Der Rohöl Thread

1. offizieller Beitrag

    Und hier schon die erste Meldung, die Saudis haben eine wilde Müllkippe aufgetan... :D


    26 Okt 2004 21:00



    26.10.2004 20:24:07 Saudi-Arabien - Neues Ölvorkommen entdeckt



    Riad, 26. Okt (Reuters) - Saudi-Arabien hat nach den Worten seines Ölministers Ali Al-Naimi ein neues Ölvorkommen in dem Königreich entdeckt.


    Bei dem Fund mit einer anfänglichen Durchflussrate von täglich 3000 Barrel (Barrel = knapp 159 Liter) handele es sich offenbar um superleichtes (sehr schwefelarmes) Öl, sagte der Minister nach einer von der staatlichen Nachrichtenagentur SPA verbreiteten Erklärung. Das Ölfeld liege 185 Kilometer südlich der Hauptstadt Riad. "Wir erwarten, eine höhere Förderung aus diesem Vorkommen zu erreichen," sagte Al-Naimi, ohne weitere Einzelheiten zu nennen.


    Saudi-Arabien ist der weltgrößte Ölexporteur und führendes Mitglied der Organisation Erdöl exportierender Länder (Opec).


    fgc/ast


    © Reuters 2004

    The Countdown for the Peak of Oil Production has Begun – but what are the Views
    of the Most Important International Energy Agencies
    W. Zittel, J. Schindler, L-B-Systemtechnik, 12 October 2004
    1. Preface
    Conditions of the world's oil supply have entered into a new phase: increasing demand
    pressure, worries about the security of supply in important oil producing countries,
    speculative factors, but particularly, clear indications that limitations on the supply side
    have caused unexpected and high price increases. In view of the fact that an increase of
    oil production is obviously becoming more and more difficult, it is now almost irrelevant,
    whether the peak of oil production has already been reached or whether growth of
    production “only” can't keep pace anymore with rising demand.
    With accumulating evidence we will soon be able to decide between the conflicting views
    held by “optimists” and “pessimists”. According to the doctrine of the “optimists” (mostly
    pronounced by economists), rising prices will induce a fast increase of oil exploration and
    production, which in turn will lead to a relaxation in the oil market in the near future. In
    contrast, the “pessimists” (mostly influenced by geological considerations) expect that it
    will become increasingly difficult to balance the increase in demand by a sufficient rise in
    supply. As a consequence production will not be able to follow demand and, after a short
    phase of stagnation, will decline inescapably.
    Many indications during the last four years vindicate the theses of the “pessimists” and not
    of the “optimists”. But it would be much more appropriate to leave these misleading
    categories behind and to speak in future only about “realistic” and “unrealistic” views. This
    topic is not a matter of belief anymore.
    At first the present state of the world's oil supply will be outlined. Then follows a detailed
    discussion of the arguments of the “optimists”. We attach particular importance to this, as
    in most publications there is a reference to the main original papers which are often quoted
    with their central messages, but this is rarely accompanied by a critical analysis. In most
    cases the conclusiveness of the cited arguments is not questioned since they originate
    from institutions to which a high authority is attributed.
    2. The present state of oil supply
    2.1. Fundamental aspects
    The different phases of oil production can be described schematically by the following
    pattern: In the early phase of the search for oil, the easily accessible oil fields are found
    and developed. With increasing experience the locations of new oil fields are detected in a
    more systematic way. This leads to a boom in which more and more new fields are
    developed, initially in the primary regions, later on all over the world. Those regions which
    are more difficult to access, are explored and developed only when sufficient new oil can't
    be found anymore in the easily accessible regions. As nobody will look for oil without also
    wanting to produce it, in general shortly after the finding of new fields their development
    will follow.
    With increasing production the pressure of an oil field diminishes and the water levels rise,


    and after some time the production rate begins to decline. This trend can be controlled to a
    certain extent so that the decline in production rate is delayed or reduced: by injecting gas
    or water into the reservoir in order to increase the pressure, by heating the oil or by
    injecting chemicals in order to reduce the viscosity of the oil.
    In every oil province the big fields will be developed first and only afterwards the smaller
    ones. As soon as the first big fields of a region have passed their production peak, an
    increasing number of new and generally smaller fields have to be developed in order to
    compensate the decline of the production base. From there on, it becomes increasingly
    difficult to sustain the rate of the production growth. A race begins which can be described
    as follows: More and more large oil fields show declining production rates. The resulting
    gap has to be filled by bringing into production a larger number of smaller fields. However,
    these smaller fields reach their peak much faster and then contribute to the overall
    production decline. As a consequence, the region's production profile which results from
    the aggregation of the production profiles of the individual fields, becomes more and more
    “skewed”, the aggregate decline of the producing fields becomes steeper and steeper.
    This decline has to be compensated for by the ever faster connection of more and more
    ever smaller fields.
    So, the production pattern over time of an oil province can be characterised as follows: To
    increase the supply of oil will become more and more difficult, the growth rate will slow
    down and costs will increase until the point is reached where industry is not anymore able
    to bring into production a sufficient number of new fields quick enough. At that point,
    production will stagnate temporarily and then eventually start to decline.
    This pattern can be observed very well in many oil provinces. However, sometimes this
    general pattern was not followed: either because the timely development of a “favourable”
    region was not possible for political reasons, or because of the existence of huge surplus
    capacities so that production was held back for a longer period of time. However, the more
    existing surplus capacities were reduced, the closer the production profile follows the
    described pattern.
    In the history of oil production, which is now extending over more than 150 years, we can
    identify some fundamental trends:
    · The world's largest oil fields were all discovered more than 50 years ago.
    · Since the 1960’s, annual oil discoveries have decreased tendentially.
    · Since 1980, annual consumption has exceeded annual new discoveries.
    · Till this day more than 42,000 oil fields have been found, but the 400 largest oil fields (1
    per cent) contain more than 75 per cent of all oil ever discovered.
    · The historical maximum of oil discoveries has to be followed after some time by a
    maximum of oil production (the “peak”).
    How close have we already got to the peak? This is the only exciting question remaining.
    2.2. Countries outside OPEC and Former Soviet Union (FSU)
    On the global level, the development of different oil regions took place at different times


    and at varying speeds. Therefore, today we are able to identify production regions being in
    different development stages and with this empirical evidence we can validate with many
    examples the simple considerations which were described in the previous chapter.
    Looking at the countries outside of the Former Soviet Union and OPEC, it can be noticed
    that their total production increased until about the year 2000, but since then total
    production has been declining. A detailed analysis of the individual countries within this
    group shows that most of them have already reached their production peaks and that only
    a very limited number of countries will still be able to expand production, particularly Brazil
    and Angola.
    Critical for the stagnation of oil production in this group of countries was the peaking of oil
    production in the North Sea which occurred in 2000 (1999 in Great Britain, 2001 in Norway
    [1]). Oil production onshore stagnated much earlier and has been declining since the mid
    90's. This decline could be balanced by the quick development of offshore fields which
    now account for almost 50% of the production of all countries in this group. The North Sea
    alone has a share of almost 40% of the total offshore production within this group. For this
    reason the peaking of the the North Sea was decisive. This production decline couldn't be
    overcompensated anymore by the quicker connection of new fields in the remaining
    regions – it could only be balanced for a few years [2].
    Decisive for the further development will be, when the production of Cantarell in Mexico,
    the world's biggest offshore field, will start to decline. This field, discovered in1978, even
    today contributes half to the Mexican oil production. It has reached a plateau for some
    years now. The present production rate can only be maintained by the massive injection of
    nitrogen. The yearly amount of nitrogen injected into the field has doubled the world's
    annual consumption of nitrogen. Optimistic observers assume that this field will continue to
    produce at current levels up to the year 2010, others expect the decline to start much
    earlier. Just recently, PEMEX itself has warned that it expects Cantarell to start decline in
    2006 at an annual rate of 14% per year [3]. Apart from that, the quality of the oil produced
    in Mexico has degraded steadily. Today, the share of light oil has halved since 1997 [4].
    This steady degradation of the quality of the oil produced can be observed in almost all
    regions having passed the peak and poses an additional challenge for the existing
    downstream infrastructures: refineries have to be run with oil of increasingly lower quality.
    The supply share of lesser oil qualities is steadily increasing – this causes additional
    pressure on the price for the remaining good oil grades.
    Particularly interesting is the example of Indonesia, which is the only OPEC member state
    which is included in this group of countries as it will probably soon leave the OPEC –
    because in march 2004 for the first time more oil was imported than exported [5].
    Oil production in regions having passed their peak can be forecasted with some certainty
    for the next 10 years. If it is assumed that the remaining regions with growth potential
    (Angola, Brazil and the Gulf of Mexico) will considerably expand their production by the
    year 2010 (in accordance with the optimistic forecasts of the companies operating in these
    regions), total oil production of this group of countries, however, will decline by 7-8 Mb/day
    (Mb = million barrels) by 2010. Not accounted for in this forecast is the fact that (contrary
    to the assumptions made above) in Brazil production has been declining for 8 month in
    series and is now back to the level of 2002, as the connection of new fields was delayed
    for economic and technological reasons [6].
    As the production of conventional oil is declining, this group of countries will be able to
    supply additional amounts only from non-conventional sources. Non-conventional oilsands in Canada and Venezuela will contribute 1-1.5 Mb/day, provided that the already
    announced expansion plans will be realised without any further delay.

    2.3. Former Soviet Union (FSU)
    The oil production of the Former Soviet Union peaked reaching a production rate of more
    than 12 Mb/day at the end of the 80's. Soon afterwards production collapsed by almost
    50% within 5 years. The production peak at the end of the 80's had been forecasted by
    western geologists based on the depletion patterns of the largest oil fields [7]. However,
    the following production collapse during the economic break down turned out to be much
    steeper than expected. For this reason, Russian companies were able to stop this decline
    after the liberalisation of the oil market and to increase production levels again – in some
    years at double-digit rates during the last 5 years - with the help of international
    cooperations and investments. However, this fast recovery now comes to an end as the
    easily accessible fields have been developed and the financial and technological backlog
    is widely closed.
    Recently the director of the Russian energy agency, Sergej Oganesyan, conceded for the
    first time that the growth rates of the past few years can't be repeated anymore and that in
    2005 production will probably stagnate or even decline [8].
    But despite this strong revival of Russian production, the oil price has remained under


    pressure and has been rising slowly but continuously and even exceeded the $40 line, a
    fourfold increase compared with 1999. The double-digit growth rates in Russia contributed
    to compensate for the inescapable production decline in other regions of the world, and to
    counter the rising demand pressure.
    The two other important oil regions of the Former Soviet Union are Azerbaijan and
    Kazakhstan.
    At world level, Azerbaijan is the oldest modern oil region. Its highest production rates were
    reached already fourty years ago. Today, we can expect production expansions only in
    the offshore areas. In this context, especially the field complex Azeri-Chirag-Guneshli has
    to be mentioned. Once fully developed, Azeri-Chirag-Guneshliy probably will reach its
    maximum in 2008 or 2009 at a production rate of 1 Mb/day. Soon thereafter the production
    rate will decline very fast to almost negligible amounts within 10-15 years. The total
    production of this region, however, will increase by a much smaller amount as 150.000
    b/day are already produced from Azeri-Chirag-Guneshli today and as in future the
    production from other fields will drop noticeably [9].
    For some years Kazakhstan was considered to be a potential counterbalance for Saudi
    Arabia. Today we know that these hopes were exaggerated. They were nurtured by
    speculations of the US federal authority “EIA” which expected oil and gas reserves in the
    region around the Caspian Sea amounting up to 300 Gb of oil equivalent. Realistically,
    only about 45 Gb of oil are likely to be recoverable, about half of this amount is located in
    already developed fields [10].
    High expectations regarding future production potentials concentrate on three fields:
    Tengiz, Kamchagarak and Kashagan. All three fields contain oil with a high sulphur
    content the development of which jeopardises the environment and is very expensive.
    Tengiz and Kamchagarak produce oil since some years; in Tengiz alone, more than 4,500
    tons of sulphur are separated from the produced oil each day and stored in the
    surrounding area polluting the environment [11]. Plans for a production extension are
    delayed due to high development costs and difficult geological conditions. In 2000, the
    third big oil field, Kashagan, was found. It is supposed that production can be increased
    considerably from 2006 on. But there are big doubts whether this will be possible. High
    sulphur content, high deposit pressure of more than 1000 bar and an unfavourable
    geographical location far away from any infrastructure make it expensive and difficult to
    develop. It is certainly no coincidence that two of the big companies being involved in the
    discovery of the field (BP and Statoil) have withdrawn from the group of companies
    developing the field. After an analysis of the first exploration drilling, it was communicated
    that the companies' internal criteria for a development weren't fulfilled [12]. British Gas
    already has announced its withdrawal.
    Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan will probably be able to double their production rate by 2010 –
    from 1.3 million barrels to 2.5-2.6 Mb/day – but to hope for more seems unrealistic.
    According to this assessment, the whole region may be able to increase its production in
    the coming years, but the very big expansion expected by many people will not occur. A
    total production increase of 2-3 million barrels/day is probably already on the high side.
    2.4. OPEC member countries
    The conclusion of the previous analyses is: the expected production decline in the group of
    countries described initially is partly offset by a possible expansion in Russia and in the


    Caspian Sea. But there still remains a gap of 3-5 Mb/day to keep world oil production
    constant until 2010. This gap has to be filled by the OPEC member countries. If the world
    demands additional oil, this amount would have to come from the OPEC member
    countries as well.
    Conventional wisdom has it that this will be possible for OPEC without any problems.
    However, a production growth of 3-5 Mb/day within a few years does constitute a problem.
    Particularly as it is widely accepted that – apart from Iraq which can't be considered to be
    a reliable oil producer for the time being – only Saudi Arabia is supposed to be able to
    increase its oil production significantly. This would require an expansion of almost 40% of
    the Saudi Arabian oil production within very few years. This is a very ambitious goal, even
    for a country with an abundance of oil.
    Moreover, in recent years the suspicion has grown that the conditions for oil production in
    Saudi Arabia are not as favourable anymore as is commonly assumed, but are becoming
    more and more difficult. In assessing the future production potential of Saudi Arabia,
    Ghawar, the world’s biggest oil field, plays a key role. This field was discovered in 1948
    and has now been producing oil for more than 50 years. It is a fact that meanwhile more
    water is pumped into the field than oil is extracted, and it seems quite possible that the
    production rate will decline soon. Anyway, it is certain that Ghawar can not anymore
    contribute to an expansion of Saudi Arabian production [13].
    There is now a debate going on about the wider question, whether Saudi Arabia will at all
    be able to increase its production significantly. This debate was initiated early in 2004 by
    Matthew Simmons, an American investment banker. His doubts are based on a
    comprehensive in-depth analysis of technical papers in the public domain addressing the
    problems of oil production in Saudi Arabia, and on a great number of interviews with
    engineers working on site and also a visit of the oil fields in Saudi Arabia.
    Simmons has provoked comments by senior executives of the state-owned company
    Saudi Aramco. But their comments have rather fueled existing fears instead of assuring
    the world. First, it was admitted by Saudi Aramco that the big old oil fields show decline
    rates, and that by now Abqaiq is depleted by 73%, and Ghawar by 48% [14]. Moreover it
    was indirectly confirmed by Abdul-Baqi and Nansen Saleri, that proven reserves do not
    amount to 262 Gb - as is commonly assumed - but are only 130 Gb and that another 130
    Gb had already been counted as reserves because it is regarded probable that they can
    be developed eventually [14]. If one would apply the same criteria which are common
    practice in western companies, then Saudi Aramco’s allegation for proven reserves should
    be devalued by 50%. This devaluation is confirmed indirectly by another Saudi Aramco
    executive [15].
    Furthermore, Saudi Aramco executives tried to counter the fears of Simmons by stating
    that a production of 10 Mb/day could be upheld until 2042. In doing this they had to
    assume that the above mentioned reserves of 260 Gb are proved reserves (which they are
    definitely not). Saudi Aramco went on to state that in case of a more aggressive
    development of remaining reserves, production could be increased to 12 Mb/day by 2016
    and then could be maintained constant until 2033 [14]. But even this scenario put forward
    by the Saudis is hardly assuring in view of the projections of the International Energy
    Agency (IEA) which assume that in the long term additionally more than 20 Mb/day are
    supposed to come from those regions.
    The analyses of Simmons [16] and others (e.g. Bakhtiari [17]) make the point that Saudi
    Arabia’s potential to increase production will soon reach its limits.

    2.5. The world is nearing the moment of truth
    The recent rise of crude prices to more than $40 per barrel could for a short while be
    slightly reversed by the announcement of OPEC member states to increase their
    production. This shows that in the short term prices can be influenced by rhetoric - but
    eventually everybody wants to see OPEC delivering. However, it will soon turn out whether
    the “pessimistic pessimists” are right who believe that also OPEC has no more spare
    capacity left or whether the world will sit back for a few more years.
    In case world oil production can be increased again, this will be taken by many as a
    refutation of the claims of the “Cassandras” and as evidence that oil production can
    therefore be increased for many more years to come. More appropriate would be the
    perception (1) that the remaining oil will be consumed this much faster and (2) that an
    increase of production in the short term will in effect further increase the level of oil
    dependency - until from this higher level a steeper decline than otherwise necessary will
    be enforced.
    Recent developments are in obvious contrast to the assertions of the optimists which don’t
    foresee any problems in the availability of oil for the next 20-30 years. But they now
    acknowledge that price increases might be possible.
    3. Critique of forecasts by USGS, US-EIA and IEA
    The analyses and forecasts of the US Geological Survey (USGS), of the Energy
    Information Administration (EIA) being the statistical arm of the US Department of Energy,
    but particularly also of the International Energy Agency (IEA) in Paris, are frequently
    quoted because they enjoy high credibility and are considered to be a reliable orientation
    regarding future developments.
    From time to time the US Geological Survey, an American federal authority, publishes
    assessments about the global availability of hydrocarbons. It has to be noted that these
    studies don’t provide any explicit information about future production potentials.
    Often these studies are quoted in a very abbreviated form, while all references to
    uncertainties and boundary conditions contained in the studies are omitted. The energy
    agencies EIA and IEA proceed in a similar way and use selected statements of the USGS
    studies as basis for their optimistic assessments of future production potentials.
    Common to all these analyses is a confident perspective which is in stark contrast to the
    analyses described in the previous chapters of this paper. Therefore recent influential
    publications of these institutions will be analysed in greater detail at this stage.
    3.1. US Geological Survey (USGS)
    The latest survey of resources is the “US Geological Survey World Petroleum Assessment
    2000” and was published in june 2000 [18]. Apart from the content of the study, also the
    way the results of the study were published is of interest. Main results were released to the
    press at the end of march 2000, before the publication of the full report, delivering the
    message that up to now the potential for future oil discoveries had been grossly
    underestimated and that there was still much oil left to be found [19]. By coincidence this


    press release appeared on the eve of a critical OPEC meeting at which an expansion of
    production quotas was to be negotiated at a time when oil prices started rising dramatically
    for the first time since Gulf War I.
    Also unusual and coinciding with the publication of the survey, one of the authors - Les
    Magoon - published a poster on the USGS web page (using the official logo) which warns
    of the imminent big “rollover”. This is the moment when the oil market changes from a
    buyers’ market – in which oil price is governed by consumer demand with no supply
    restrictions - to a sellers’ market in which supply constraints determine prices [20]. This
    moment will be reached when global oil production can’t be expanded anymore and
    begins to decline. According to Magoon, the examination of many analyses leads to the
    conclusion that the exact moment can’t be determined with certainty by anyone, but
    production peak will be reached in all probability somewhere between 2003 and 2020:
    “Nobody is sure, but those willing to forecast say somewhere between 2003 and 2020.
    Most everybody seems to agree that it will most likely be within our lifetime, and possibly
    quite soon!”
    For the illustration of this statement the production curve published by the “pessimists”
    Colin Campbell and Jean Laherrere in Scientific American [21] showing a maximum in
    2003 is used and by doing this he gave prominent support to their view. Only after
    protests of the oil industry, a small annotation was added that this does not present the
    official opinion of the USGS. But albeit, this illustration has been visible until today on the
    USGS web page with the logo of the federal authority. Therefore, a certain identification
    with the content can’t be denied.
    In the executive summary of the resource survey 2000 the following phrases deserve
    attention: purpose of the study is “... to assess resources ... which have the potential to be
    added to reserves within a 30-year timeframe (1995-2025)...” [18]. It is stated explicitly that
    those oil findings can be expected in the time between 1995 and 2025. Until today almost
    one third of this period of time has elapsed, so that already now we are able to compare
    the estimates of the study with reality.
    Moreover the wording “to assess resources... which have the potential to be added to
    reserves” is so vague that its exact interpretation is left to the reader.
    In brief the results of the survey can be summed up as follows:
    · Outside of the USA up to 334 Gb of oil can be found between 1995 and 2025 at a
    probability of 95%, and 1107 Gb at a probability of 5%. By using extensive Monte-Carlo
    simulations a “mean” value of 649 Gb is calculated.
    · Furthermore between 95 Gb (5% probability) and 378 Gb (95% probability) of natural
    gas liquids (NGLs) can be found.
    · In contrast to previous analyses a new factor - called “reserve growth” - is introduced.
    The factor for the reserve growth is calculated from the experience in the USA during
    the last decades, extrapolated for the next 30 years and then applied on the rest of the
    world.
    This method of adjusting reserves by a growth factor must be criticised in two respects:
    The upward revision of reserves in the past is caused in most cases by an initial
    underestimation of the content of the old and large fields. These fields were so large that it
    wasn’t necessary for their efficient development to determine their exact size. And some of
    these fields are so old (up to 100 years and more) so that the methods of reserve
    estimation at the time of discovery were very simple and unprecise.

    Today the growth of reserves tends to be much smaller, partly because newly found fields
    are so small that a precise estimate is needed, but also because modern exploration
    methods are much more precise than in the past. Nowadays it happens quite often that
    reserves also have to be adjusted downwards instead of upwards (as lately the example of
    Shell has shown).
    The second point of critique refers to the fact that – as is known to all experts - the growth
    of reserves in the USA in the past was much higher than elsewhere. This is a direct
    consequence of the regulations by the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC), which for
    financial reasons call for very conservative evaluations at the beginning of the
    development of an oil field. This American practice leads to systematic underestimations.
    For these reasons this marked reserve growth in the past was only observed in the USA
    and can not be extrapolated into the next 30 years, nor even less can this pattern be
    applied to the whole world.
    But apart from this important aspect, it seems very strange that a scientific geological
    institute makes estimates of the geological potential of oil findings and then additionally
    applies a growth factor which only reflects the economic rules of “reserve reporting”. It is
    obvious that the reporting of reserves can only extend within the boundaries of the
    geologically possible. The USGS study mixes different categories of reserve evaluation
    which are not compatible. The results can not be regarded as scientifically sound and are
    all but reliable.
    To arrive at a global picture, US data have to be added to the world’s oil resources outside
    the US. For this purpose the USGS draws on its own analysis of the US from 1996 [22].
    The total results of the USGS study are shown in the following table.
    Table: USGS estimate of potential oil findings between 1995 and 2025 and reserve growth

    Hinweiss !!



    Grossmacht zwischen Marktwirtschaft und Machenschaften



    Spiegel TV auf Vox heute um 21:50


    2Stunden Marktwirtschaft in Russland,dabei geht es vorrangig auch um Yukos.Die Sendung wird morgen Vormittag wiederholt.


    Grüsse


    Kalle

    Mal nen interessanter Beitrag aus der FAZ:


    Text: Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 15.11.2004, Nr. 267 / Seite 18


    Die hohen Ölpreise schaffen ein neues Industriesegment


    Im Schatten der großen Ölkonzerne betätigen sich kleine Unternehmen in Amerika als Resteverwerter



    lid. NEW YORK, 14. November. Das Ölgeschäft gleicht im Moment einer Lizenz zum Gelddrucken. Die großen internationalen Ölkonzerne haben im dritten Quartal schwindelerregend hohe Gewinne erwirtschaftet und verdanken dies überwiegend den steigenden Ölpreisen. Der Weltmarktführer Exxon-Mobil hat seinen Quartalsgewinn um 56 Prozent auf 5,7 Milliarden Dollar gesteigert, bei Chevron-Texaco gab es ein Plus von 62 Prozent auf 3,2 Milliarden Dollar.



    Das lukrative Geschäft lockt Unternehmer in amerikanischen Ölgebieten an und läßt im Moment ein ganz neues Marktsegment entstehen. Kleine Unternehmen erwerben Ölfelder, die den Großkonzernen nicht mehr rentabel genug sind, die aber angesichts der derzeitigen Ölpreise noch immer genügend Gewinne abwerfen. Das hat folgenden Hintergrund: Ölfelder werden nach ihrer Erschließung bei weitem nicht vollständig ausgeschöpft. Je tiefer gebohrt wird, um so aufwendiger und teurer wird die Förderung.


    Daher werden Felder häufig aufgegeben, wenn das leicht und billig zu fördernde Öl aus dem Boden geholt ist. " Für jedes geförderte Barrel Öl bleiben zwei weitere Barrel im Boden" , sagt Jeff Johnson, Chief Executive Officer der im texanischen Fort Worth ansässigen Cano Petroleum Inc.


    Cano ist eines von diesen kleinen Unternehmen, das reife Ölfelder aufkauft und danach weiter ausschöpft, als dies die Großkonzerne machen würden. Das Unternehmen ist erst in diesem Jahr mit der Übernahme des Ölfeldes Davenport im Bundesstaat Oklahoma entstanden, seither wurden zwei weitere Felder zugekauft. Die Aktien von Cano werden über den außerbörslichen OTC-Markt gehandelt, bis zum Jahresende strebt das Unternehmen eine Börsennotierung an der American Stock Exchange (Amex) an. Cano nutzt neue Produktionstechniken - einen chemischen Flutungsprozeß -, um zusätzliches Öl aus diesen Regionen gewinnen zu können.


    Auch mit der Cano-Technik werden die Felder bei weitem nicht ausgeschöpft. Der Anteil des geförderten Öls in Davenport zum Beispiel soll sich aber von derzeit 31 Prozent auf bis zu 45 Prozent erhöhen. Die Fördertechnik von Cano ist viel teurer als herkömmliche Methoden, und nach den Worten von Johnson ist ein Ölpreis von mindestens 20 Dollar je Barrel nötig, um einen Gewinn zu erzielen. Beim gegenwärtigen Preis von knapp 48 Dollar ist das Geschäft hoch profitabel. Die Frage ist allerdings, wie sich die Ölpreise künftig entwickeln werden. In den vergangenen Wochen sind die Preise deutlich gesunken, nachdem im Oktober ein Höchststand um 55 Dollar erreicht worden war. Johnson ist sich indessen sicher, daß die Preise wieder steigen werden: " In einem Jahr wird das Barrel 60 bis 70 Dollar kosten" , sagt er. Nach seinen Worten ist dafür nicht entscheidend, wie sich die Angebotsseite entwickelt, also zum Beispiel welche Fördermengen die Opec festlegt. Einen Preisanstieg werde es allein schon durch eine rasant steigende Nachfrage in Ländern wie China und Indien geben. In China ist der Ölverbrauch nach Einschätzung von Johnson allein in diesem Jahr um 40 Prozent gestiegen. Der weltweite tägliche Ölverbrauch von derzeit 83 Millionen Barrel wird nach seiner Ansicht bis Ende kommenden Jahres auf 86 Millionen Barrel zulegen.


    Neben Cano gibt es bislang noch nicht allzu viele Wettbewerber, die sich mit der Erschließung reifer Ölfelder beschäftigen. Die bekannteste Adresse dürfte der ebenfalls in Fort Worth beheimatete Energiekonzern XTO Energy sein. XTO hat sich in den vergangenen Jahren vor allem auf Erdgas konzentriert, baut in jüngster Zeit aber seine Ölsparte mit dem Erwerb reifer Felder aus.


    So hat das Unternehmen in diesem Jahr Chevron-Texaco-Felder im Wert von mehr als einer Milliarde Dollar abgekauft. Johnson erwartet zahlreiche neue Wettbewerber, Cano habe aber einen Vorsprung von sechs bis zwölf Monaten. In der Zukunft will er jährlich zwei bis vier neue Ölfelder zukaufen. In den nächsten zwei Jahren soll die heutige Produktionsmenge von 400 bis 500 Barrel am Tag verzehnfacht werden. Konkurrenz durch die großen Ölkonzerne erwartet Johnson bei seiner Expansion nicht. Obwohl die Vereinigten Staaten neben Saudi-Arabien und Rußland zu den drei größten Ölproduzenten der Welt gehören, sind die in Amerika zur Verfügung stehenden Vorkommen für die Ölmultis zu unbedeutend. Daher bauen sie ihre Aktivitäten in Rußland und anderen ausländischen Märkten aus.


    Den Ausgang der Präsidentenwahlen in Amerika sieht Johnson eher als gute Nachricht für die Ölbranche, wobei er keine längerfristigen Auswirkungen auf die Ölpreise erwartet. George W. Bush könnte sich nach Ansicht von Johnson womöglich darum bemühen, bisher politisch umstrittene Gebiete zu erschließen. Das gilt an erster Stelle für das ölreiche Naturschutzgebiet Alaska National Wildlife Refuge (ANWR), über dessen Freigabe für die Ölförderung in der amerikanischen Öffentlichkeit seit Jahren kontrovers diskutiert wird und das deshalb schon mehrfach Wahlkampfthema war. Daneben gibt es aber auch noch kleinere Gebiete in Kalifornien und Florida, die möglicherweise auf die Tagesordnung kommen könnten.

    Einer der interessantesten Artikel in der letzten Zeit, der sich mit Saudi Arabien und dem Einfluß auf den Ölpreis befaßt:


    http://www.321gold.com/editorials/george/george012405.html


    Neben der Instabilität (insb. aufgrund des wachsenden Islamismus), wird vor allem zum Schluß auf die sinkenden Ölbestande sowie auf die Gefahr von terroristischen Sabotageakten eingegangen:


    • Um die Ölproduktion zu maximieren, pressen die Saudis derzeit Seewasser in ihr größtes Ölfeld (Ghawar), die derzeit ein Volumen von ca. 55 % der Produktion ausmacht. Erfahrungen zeigen, dass bei 75 % das Ölfeld zusammenbricht.


    • Simmons geht davon aus, dass die saudische Ölproduktion innerhalb von 3 Jahren rapide sinken wird. Es gibt keinen anderen Ölproduzenten, der die Saudis ersetzen kann.


    • 2015 wird die Ölnachfrage (inkl. der steigenden Nachfrage aus China / Indien) um 66 % ansteigen.


    • Es gibt massive Unterschiede bzgl. der Schätzungen der Ölreserven der Saudis. Die US-Quellen gingen 1975 von 108 Mio. Barrels aus, die Saudis von 280 Mio. Barrels.


    • Die Schätzung der Produktion liegt bei 9,6 Mio. Barrels tgl. für Ende 2004, 9 Mio. Barrels tgl. für Ende 2005, 8,7 Mio. Barrels tgl. für Ende 2006 und über 8 Mio. Barrels tgl. für 2007.


    • Bei einem Sabotageakt auf die saudische Ölproduktion geht man von einem Rückgang der Ölproduktion um 5,8 Mio. Barrel tgl. in den ersten 2 Monaten aus. Nach 7 Monaten liegt das Niveau immer noch 4 Mio. Barrel unter dem normalen Niveau.


    • Sollten die Saudis in Bedrängnis geraten, ist ein Endpreis von 75 $/Barrel Ende 2005 möglich. Bei der Relation Öl/Gold bedeutet dies eine Verdoppelung des Goldkurses.

    "Nicht-konventionelles" Erdöl

    VON MARTIN KUGLER (Die Presse) 19.02.2005

    In Alternativen zur herkömmlichen Erdöl-Förderung werden hohe Milliardenbeträge gesteckt.

    Wann der Zeitpunkt kommt, dass die weltweite Erdöl- Förderung zurückgehen wird, weiß derzeit niemand - die Internationale Energieagentur (IEA) erwartet den "Peak" irgendwann zwischen 2013 und 2037. Was hingegen schon Tatsache ist: Die Neufunde von Ölfeldern sinken seit den 60er Jahren, seit 20 Jahren wird alljährlich mehr Öl verbraucht als gefunden wird.


    Die Ölkonzerne versuchen deshalb zum einen, mit immer ausgefuchsteren Technologien mehr Öl aus den bekannten Feldern zu fördern - etwa durch Einpressen von Wasser oder CO2. Zum anderen aber gibt es einen Boom bei neuen Herstellungsverfahren für flüssige Treibstoffe: eine Suche nach "nicht-konventionellem Erdöl".


    Eine große Rolle spielt dabei Ölsand, vor allem in Kanada. Dabei sind Kohlenwasserstoffe an Sandkörner gebunden, die in gigantischen Tagbauen abgebaut werden. Aus dem Material wird Bitumen herausgelöst, das dann in Chemiebenzin aufgelöst und "gecrackt" wird - es werden die langkettigen Moleküle also durch Hitze oder Katalysatoren in kleinere Moleküle gespalten. Diese werden dann, wie in einer Raffinerie abgetrennt und durch Hydrieren veredelt.


    Technologische Fortschritte - und natürlich der derzeit hohe Ölpreis von über 45 Dollar je Barrel (à 159 Liter) - haben Ölsand zu einem guten Geschäft gemacht: Die großen Produzenten wie Syncrude oder Suncor entwickeln sich prächtig. Und zwar so prächtig, dass auch Öl-Multis wie Exxon immer mehr auf den Gusto kommen. "Ölsand kann zwar doppelt so viel kosten wie wenn wir in der Nordsee Öl fördern, aber es ist ein sehr gutes Geschäft", sagte Shell-Kanada-Chef Clive Mather der Nachrichtenagentur Bloomberg. Die Produktionskosten liegen zwischen 9,6 und 13,7 Dollar je Barrel Öl. Zum Vergleich: Die billigsten Ölfelder in Saudiarabien liefern Öl zu Kosten von zwei Dollar, die OMV fördert zu rund fünf Dollar.


    Allerdings leidet die Branche noch unter Kinderkrankheiten: Einige Konzerne mussten kürzlich drastische Kostensteigerungen bei neuen Projekten eingestehen. Nichtsdestotrotz gilt Ölsand als Zukunftssektor: Allein in Kanada sind in den nächsten zehn Jahren Investitionen von 36 Mrd. Euro geplant. Und die IEA schätzt, dass 2030 - je nach Szenario - zwischen acht und 39 Prozent des Ölverbrauchs mit Ölsand gedeckt wird.


    Viel schwieriger zu verwirklichen ist ein anderer Weg zur Herstellung flüssiger Treibstoffe: aus Erdgas ("gas to liqid", GTL). Dabei werden die (kleinen) Methan-Moleküle durch teilweise Oxidation in Synthesegas umgewandelt, aus dem langkettige Kohlenwasserstoff-Moleküle hergestellt werden.


    Die Technologie dieses "Synfuels" hat aber noch Probleme: Laut IEA gehen bei der Umwandlung 45 Prozent des Erdgases verloren. Einen wesentlichen Vorteil könnten GTL-Treibstoffe haben: Weil die Zusammensetzung fein gesteuert werden kann, können etwa Auto-Abgase vermindert werden.


    Derzeit gibt es weltweit nur zwei funktionierende GTL-Anlagen. Geplant ist rund ein Dutzend - die größte mit einem Investitionsvolumen von 22 Mrd. Euro in Katar. Die Branche musste aber kürzlich einen herben Rückschlag hinnehmen: BP hat seine Versuche eingestellt - und verkauft das Gas nun wieder lieber unverarbeitet.

    Quelle: diepresse.com

    Silbertaler,


    das mit dem Oelsand,kannste die nächsten 20 Jahre komplett vergessen,das wird überhaupt nix! Es gibt jede Menge Oberflächennahe
    ältere Oellagerstätten,die man sofort als Tagebau betreiben könnte.Selbst mit Heightech sind den Oelagerstätten nur durchschnittlich 40% der Vorkommen förderbar,das heisst,60% des Oels verbleiben in der Lagerstätte.


    Möchte mich an dieser Stelle mal für Dein fleissiges Posten bedanken! ;)



    Schönes WE


    Kalle

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