The John Brimelow Report
Maybe this '99 - but Spring or Summer?
Friday, February 04, 2005
Indian ex-duty premiums: AM $7.86, PM $8.67, with world gold at $415.65 and $416.20. High: ample for legal imports. The rupee weakened slightly today and the Reuters wrap up unprecedentedly attributed this to increased gold demand:
"The rupee ended weaker on Friday as …demand for dollars from gold importers weighed the Indian currency down…(a senior dealer at a foreign bank said): "There was some gold-related dollar demand as gold prices have fallen quite a bit and this also dragged the rupee (down)."
This is quite plausible – gold is India’s second import item after oil – but I have never seen it said before.
Gold’s fall in NY yesterday did elicit some response from TOCOM, albeit not very decisive. Volume jumped 52% to the equivalent of 18,219 Comex lots, and open interest rose the equivalent of 1,083 Comex (to the equivalent of 109,988 Comex). But Mitsubishi says the public was a seller and reports their long slipped very slightly (279 Comex lot equivalent). The active contract was down 11 yen and world gold stood 70c below the NY close at the end. (NY yesterday traded 59,831 contracts – 42% above the estimate. Open interest rose 1,121 lots.)
At the Shanghai Gold Exchange, premiums over world gold have now reached $4.04 -$4.47, with world gold at $415.65 this morning. This could be seen as a comment on the cheapness of $US gold; or as a statement of mounting confidence amongst the Chinese business community that G-7 efforts to curtail the Yuan undervaluation gravy train will fail. (The latter is my interpretation.) Premiums were last here at the bottom of gold’s downswing in May of last year.
The open interest data suggests that at least part of yesterday’s persistent selling pressure was shorting; although stop-loss selling was also detected. Gold’s weakness yesterday was not just a case of the market automatically adjusting to the flow of malign Official Sector comments: there was significant selling, especially in Europe.
This IMF gold sales saga has created an unusual situation amongst commentators. Three significant bullion banks, UBS, Royal Bank of Canada, and HSBC have now published analyses concluding that IMF gold sales (as opposed to market-benign revaluation) are impractical for reasons derived from the IMF Constitution and irrational from the point of view of debt relief. All three are making bullish noises:
UBS:
"We believe that selling gold for debt relief of poor countries makes no sense, as it is neither practicable nor necessary…we expect the market to snap back once revaluation and its implications are accepted by the market."
HSBC:
"…we doubt that anything material has changed in the bullion market to justify such huge swings in the long gold/short dollar positions and look at current price levels as an increasingly attractive buying opportunity"
(HSBC says of this afternoon’s CFTC report:
"had the data been collected at the close of yesterday’s trading rather than Tuesday’s the market could show a net short position for the first time since December 2001."
Remarkable!)
RBC:
"We feel the market has overreacted to Brown’s comments, and that gold is oversold… gold’s current weakness presents a good buying opportunity."
The problem with all this is, as remarked yesterday, extremely painful experience ’96-’98 taught that if the Official Sector is involved, being rational is very dangerous. This is because their objectives may simply not be what a business-oriented mind assumes.
In this respect it is ominous that the apparently casual remarks by US Treasury Under Secretary Taylor that the US was "not convinced of need for IMF Gold Sales" (as the Reuters news flash put it) was countered within half an hour by a UK briefing asserting "UK has G7 majority backing on debt relief".
Something is clearly stirring here.
If it involves gold, the physical market is behaving like summer ’99 (e.g. at the bottom) the noted gold bear, and for that matter the Gartman Letter with its Hedge Fund informants, while enjoying the spectacle, seem disinclined to go short.
JB