace indicates there is momentum left in the credit creation machine. In a warped expression of Say’s Law, supply of credit creates its own demand. All bubbles in effect cause their own demise. Based on the time and growth variables, a reasonable estimate is this one will end in late 2007 or the first half of 2008.
A more precise quantitative measure is available – contraction of credit. Credit growth can be measured by the year over year growth of the four quarter moving average. (See my previous note and spreadsheet for detail.) The break point is a contraction of 10% or more. Further confirmation will be seen in spreads. The one year Libor over one year T-Bill spread will widen to over 100 bps with perhaps a 50 bps spike in one quarter, indicating mounting stress in the financial system. High yield spreads will shoot upwards as well. The smoothed credit growth rate and Libor spread have in the past issued advanced warning. The stock market will react at about the same time, anticipating problems three to six months down the road.
How could this play out? What is a logical course of events?
Relief will be felt in 2007 at the limited fallout from the Housing slowdown. Goldman Sachs’ economic team has forecast a 1.5% impact to the economy resulting in a GDP growth of 1.5 to 2.0% next year. Consumer spending will slow and inflationary pressures will abate. The desired soft landing will appear to have been achieved -- a slowdown but no recession. The Fed will feel empowered to cut rates. Long term interest rates, already quiescent from a slow economy, will move lower as enormous new carry trades will be placed on Treasuries. Debt creation will surge again. Economic growth will pick up for a time.
It will be the last hurrah, analogous to the NASDAQ of early 2000. All bubbles have a bursting point. At some point some over-leveraged, in over their heads individuals and companies will be unable to meet their debt obligations. Defaults will slowly mount. Financials will finally demonstrate lending restraint. Companies unable to extend their credit lines and now in financial distress will lay off employees who will then be unable to meet their payments. A cowed consumer will retrench. Consumer spending, having increased every quarter since 1991, will experience negative growth. Reduced aggregate demand will squeeze corporate cash flows and they will cut expenditures, including payroll. The newly unemployed will…do the obvious and the problem will multiply to worldwide effect.
In conclusion a deep recession is an unavoidable outcome of history’s largest bubble, the Credit Bubble. That it has not been widely noticed makes it all the more dangerous. Conventional economists, including those at the Fed, see no problem in unbounded credit and monetary growth. The post 2003 recovery is accepted as solid and sustainable. The fact it is built on debt has conveniently been ignored. Some day it will be viewed.
September 15, 2006
The Broker/Dealers (Goldman, Lehman and Bear Stearns) this week reported better-than-expected fiscal third quarter results, an especially inspiriting development considering that they maintained remarkable momentum despite headwinds from the most challenging market environment in many quarters.
For the first nine months or the year, the three Wall Street firms combined for Net Revenues of an incredible $47.8 billion, up 37% from comparable 2005. This provides a valuable reminder that “resiliency” is a defining attribute of contemporary “Wall Street Finance.” As they demonstrated (again) this past quarter, if market dynamics dictate that particular segments of the brokerage/proprietary trading/securities financing/investment banking/derivatives/global finance business face tougher headwinds, it is simply a matter of tacking a bit in another direction. If one sector or region is struggling, just push the others. If one area of the market falls somewhat out of favor, simply fashion and offer buyers (increasingly hedge funds – see “Speculator Watch” above) the type of securities, instruments and/or derivative products with the return, risk and liquidity profile they demand. If clients prefer to leverage U.S. or global securities, fine; need financing to buy companies at home or abroad, no problem; or any complex derivative strategy for any market – now so easily accomplished. And, importantly, championing booms in the relatively better performing areas, sectors and regions works to buttress liquidity for the enjoyment of all (hence, bolstering the lagging – as we witnessed with market pricing this week). It is also worth noting that Goldman, Lehman, and Bear Stearns combined to compensate their employees $23.6 billion during the first three quarters of the year. Have there ever been more powerful direct incentives to sustain a financial boom?
I have argued for too long that mounting U.S. Current Account Deficits are a consequence of the U.S. Financial Sphere creating excessive Credit/”purchasing power” and then directing resultant abundant financial flows to securities and asset markets (with attendant Financial and Economic Spheres maladjustment). These Monetary Processes and resulting Monetary Disorder are only reinforced by the Bernanke Fed’s abhorrence of popping Bubbles.
I hope readers will connect the dots, although we all know that policymakers never ever will. Runaway U.S. Financial Sphere excess and attendant massive U.S. Current Account Deficits are the primary (inflationary) factor spawning this unparalleled Ballooning Pool of Global Speculative Finance.
Dollar “stability” demands ongoing massive central bank dollar purchases – support operations certain to only exacerbate Global Monetary Disorder. In concert, domestic and international Credit system dynamics do today buttress U.S. financial and economic Bubbles – housing slowdown notwithstanding. It’s inevitably a losing proposition.
The market impact of the recent unwind of some commodities and bearish bets is absolutely inconsequential compared to the crisis that will be initiated when Monetary Disorder eventually leads to a scramble (and de-leveraging) out of bursting U.S. and global securities markets Bubbles.
Since the Fed began cutting rates aggressively in early 2001, Total Credit Market Debt has increased $15.8 TN, or 58%, to $42.67 TN (320% of GDP!). The bond market turned giddy this week with the happy notion that Fed policy will soon be poised to once again inflate the market value of the ever-more-massive stockpile of U.S. fixed-income securities, instruments and their derivatives. We’re now witnessing a consequence of the Fed’s flawed “tightening” stance, focusing on economic vulnerability while disregarding precariously loose financial conditions.
To be sure, speculative leveraging these days in the fixed-income markets has an unparalleled capability of creating abundant liquidity for the markets and system generally. And as bond prices inflate in response to heightened speculative leveraging and resulting liquidity creation, those that had been positioned for higher rates (both speculations and hedges) are forced to unwind these trades – in the process creating only more price inflation and liquidity over-abundance. Meanwhile, the yield curve gyrates and causes bloody havoc for myriad curve and rate speculations.
Alas, the specter of unending Credit Bubble excess, unending Current Account Deficits and resulting unending foreign buying of U.S. Treasuries, agencies, ABS, and MBS is providing the impetus for one heck of a liquidity-driven dislocation in bond market pricing.
To begin, it is worth mentioning that in the 21 quarters prior to the second quarter (since the beginning of 1998) total Credit Market Borrowings (Non-financial and Financial) surged 51% - or $10.9 Trillion - to $32.1 Trillion. After an extended period of historic excess, Credit growth has now gone "parabolic." During the second quarter, Total Credit Market Borrowings expanded at an (seasonally-adjusted) annualized rate of $3.35 Trillion (10.4%). This was a pace 27% greater than the previous record posted during 2002's fourth quarter.
Led by record federal and household borrowings, Non-financial debt expanded at a 12% rate, double the first quarter. One has to go all the way back to 1985 to find a year with stronger Non-financial debt expansion. The federal government increased borrowings at a 24.3% annual pace. Total Non-financial Credit increased an unprecedented $631 billion during the quarter to $21.6 Trillion. Since the beginning of 1998, Total Non-financial Credit has jumped $6.40 Trillion, or 42%. Over this same period, GDP increased $2.54 Trillion, or 31%. Thus, over the past 22 quarters, Total Non-financial Credit has increased from 184% of GDP to 200%. Non-financial Credit was about 140% of GDP back in 1980. Since the beginning of 1998, Financial Sector Credit Market Borrowings have surged $5.30 Trillion, or 97%, to $10.76 Trillion. Financial borrowings as a percentage of GDP have jumped from 66% to 100%. Total Credit Market borrowings (Non-financial and Financial) have surged $11.7 Trillion, or 57% over 22 quarters. As a percentage of GDP, Total Credit has increased from 250% of GDP to 300%.
And despite a surge in Household borrowings (expanding 15% annualized to $9.3 Trillion), Household Net Worth jumped $1.7 Trillion during the quarter, or almost 17% annualized, to $41.4 Trillion. There remains little mystery as to why consumer borrowing and spending remains so resilient: Asset Inflation.
And there is simply no way around the very harsh reality that current extraordinary Credit and speculative excesses are setting the stage for financial and economic instability unlike anything experienced in a very long time. Rampant asset inflation and lurching economies are seductively un-enduring inflationary manifestations.
The Debt Bubble - The End Point
by Frank Corbett
January 4, 2007
A lot attention has focused on the housing bubble. Receiving less notice in the mainstream media is the overall credit situation. The debt bubble is much larger than the housing bubble and permeates every sector of the economy. The fallout of the Tech/Media/Telecom bubble of the late 1990’s was for the most part limited to those sectors. When this bubble ends the damage will be far, wide, and deep.
The key question to be addressed here is: When could it end?
First let’s look at the ratio of Total Credit Market Debt to GDP. Intuitively this is not a good picture. There will come a point where cash flows will be strained to service the debt.
[Blockierte Grafik: http://www.financialsense.com/fsu/editorials/2007/images/0104d.28.gif]
Another helpful illustration is to review seasonally adjusted flows of total credit market debt (TCMD) instruments provided by the Federal Reserve. It is essentially the additional debt added each quarter, as opposed to the cumulative total. Flows show the quarterly change and illuminate the rapid growth of credit, especially in recent years. The amount of debt added each quarter has been rising steadily despite an erratic quarter by quarter variation.
[Blockierte Grafik: http://www.financialsense.com/fsu/editorials/2007/images/0104d.29.gif]
Could this data be used to predict a reversal or slowdown? Some sort of quantitative analysis is desirable. The following steps yielded meaningful results.
1. Calculate the moving average of the last four quarters of seasonally adjusted flows to all credit market sectors.
2. Figure the quarterly percentage changes of the moving average from step one.
3. Determine the year over year percentage changes of the quarterly growth derived in step two.
In summary the steps provide a year over year change of the quarterly growth of a four quarter moving average. It is a smoothing technique for volatile quarterly variation.
Using the data provided by the Federal Reserve back to 1981 it is apparent the economy and stock market struggle when the number becomes negative. Serious trouble occurs when the number goes below -10%.
[Blockierte Grafik: http://www.financialsense.com/fsu/editorials/2007/images/0104d.30.gif]
The current level is +8.34%. A decline of 18.34% is required to arrive at -10%. How quickly could the danger zone be reached? Two estimates of time needed to reach -10% are provided in the far right column below.
*
Absolute value of all quarterly changes 9.56% 1.92 Quarters
*
Absolute value of all negative quarters 10.80% 1.70 Quarters
Two quarters is about the shortest time frame until difficulties could ensue. Data is as of September so the end of the first quarter of 2007 is the first potential target date. Based on the time and quarterly change variables, a reasonable estimate is this bubble will end two to four quarters after September, 2006. Look for problems to surface between March and September of next year. The smoothed trend is postured to decline and looks like it may roll over. The second chart pictured above (TCMD Flows) shows a significant decline in flows over the two most recent quarters, from 4 trillion to 3 trillion dollars.
The creation of mortgage debt has slowed appreciably. Undeterred, individuals are still looking for ways to spend by borrowing. Dow Jones reported on November 1 that “89% of Freddie Mac-owned loans that were refinanced resulted in new mortgages with loan amounts that were at least 5% higher than the original loan balances …and is the highest share since the second quarter of 1990.” Revolving credit such as credit cards is expanding. However, corporate debt is the major story of late; it has resurfaced as a powerful force after the 2002 to 2003 debacle.
Financial institutions are aggressively positioned for expansion. Just look in your mailbox. Everybody is pre-approved. Any company qualifies for leveraged bank loans or high yield debt. A department manager at a major financial company submitting a business plan calling for less than 20% growth may as well include a letter of resignation. In a warped expression of Say’s Law, supply of credit creates its own demand. The economy and the consumer may well surprise on the upside for several quarters. In the end though, all bubbles cause their own demise.
Contractions in credit growth have been bad news in the past. The next instance will be more harmful than past episodes given the credit dependent nature of the US economy. Lower interest rates may generate relief for those able to refinance their debt. However, fully levered consumers and businesses will not be in a position to take on additional obligations. Moreover, consumers no longer have a pool of savings to augment income and maintain spending. Fear of job loss could finally motivate people to save, further reducing near term economic growth.
What circumstances might serve as tipping points?
An increase in long term rates would be very harmful. The supply of oxygen to the US economy was restricted in May of 2006 when the ten year US Treasury Bond yield moved over 5%. Raising the price of credit is the most direct means of restricting its growth.
A slowdown in the economy beyond the universally accepted “soft landing” scenario will markedly increase the default rate on loans. If the rate of underperforming loans increases, financial intermediaries will finally demonstrate lending restraint. Sub-prime lending is exhibiting signs of difficulty and two firms recently shut down. (Dissolving the company is the ultimate form of lending restraint.) Corporate borrowers unable to extend their credit lines and experiencing financial stress will lay off employees who will then be unable to meet their payments. Consumer spending, having increased every quarter since 1991, will undergo negative growth. Reduced aggregate demand will further squeeze corporate cash flows and they will cut more expenses, including payroll. The newly unemployed will reinforce the cycle and the problem will multiply to worldwide effect.
The delicate balance of the Yen/Dollar carry trade must be maintained. An enormous shower of liquidity has descended on world financial systems, through borrowing short term in Japan (and Switzerland) and lending long elsewhere. To encourage this arrangement, exchange rates must be relatively stable. When the dollar fell and the yen rose last spring difficulties arose for those hoping to close their Japanese obligation with equal or lower valued yen. The Japanese central bank also drained liquidity from the system and declared an eventual end to ultra-low short rates. Further damage was inflicted on the long end via the decline in bond prices. Over the summer the dollar/yen relation stabilized and Japan’s central bank deferred a rate increase. Almost simultaneously Treasury prices began to rise, restoring profits on the long end of the trade. This scenario needs to be maintained in approximate equilibrium.
The leveraged carry trade is an important driver of our economy as it helps suppress interest rates. Last spring’s partial unwinding was an unpleasant illustration of the potential and eventual impairment. Meanwhile its resumption later in the summer reinvigorated asset prices and risk appetites across the globe. Even if the carry trade is only providing marginal support to bonds, the withdrawal of marginal buyers will cause an adjustment in prices.
Many market observers have been calling for the Federal Reserve to cut short term rates in 2007. Be careful what you wish for. Looser financial conditions may well put downward pressure on the dollar. A decline in the dollar could promote higher long term interest rates and trigger a protracted slump. The Fed may not have the option of substantial easing in the next economic downturn. Some have postulated the Fed may indeed be forced to raise rates. The justification proffered would be inflation; the unspoken reason would be to defend the dollar. It’s possible a Fed Funds move in either direction in excess of 50 bps would be harmful.
Another feasible tipping point is gaining momentum every day. Leveraged buy-outs, mergers, and acquisitions are leading a surge in corporate debt. Reminiscent of the junk bond craze of the 1980’s, highly levered companies have a high degree of financial risk and are extremely exposed should an earnings shortfall occur. This will end badly.
In conclusion a recession or prolonged slowdown is an unavoidable outcome of history’s largest bubble. That it has not been widely noticed makes it all the more dangerous. A credit reduction induced recession is considered at best a very low probability “outlier” by Wall Street. Perhaps that enhances the case presented here. Conventional economists, including those at the Fed, see no problem in unbounded credit and monetary growth. The post 2003 recovery is accepted as solid and sustainable. The fact it is built on debt has conveniently been ignored. Some day it will be viewed differently.
Using the NASDAQ timeline as a basis the major surge began in 1995 and lasted five years. Credit growth went ballistic in 2003 so 2008 would be a comparable end point. From a growth standpoint the NASDAQ had a five-fold gain from near 1000 to 5000. Total Credit Market Debt has about doubled since 2003. A 500% gain from $2.7T projects to $13.5T, a preposterous 170% gain from today’s basis. Looking back to 1997 debt has surged form $1T to an estimated $5T today. The recent pace indicates there is momentum left in the credit creation machine. In a warped expression of Say’s Law, supply of credit creates its own demand. All bubbles in effect cause their own demise. Based on the time and growth variables, a reasonable estimate is this one will end in late 2007 or the first half of 2008.
A more precise quantitative measure is available – contraction of credit. Credit growth can be measured by the year over year growth of the four quarter moving average. (See my previous note and spreadsheet for detail.) The break point is a contraction of 10% or more. Further confirmation will be seen in spreads. The one year Libor over one year T-Bill spread will widen to over 100 bps with perhaps a 50 bps spike in one quarter, indicating mounting stress in the financial system. High yield spreads will shoot upwards as well. The smoothed credit growth rate and Libor spread have in the past issued advanced warning. The stock market will react at about the same time, anticipating problems three to six months down the road.
How could this play out? What is a logical course of events?
Relief will be felt in 2007 at the limited fallout from the Housing slowdown. Goldman Sachs’ economic team has forecast a 1.5% impact to the economy resulting in a GDP growth of 1.5 to 2.0% next year. Consumer spending will slow and inflationary pressures will abate. The desired soft landing will appear to have been achieved -- a slowdown but no recession. The Fed will feel empowered to cut rates. Long term interest rates, already quiescent from a slow economy, will move lower as enormous new carry trades will be placed on Treasuries. Debt creation will surge again. Economic growth will pick up for a time.
It will be the last hurrah, analogous to the NASDAQ of early 2000. All bubbles have a bursting point. At some point some over-leveraged, in over their heads individuals and companies will be unable to meet their debt obligations. Defaults will slowly mount. Financials will finally demonstrate lending restraint. Companies unable to extend their credit lines and now in financial distress will lay off employees who will then be unable to meet their payments. A cowed consumer will retrench. Consumer spending, having increased every quarter since 1991, will experience negative growth. Reduced aggregate demand will squeeze corporate cash flows and they will cut expenditures, including payroll. The newly unemployed will…do the obvious and the problem will multiply to worldwide effect.
In conclusion a deep recession is an unavoidable outcome of history’s largest bubble, the Credit Bubble. That it has not been widely noticed makes it all the more dangerous. Conventional economists, including those at the Fed, see no problem in unbounded credit and monetary growth. The post 2003 recovery is accepted as solid and sustainable. The fact it is built on debt has conveniently been ignored. Some day it will be viewed.
September 15, 2006
The Broker/Dealers (Goldman, Lehman and Bear Stearns) this week reported better-than-expected fiscal third quarter results, an especially inspiriting development considering that they maintained remarkable momentum despite headwinds from the most challenging market environment in many quarters.
For the first nine months or the year, the three Wall Street firms combined for Net Revenues of an incredible $47.8 billion, up 37% from comparable 2005. This provides a valuable reminder that “resiliency” is a defining attribute of contemporary “Wall Street Finance.” As they demonstrated (again) this past quarter, if market dynamics dictate that particular segments of the brokerage/proprietary trading/securities financing/investment banking/derivatives/global finance business face tougher headwinds, it is simply a matter of tacking a bit in another direction. If one sector or region is struggling, just push the others. If one area of the market falls somewhat out of favor, simply fashion and offer buyers (increasingly hedge funds – see “Speculator Watch” above) the type of securities, instruments and/or derivative products with the return, risk and liquidity profile they demand. If clients prefer to leverage U.S. or global securities, fine; need financing to buy companies at home or abroad, no problem; or any complex derivative strategy for any market – now so easily accomplished. And, importantly, championing booms in the relatively better performing areas, sectors and regions works to buttress liquidity for the enjoyment of all (hence, bolstering the lagging – as we witnessed with market pricing this week). It is also worth noting that Goldman, Lehman, and Bear Stearns combined to compensate their employees $23.6 billion during the first three quarters of the year. Have there ever been more powerful direct incentives to sustain a financial boom?
I have argued for too long that mounting U.S. Current Account Deficits are a consequence of the U.S. Financial Sphere creating excessive Credit/”purchasing power” and then directing resultant abundant financial flows to securities and asset markets (with attendant Financial and Economic Spheres maladjustment). These Monetary Processes and resulting Monetary Disorder are only reinforced by the Bernanke Fed’s abhorrence of popping Bubbles.
I hope readers will connect the dots, although we all know that policymakers never ever will. Runaway U.S. Financial Sphere excess and attendant massive U.S. Current Account Deficits are the primary (inflationary) factor spawning this unparalleled Ballooning Pool of Global Speculative Finance.
Dollar “stability” demands ongoing massive central bank dollar purchases – support operations certain to only exacerbate Global Monetary Disorder. In concert, domestic and international Credit system dynamics do today buttress U.S. financial and economic Bubbles – housing slowdown notwithstanding. It’s inevitably a losing proposition.
The market impact of the recent unwind of some commodities and bearish bets is absolutely inconsequential compared to the crisis that will be initiated when Monetary Disorder eventually leads to a scramble (and de-leveraging) out of bursting U.S. and global securities markets Bubbles.
Since the Fed began cutting rates aggressively in early 2001, Total Credit Market Debt has increased $15.8 TN, or 58%, to $42.67 TN (320% of GDP!). The bond market turned giddy this week with the happy notion that Fed policy will soon be poised to once again inflate the market value of the ever-more-massive stockpile of U.S. fixed-income securities, instruments and their derivatives. We’re now witnessing a consequence of the Fed’s flawed “tightening” stance, focusing on economic vulnerability while disregarding precariously loose financial conditions.
To be sure, speculative leveraging these days in the fixed-income markets has an unparalleled capability of creating abundant liquidity for the markets and system generally. And as bond prices inflate in response to heightened speculative leveraging and resulting liquidity creation, those that had been positioned for higher rates (both speculations and hedges) are forced to unwind these trades – in the process creating only more price inflation and liquidity over-abundance. Meanwhile, the yield curve gyrates and causes bloody havoc for myriad curve and rate speculations.
Alas, the specter of unending Credit Bubble excess, unending Current Account Deficits and resulting unending foreign buying of U.S. Treasuries, agencies, ABS, and MBS is providing the impetus for one heck of a liquidity-driven dislocation in bond market pricing.
To begin, it is worth mentioning that in the 21 quarters prior to the second quarter (since the beginning of 1998) total Credit Market Borrowings (Non-financial and Financial) surged 51% - or $10.9 Trillion - to $32.1 Trillion. After an extended period of historic excess, Credit growth has now gone "parabolic." During the second quarter, Total Credit Market Borrowings expanded at an (seasonally-adjusted) annualized rate of $3.35 Trillion (10.4%). This was a pace 27% greater than the previous record posted during 2002's fourth quarter.
Led by record federal and household borrowings, Non-financial debt expanded at a 12% rate, double the first quarter. One has to go all the way back to 1985 to find a year with stronger Non-financial debt expansion. The federal government increased borrowings at a 24.3% annual pace. Total Non-financial Credit increased an unprecedented $631 billion during the quarter to $21.6 Trillion. Since the beginning of 1998, Total Non-financial Credit has jumped $6.40 Trillion, or 42%. Over this same period, GDP increased $2.54 Trillion, or 31%. Thus, over the past 22 quarters, Total Non-financial Credit has increased from 184% of GDP to 200%. Non-financial Credit was about 140% of GDP back in 1980. Since the beginning of 1998, Financial Sector Credit Market Borrowings have surged $5.30 Trillion, or 97%, to $10.76 Trillion. Financial borrowings as a percentage of GDP have jumped from 66% to 100%. Total Credit Market borrowings (Non-financial and Financial) have surged $11.7 Trillion, or 57% over 22 quarters. As a percentage of GDP, Total Credit has increased from 250% of GDP to 300%.
And despite a surge in Household borrowings (expanding 15% annualized to $9.3 Trillion), Household Net Worth jumped $1.7 Trillion during the quarter, or almost 17% annualized, to $41.4 Trillion. There remains little mystery as to why consumer borrowing and spending remains so resilient: Asset Inflation.
And there is simply no way around the very harsh reality that current extraordinary Credit and speculative excesses are setting the stage for financial and economic instability unlike anything experienced in a very long time. Rampant asset inflation and lurching economies are seductively un-enduring inflationary manifestations.
Es ist doch immer das gleiche:
Geht es runter sind die Meisten pessimistisch,
geht es hoch optimistisch.
Was musste ich heute lesen?
Die Maple Leaves, die jetzt geprägt werden, sind unecht, da es kein Silber mehr gibt.
Dann etwas von einem Bearkeil bei PoG/EUR mit Fahrstuhldynamik nach unten und einem Vergleich von Kupfer und Gold.
Alle kaufen US-Anleihen und das wars mit der Goldhausse, als wäre seit dem Neujahr irgendetwas anders. (Es hilft sich ab und zu auch mal außerhalb des Forums über die Hintergründe des Anleihenkaufs am Jahresanfang zu informieren)
....*man könnte ewig weiter schreiben*
Was ist denn los mit Euch?
Zählen die Fundamentaldaten gar nichts? Achja, die sind ja seit heute - musste ich hier lesen - auch eventuell gefälscht.
Einige drehen langsam durch. Ich hoffe es kommt nochmal ein massiver Absturz, damit es diese Ungläubigen aus dem Bullenmarkt wedelt.
Unfassbar.
Das einzige was heute wichtig war, war das Gehirnfurze-Protokoll der FED.
Kaum ist das erschien steigt der Dollar schlagartig, als wäre vorher nicht klar gewesen was drin steht. Always the same.
Good Night & kommt mal runter (zumindest einige hier)
Baron
Die höchsten Gebühren strich JP Morgan ein, gefolgt von Goldman Sachs.
Junk Bonds Lure Crowd to Bulgaria Steel, Kiev Chicken 
By Sebastian Boyd and John Glover
Jan. 3 (Bloomberg) -- A dozen Merrill Lynch & Co. clients endured a flight to Serbia and a five-hour taxi ride last month on their way to visit a Soviet-era steel mill whose bonds were plunging.
Kremikovtzi AD's notes had just tumbled 30 percent after the Bulgarian steelmaker said it would post a $7 million loss for the year. Investors were alarmed because the company estimated a $34 million profit in April, when Merrill arranged the sale of 325 million euros ($427 million) of 12 percent bonds.
Investors bought Kremikovtzi's securities because those yields are hard to find outside emerging markets. Bondholders who used to get 24 percent on Xerox Corp. in Stamford, Connecticut, or Remy Cointreau SA in Paris now finance a Kiev chicken farm and a Moscow ball-bearing factory for half the rate of interest.
``People are having to go further and further down the ratings scale to get yield,'' said Alex Moss, who holds Kremikovtzi's bonds among the $94 billion of assets he helps oversee at Insight Investment Management in London. ``It was risky, but people thought they were getting paid for the risk.''
European bonds rated below investment grade yield 2.3 percentage points more than government debt, down from 16.5 percentage points in 2001, according to indexes compiled by Merrill. Notes ranked below Baa3 by Moody's Investors Service and BBB- by Standard & Poor's are speculative grade, or junk.
Bond Sales Soar
Nowhere have yields fallen more than for securities with the lowest credit ratings. Bonds ranked Caa by Moody's and CCC by S&P, the category above default, pay 4.6 percentage points more than government securities, down from 42 percentage points five years ago, Merrill data show.
Kremikovtzi is among 10 companies that sold a record 5.5 billion euros of bonds with the lowest ratings in 2006, data compiled by Bloomberg show. The steel mill is rated Caa1 by Moody's and CCC+ at S&P.
Investors are clamoring for junk bonds because the yield premiums on investment-grade corporate debt have narrowed to 0.51 percentage point on average from 0.84 percentage point in 2001, according to Merrill data.
Investors poured a net 1.7 billion euros into high-yield corporate bond funds, double the 864 million euros in 2005, according to data from FERI Fund Market Information in London.
The increasing demand is making it easier for companies to sell bonds, no matter how risky. Sales of the lowest-rated debt jumped 45 percent in the past year and notes with non-investment grade ratings totaled a record 38 billion euros, according to data compiled by Bloomberg. Junk bonds returned 11 percent in 2006, compared with 0.7 percent on investment-grade debt, Merrill's data show. European government bonds lost 0.28 percent.
Fewer Defaults
``People need to reach for yield, so they're buying into riskier assets,'' said Axel Potthof in Munich, who oversees European non-investment grade bonds for Pacific Investment Management Co., manager of the world's biggest bond fund and a unit of Allianz SE. ``People who have done so were rewarded and others have followed.''
Bondholders are more confident because companies defaulted on fewer than 2 percent of junk bonds in 2006, compared with as much as 22 percent five years ago, according to Moody's data. Defaults will probably increase to 2.8 percent by the end of 2007, less than half the average 7.3 percent in the last five years, according to Moody's.
`Bit Crazy'
Europe's 2.6 percent economic expansion last year helped keep default rates low. Growth may be as high as 2.7 percent this year, the European Central Bank said in December.
Bondholders will keep buying riskier securities until an increase in defaults makes them wary, said Adam Cordery, who manages $750 million at Schroder Investment Management Ltd. in London. He favors junk bonds over investment-grade debt.
``The credit market went a little bit crazy last year and will continue to be crazy this year,'' Cordery said. ``It normally takes a blow-up somewhere before investors stop buying high-yield.''
Investors are turning to the newest European Union members because their economies are growing the fastest. Bulgaria, which joined the EU on Jan. 1, forecasts 5.8 percent expansion in 2007. The former communist country of 7.8 million people plans to reduce foreign exchange risk for companies by linking the lev to the euro before April in the first step to adopting the single European currency.
Debt Burden
Yields on junk bonds are falling even as companies take on more debt. The average non-investment grade company in Europe owes 5.4 times annual earnings, up from 4.2 times five years ago, according to S&P's LCD.
Treofan Holdings GmbH, a Raunheim, Germany-based maker of wrapping for cigarette packs, sold 170 million euros of 11 percent bonds due 2013, boosting its debt ratio to more than 7 times earnings. The company probably will spend more than it earns in 2007, S&P said. The bonds, which have Caa1 ratings from Moody's and CCC+ from S&P, trade at 101.4 cents on the euro.
``We're moving away from the edge -- buying fewer CCC rated bonds,'' said James Gledhill, who helps oversee $2 billion of bonds at New Star Asset Management in London.
Kremikovtzi almost tripled its long-term debt to 910 million lev ($611 million) last year when it sold the 12 percent notes. Investors bought the bonds in part because the company is controlled by Pramod Mittal, whose brother, Lakshmi Mittal, is chief executive officer of Arcelor Mittal, the world's largest steelmaker. The securities also attracted investors because they included warrants that allowed holders to buy Kremikovtzi shares. The bonds rose as high as 104 cents after the sale in April.
The securities tumbled to 70 cents on Nov. 15 after Pramod Mittal projected a loss for 2006. Two weeks later, the company announced a loss of 217 million lev for the first nine months of 2006 after taking into account costs for interest, tax, depreciation and amortization.
Bad Weather
Pramod Mittal responded to investor concerns by pledging to invest $15 million a quarter should the losses continue this year.
``We've declared our commitment and we're putting the money in,'' Mittal said today in an interview. ``The money will go in directly every quarter.''
Merrill also sought to reassure clients. The firm's director of debt capital markets in London, Adel Kambar, last month arranged site visits and management meetings for about 30 investors and analysts. One group of bondholders, including Insight's Moss, got diverted to Belgrade because of bad weather and had to catch cabs to Sofia, more than 200 miles away.
Merrill spokeswoman Joanna Carss in London declined to comment.
Of the 178 junk bonds included in Merrill's European high- yield index, only two are trading below Kremikovtzi's current price of 83 cents.
Poultry Producer
Ukraine's largest poultry farmer, Myronivsky Hliboproduct, sold bonds for the first time, spurred by investor demand for higher yields. The company, known also as MHP, raised $250 million to expand into beef, goose liver and fruit. The 10.25 percent notes due 2011 gained 2.4 percent since the sale in November, reducing the yield to 9.6 percent. Moody's rates the securities B2.
European Bearing Corp. in Moscow sold $150 million of 9.75 percent three-year notes in October, its first offering to international bondholders.
``You're seeing for the first time companies as far east as Ukraine and Russia doing high-yield offerings,'' said Carter Brod, capital markets partner at law firm Baker & McKenzie in London, which advised MHP on its bond sale. ``It appears investors can't get enough bonds from eastern Europe.''
Quelle:
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/…rTge7hXVY&refer=worldwide
Eldo, du oller Pessimist! (oder Realist?)
Dow Shocks in 2007! (by Larry Edelson)
1/4/2007 8:00:00 AM
We’ve had almost four years of relative calm in the financial markets. Corporate earnings have rebounded from the depths of the 2000 — 2001 stock market collapse. There have been no terror attacks on U.S. soil. Interest rates have remained artificially low.
But now, even as foreign economies are gaining in strength, the U.S. economy’s second-breath — as I call it — is ending. Coming next — a series of shocks in the Dow Jones Industrials that could catch investors with their pants down.
I’ll give you some steps to take in a moment. First, let’s start with what I see for the Dow ...
Dissonance in the Dow Does
Not Bode Well for 2007
Take a look at the Dow Jones Industrials index (bottom of the chart) vs. the Dow Jones Transportation index. Notice that the Dow marched to record highs at the end of 2006, while the Dow Transports turned lower.
[Blockierte Grafik: http://images.moneyandmarkets.com/485/MAM485chart1.gif]
This is called a “Dow Theory non-confirmation,” and it’s especially bearish for most U.S. industrial stocks. Historically, some 80% of Dow Theory non-confirmations have ended in disasters, with the Dow indices losing as much as 40% of their value. The same is possible this time around.
What could set this off? One possibility is a crash in the dollar, which is already starting. A plunge in the dollar could force overseas investors to yank their money out of the U.S., setting off a row of financial crises:
* Banking, already starting to hurt from falling property values and rising mortgage delinquencies and defaults, will get killed.
* Currency markets could enter a period of extreme volatility, setting off disasters in the highly leveraged hedge fund industry.
* Big U.S. companies already in deep financial doo-doo (think Ford, GM, Delta) could go bust.
I’m seeing subtle but important confirmations that these forecasts are going to be right. For example ...
Investors Are the Most Complacent
They’ve Been in 12 Years!
Crises rarely hit when investors expect them. Instead, they show up when investors are complacent. And that’s exactly what we have right now.
Look at my chart of the Volatility Index, or VIX. This index effectively measures investor complacency.
[Blockierte Grafik: http://images.moneyandmarkets.com/485/MAM485chart3.gif]
When the line in this chart is declining toward the bottom, it means investors have no fear. They think everything is hunky-dory, so they buy stocks with almost reckless abandon.
Right now, the VIX Index is at 12-year lows. It’s lower than it was before the 1997-1998 financial crisis ... lower than it was before the Long Term Capital Management collapse in 1998 (which almost took down the entire U.S. banking system) ... lower than it was at the peak of the greatest stock bull market in history.
This is extreme complacency — the kind that crises love to feed on. It’s how the stock market peels money away from unwary investors. And it’s how smart, savvy investors pile up wads of profits.
I expect the Dow to tank, and transport stocks to get killed. At the same time, I expect key sectors — especially those driven by the boom in Asia and the rise in natural resources — to soar.
Remember, the U.S. is no longer primarily a manufacturing country. And many of our service industries have been outsourced, too. For instance, tech support and IT services have gone to India.
What this means: When the dollar falls, we do not gain a competitive edge. Instead, everything we’ve outsourced gets more expensive. Hardly anyone is talking about this. But the weaker dollar is not going to rescue American industry.
Here are the other consequences I see:
* Inflation will accelerate higher ... much higher.
* China and India will gain greater influence over the global economy.
* Gold — now trading at nearly $645 an ounce — will head to new record highs, well above $740 an ounce.
* Oil will hit $100 per barrel. In the malaise of the poor economic environment that will emerge in 2007, the crises with Iraq, Iran, North Korea, and terrorism will all sadly get worse.
Prepare Your Portfolio:
Consider Taking These Steps Now!
First, minimize your exposure to the Dow. In my opinion, this is the perfect time to get out. You won’t have to pay taxes on your capital gains for the next 15 months. More importantly, I think we’re very near the Dow’s peak, and I believe the risk of staying in far outweighs the potential rewards.
Second, get out of long-term bonds. A tanking dollar virtually guarantees that the bond markets are going to get hit across the back of the head with a baseball bat.
Third, don’t buy any real estate right now. Later this year, when the dust from the dollar’s plunge starts to settle, you may see a major bottom in real estate prices. And you’ll see foreign investors — especially wealthy Asians — come rushing back into the U.S. to buy properties on the cheap with their stronger currencies. But until then, residential real estate prices could easily fall another 20%.
Fourth, most of your keep-safe money should be in liquid, short-term investments such as money markets.
Fifth, don’t ignore gold! In my view, the best way to get a stake in gold is through the streetTRACKS Gold Fund (GLD). Each share represents 1/10 of an ounce of gold. The fund eliminates storage and shipping worries because the gold is held in trust for you.
Or, check out my Real Wealth Report’s two favorite gold mutual funds, DWS Gold and Precious Metal (SCGDX) and Tocqueville Gold (TGLDX). Also consider the Market Vectors Gold Miners ETF (AMEX: GDX). This single investment holds ten of the largest gold miners in the world.
Stay safe and cautious,
Larry
Ob PP oder Normalprägung ist doch prinzipiell - was die Krisensituation angeht - nicht von Bedeutung, oder?
US-Notenbanker sehen Risiken
Die jüngsten Fed-Minutes, das Sitzungsprotokoll der US-Notenbank, zeigen, dass die Notenbanker zunehmend Unsicherheiten am Immobilienmarkt sehen. Ihre größte Sorge ist allerdings die Inflation.
Die meisten Mitglieder des geldpolitischen Ausschusses der US-Notenbank (FOMC) seien sich einig, dass die Inflationsrisiken der größte Grund zur Sorge seien. Die Inflation sei "unkomfortabel hoch", weitere Zinserhöhungen möglich. Dies teilte die US-Notenbank in ihrem am Mittwochabend veröffentlichten Protokoll zu ihrer Sitzung am 12. Dezember mit.
Wie aus dem Sitzungsprotokoll weiter hervorgeht, sehen die Währungshüter weiterhin ein Risiko, dass sich die Inflation nicht wie erhofft verlangsamt. Doch es gab auch andere Stimmen. Einige Mitglieder hätten sich bei der Sitzung des Offenmarktausschusses besorgt über verstärkte Wachstumsrisiken geäußert.
Eine schwächelnde Konjunktur garniert mit anhaltenden Inflationsrisiken ist so ziemlich das Letzte, was sich Börsianer wünschen. Prompt machte an der Wall Street das Gespenst einer "Stagflation" die Runde. Mit dem Kunstwort verbinden sich unangenehme Erinnerungen an die 70er-Jahre. Gemeint ist ein stagnierendes Wirtschaftswachstum bei gleichzeitiger Inflation.
Sorge um Immobilienmarkt
Sorgen um das Wirtschaftswachstum bereitet den amerikanischen Notenbanker insbesondere die Entwicklung am US-Immobilienmarkt. Fast alle Mitglieder des Ausschusses sahen laut Sitzungsprotokoll die Wahrscheinlichkeit, dass die Abkühlung am Häusermarkt zu einem niedrigeren Wachstum in der nahen Zukunft führen werde. Über die Auswirkungen der Abkühlung am Immobilienmarkt herrsche aber Unsicherheit. Ein Überspringen auf den Konsum könne offensichtlicher werden, besonders wenn die Hauspreise deutlich zurückgehen sollten.
Die US-Notenbank hatte im Dezember ihren Leitzins bei 5,25 Prozent belassen. Der amerikanische Leitzins blieb damit das vierte Mal in Folge unverändert. Zuvor hatte die Federal Reserve innerhalb von zwei Jahren den Zielsatz für Tagesgeld in 17 Trippelschritten von historisch niedrigen 1,0 Prozent angehoben. Die nächste Zinsentscheidung ist für den 31.Januar angesetzt.
Obwohl die amerikanische Notenbank zuletzt eine Pause in ihrem geldpolitischen Verschärfungskurs einlegte, signalisiert das jetzt veröffentlichte Sitzungsprotokoll die Bereitschaft der Fed zur Wachsamkeit.
Ja ich lebe im Wald. Stichelein finde ich nicht angebracht.
Danke.
Momentan kann ich Bedeutung dieser Silber 10ner nicht schätzen, zumal die Maple Leaf wirklich für das gleiche Geld zu bekommen ist und 999,99 Reinheit hat = Mehrwert!
Könnte ich denn jetzt zu meiner Sparkasse gehen und 100 Silberzehner für je 10 Euro kaufen gehen?
November 2006: der schlechteste Monat für den Güterfernverkehr auf den US-Straßen seit der letzten Rezession
[Blockierte Grafik: http://www.leap2020.eu/photo/529917-647412.jpg]
So kommentiert Bob Costello, Chef-Volkswirt des US-Verbands der LKW-Speditieure, den Rückgang der auf der Straße transportierten Güter um 3,6 Prozent im November 2006 im Vergleich zum Oktober (in dem bereits ein Rückgang um 1,9 Prozent zu verzeichnen war). Gegenüber November 2005 beläuft sich der Rückgang auf 8,8 Prozent (Quelle ATA).
Der Güterfernverkehr auf der Straße ist einer der besten Indikatoren über den Zustand der US-Wirtschaft, denn auf der Straße werden 70 Prozent der gesamten Warenmenge transportiert; sollte auch im folgenden oder in den zwei folgenden Monaten ein solcher Rückgang zu verzeichnen sein, würde man daraus ablesen können, dass die US-Wirtschaft sich nun zweifelsohne in einer Rezession befindet. Auch die Statistiker des US-Arbeitsministeriums sind sich über die Bedeutung des LKW-Güterfernverkehrs als Indikator für die Gesamtwirtschaft bewußt: In Rezessionen sei der Güterfernverkehr einer der Industriezweige, die zuerst betroffen seien, da die Warenbestellungen zurückgingen: "During economic downturns, the truck transportation and warehousing industry is one of the first to slow down as orders for goods and shipments decline." (Quelle: US Department of Labour / Bureau of Labor Statistics)
US-GROSSSTÄDTE
Starker Staat soll Miethaie stoppen
Von Karsten Stumm
In Deutschland übernehmen US-Investoren städtische Wohnungen im großen Stil - in ihrer Heimat dagegen dreht wegen Mietwuchers der Wind. US-Stadtverwaltungen kaufen ganze Straßenzüge auf. Einige drohen sogar mit Enteignungen.
[Blockierte Grafik: http://www.spiegel.de/img/0,1020,769277,00.jpg]
Hamburg - Wenn Jerry Sanders in seinem Büro im elften Stock der öffentlichen Verwaltung von San Diego seine Stadt vorstellen möchte, dann nimmt der Oberbürgermeister gerne den Straßenplan zur Hand. Zoo, Seaworld, 70 Meilen lange Strände im Stadtgebiet und die elegante Einkaufs- und Flaniergegend Gaslamp Quarter - die zweitgrößte Metropole Kaliforniens hat viel zu bieten. Wenn es nach dem Willen der Stadtvorsteher geht, dürfte bald sogar noch eine Attraktion dazukommen: bezahlbare Wohnungen.
Die Sonnenscheinstadt San Diego hat zusammen mit privaten Geldgebern 38 Millionen Dollar in einen mächtigen Häuserblock im Stadtteil Barrio Logan gesteckt, einem der ältesten und traditionsreichsten Viertel der City. Und diese Wohnungen will die Gemeinde ausschließlich Stadtbewohnern mit niedrigen Einkommen zur Miete anbieten. "Eines der Hauptziele unserer Stadtentwicklung ist es, mehr bezahlbaren Wohnraum aufzubauen", sagt Sanders.
Er hat Erfahrung damit. Schon im Mai vergangenen Jahres wurde der Grundstein für ein ähnliches Projekt an San Diegos Logan Avenue gelegt, Ecke 16. Straße. Die Investitionssumme dort: 15 Millionen Dollar. 1167 Apartments sollen errichtet werden, für Stadtbewohner mit Gehältern weit unter dem Durchschnitt der Business-Stadt.
Markteingriff mit Steuergeld
"Barrio Logan ist ein Stadtteil, in dem verzweifelter Bedarf nach günstigen Unterbringungen besteht", sagt Ben Hueso fast entschuldigend für den städtischen Eingriff in San Diegos Wohnungsmarkt. Hueso ist Bürgermeister des Districts der kalifornischen Großstadt, zu dem Barrio Logan zählt.
Ausgerechnet im Heimatland der Finanzinvestoren dreht der Wind: Während US-Finanzinvestoren wie Fortress oder Lone Star in der Bundesrepublik im großen Stil städtische Wohnungen kaufen, erwerben amerikanische Städte ganze Straßenzüge von privaten Wohnungsbaugesellschaften.
Die sind allerdings weniger von der möglichen Rendite ihres Investments umgetrieben als von der Struktur ihres städtischen Wohnungsmarkts: Speziell günstiger Wohnraum ist inzwischen vielerorts sehr knapp geworden.
Die lange Boomphase in einigen Metropolen der USA hat das Preisniveau für Wohnhäuser und Mietwohnungen landesweit in die Höhe getrieben. Seit 1995 stieg der Preis für US-Wohnhäuser im Schnitt fast um die Hälfte. Und die Mieten gingen nach Angaben des Bureau of Labour Statistics im gleichen Zeitraum um etwa ein Drittel in die Höhe. Je nach Region war es sogar weit mehr: Speziell in New York und in Kalifornien legten die Preise für Wohnimmobilien in dieser Phase viel stärker zu als im Landesdurchschnitt, errechnete unlängst die NordLB.
Notfalls enteignen
Vergleichsweise billige Apartments sind in etlichen Großstädten Amerikas kaum noch zu bekommen. Angesichts dieser Notlage werden auch in der Öffentlichkeit zunehmend Rufe nach dem Staat laut - in den USA ein seltenes Phänomen. In New York beispielsweise sorgt der geplante Verkauf der Manhattan-Viertel Stuyvesant Town und Peter Cooper Village für einen regelrechten Aufschrei.
Der riesige Komplex an New Yorks East-River-Ufer galt bis jetzt als eine der letzten Zufluchtstätten amerikanischer Mittelstandsfamilien, die sich andere Wohnungen in Manhatten nicht mehr leisten können: Feuerwehrleute, Polizisten, Lehrer oder Krankenschwestern zahlen hier 1700 Dollar pro Monat für ein Zweizimmerapartment.
Nun aber verkauft der Besitzer der Wohnanlage, der US-Versicherungsriese Metlife, die Apartments für 5,4 Milliarden Dollar an die Investorenfirma Tishman Speyer. Viele Bewohner fürchten nun, dass sie mittelfristig ihre Wohnungen räumen müssen. Das aber bedeutet für viele gleichzeitig, dass sie Manhattan verlassen müssten.
Hinzu kommt, dass die Nachfrage nach Mietwohnungen in den kommenden Jahren wahrscheinlich überproportional steigen wird. Denn viele Amerikaner, die bisher in den eigenen vier Wänden gewohnt haben, sind in den vergangenen Jahren immer stärker in Bedrängnis geraten, weil sie ihre Häuser mit Krediten ohne feste Zinsbindung finanzieren. Das war kein Problem, solange die Zinsen gleich blieben oder fielen. Doch seit die US-Notenbank an der Zinsschraube dreht, sieht die Sache anders aus.
In der Kreditklemme
Allein in den vergangenen zwei Jahren haben die Währungshüter Amerikas wichtigsten Zinssatz 17-mal in Folge erhöht, auf nunmehr 5,25 Prozent. Entsprechend viele Grundeigentümer sind in den vergangenen Monaten Schritt für Schritt in Kreditschwierigkeiten geraten, und das stellt irgendwann die US-Gemeinden vor Probleme. Denn die Kommunen müssen unter Umständen einspringen, sollten die Immobilien der betroffenen Hausbesitzer tatsächlich unter den Hammer kommen: Im Notfall sollen die Städte die Familien mit Wohnraum versorgen.
Ein Vorhaben der kalifornischen Gemeinde Moorpark lässt ahnen, wie dringend in manchen US-Städten mittlerweile günstiger Wohnraum gesucht wird. Mitten in ihrem City-Gebiet, von der Poindexter Avenue im Norden bis zur Los Angeles Avenue im Süden, erstrecken sich bisher Brachen mit heruntergekommenen Bauten. Niemand hat sich für die Immobilien bisher interessiert. Die Besitzer spekulierten vielmehr auf den Weiterverkauf, sollte das Viertel einmal einen Aufschwung nehmen. Jetzt erwägt die Stadt die Eigentümer kurzerhand zu enteignen, die Gebäude zu sanieren - und darin günstige Mietapartments anzubieten.
"Eines ist klar", sagt Moorpark-Bürgermeister Patrick Hunter: "Enteignung ist ein außergewöhnlich gravierender Eingriff der Stadtführung und sollte auch nur in außergewöhnlichen Fällen eingesetzt werden - als letztes Mittel und nachdem der private Besitzer fair abgefunden worden ist."
Noch hat der Rat der Stadt nicht entschieden.
